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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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WORLDWIDE REPORT ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW REPORTS BEGINNING OF U.S.-JAPAN SDI TALKS

OW161309 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1125 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] A report has come in from Tokyo that U.S.-Japanese working level consultations on the issue of jointly establishing an orbital space base have started at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Representatives of foreign policy departments from both countries, the Japanese Science and Technology Agency, and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration are participating in the consultations. According to Japanese press reports, Tokyo and Washington plan to establish a multipurpose orbital station for long-term use by the middle of the 1990's. There is every reason to presume that this multipurpose station will in reality have one main purpose: It will be used for SDI experiments.

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Official Japanese circles' persistently striving to harness the country to this program and to generally coordinate its political actions with Washington in every possible way is causing growing criticism in the country. For example, it became known today that the Japanese city of Takasaki has been declared a nuclear-free zone. More than a hundred cities and settlements in Japan have been peace, free of nuclear weapons, and more than half of the Japanese people now reside in population centers that have been declared nuclear-free zones by decisions of local governments.

/9274 cso: 5200/1105

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI EXPENDITURES IMPORTANT TO U.S. ECONOMY

PM231005 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Oct 86 p 3

[E. Alekseyev commentary: "The Cost of SDI"]

[Text] The authoritative Senator Edward Kennedy has called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) "a utopia far removed from reality," sharply criticizing the administration, which wrecked the chances of reaching an accord in Reykjavik because of SDI. Others use even more cutting descriptions, calling SDI a "chimera," "mad fantasy," and so forth. Its untenable nature from a military viewpoint has been revealed by Harold Brown, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, and many other Americans competent in military matters.

This is one side of the issue. But there is also another side. Senator E. Kennedy reminds us that the "dubious and extremely expensive" SDI system will be created only "in 10 years' time, if not longer." But if the accords reached in Reykjavik had not been torpedoed, by that time there might be no nuclear weapons left on earth anyway. So what would one then be defending oneself against? Why would SDI be necessary? Where is the logic in this?

The logic here is obvious. "SDI is primarily intended for offensive purposes," Eric Jacobson, the well known physicist from Illinois University, says quite categorically. This is obvious to every intelligent person. Vast means are being spent on SDI and the United States' prestige is being sacrificed for one purpose only—to create an offensive system, strive to fulfill its madedream of military superiority over the Soviet Union by dominating in space, and dictate its will to the whole world.

Washington's neoglobalist ambitions connected with SDI are being earnestly backed up by the U.S. military-industrial complex. In recent years the bosses of the U.S. military-industrial complex have earnestly sought "new ideas" as a source of new profits. And now they have taken a mortal grip on the "space version" of the arms race, considering it to be the most "long-term" and promising.

And it does indeed promise them a great deal. Jack (Kelish), vice president of the consultative firm Systems Planning Corporation, who specializes in military problems, says: "SDI is becoming an increasingly important part of our future. In the last 5 years this program has brought us a vast amount of money and created a real base for expanding our operations."

Indeed. In the last fiscal year 2.75 billion dollars were allocated for SDI and 3.5 billion this year. In President Reagan's home state alone—California—according to figures given by the Federation of American Scientists, since 1984 the Pentagon has concluded SDI contracts with companies to the tune of no less than 3.6 billion dollars. If Congress ever decides to curtail the "Star Wars" program, Jerry (Kinni), vice president of the Sparta Company, frankly admitted to THE WASHINGTON POST, "we will lose half of our business."

Now they are really going for SDI. American experts calculate that the total cost of programs to prepare "Star Wars" will be at least \$1 trillion. And for such phenomenal sums, promising new, fabulous profits, the military business is prepared to commit any crime against its own people and against the whole of mankind.

The U.S. military and industrial complex has concentrated vast power in its hands, is tightly holding onto SDI, and greatly influences the present administration. Nevertheless, it is not omnipotent. The peace-loving forces of the world must proceed from this and step up their struggle against the threat of war even more.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1112 PRAVDA HITS SDI-GAS MASK LINK, U.S. CW POLICY

PM271641 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[K. Georgiyev article: "On SDI and Gas Masks"]

[Text] Any sober-minded person obviously cannot help but ask: What do gas masks have to do with the American "Star Wars" program? But it is a well-known fact that Washington has woven a great many tales to advertise SDI.

This is one of them — comparing a space—based ABM system, whose development [razrabotka] is being carried out within the framework of the SDI program, to a gas mask. U.S. President R. Reagan resorts to this more than original comparison particularly frequently, evidently considering it to be highly successful and persuasive. In his television address to the country the day after the meeting in Reykjavik had ended, telling how he had tried to convince M.S. Gorbachev of the reasonableness and necessity of creating [sozdaniye] a space—based ABM system even if offensive ballistic missiles were totally eliminated, the President said: "I compared this to the fact that we have kept our gas masks even though all the countries of the world have banned toxic gases since World War I."

Let us objectively analyze the meaning of this statement — and we will discover the truth! Leaving aside at present whether one can conceivably compare such incomparable objects as space-based strike weapons and gas masks, we will first examine whether the initial premise regarding the preservation of gas masks is actually correct, despite the fact that the President has said "all the countries of the world have banned toxic gases."

In actual fact, toxic gases -- like other types of chemical weapons -- have unfortunately still not been banned. The 1925 Geneva protocol, which is what the President obviously has in mind, only bans their USE [published in bold face], but stockpiles of these weapons and new production of them are not banned.

It is also not inappropriate to recall that, unlike the Soviet Union and the majority of other states, the United States ratified the 1925 Geneva protocol only in 1975, that is, 50 years after its appearance and 30 years after World War II — certainly not after World War I. Meanwhile the United States resorted to the extensive use of chemical warfare during its aggression in Vietnam. Is it surprising, therefore, that people prefer to hold onto their gas masks under these conditions?

If an international convention has still not been concluded which would ban chemical weapons as such and guarantee the elimination of stockpiles, as well as the industrial base for the production of this type of mass destruction weapons — which, incidentally, would make the retention of gas masks pointless — the blame also lies primarily with the United States. The draft of this convention was submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Geneva Disarmament Committee back in 1972. This, as we saw, pushed the United States in the direction of at least ratifying the 1925 Geneva protocol, in an evident wish to "defuse the situation."

However, even after this, for many years the United States has obstructed the drawing up of a convention totally banning and eliminating chemical weapons and, what is more, it is forcing the pace of creating [sozdaniye] new types of these weapons, still more lethal, against which no gas masks could afford any protection. Only under the influence of persistent efforts by the Soviet Union, which has put forward far-reaching proposals in this sphere also, has any improvement been noted at talks on drawing up a convention — quite recent improvement.

Such is the situation with toxic gases and gas masks. As we can see, the very premise on which the equation of SDI and the gas mask is based is false.

The main thing, however, is whether it is at all possible, in any rational sense, to compare a gas mask — with which it would hardly be possible to kill anyone (if one were to hit someone on the head with it, for example) with a colossal space-based system which could be used both as a directly offensive weapon and as a "shield" behind which a first nuclear strike could be carried out.

One must assume that Washington came up with these comparisons from force of circumstance.

/9604 CSO: 5200/1107 SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW TV: SCIENCE ACADEMY'S FROLOV ON U.S. ARMS POLICY, SDI

LD200421 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 19 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video talk by Konstantin Vasilyevich Frolov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] I think that I will be expressing the opinion of not just all the scientists of our country but also of scientists of the whole world and of the whole preogressive mankind if I say that we all utterly, completely, and indivisibly share and support the new, bold initiatives by our party and state on disarmament and on turning our world into a planet free of nuclear weapons. Now, as never before, it's become clear that the Washington administration is evidently counting on Star Wars as an approach that could guarantee the United States military superiority—that for which the United States is evidently constantly striving and in which, as history by now shows, it is not succeeding, which is fortunate for the whole progressive mankind. And so it is now, of course. Most likely it is simply that under the banner of the SDI, or Star Wars, essentially new weapons are being developed which represent a new spiral in the arms race. President Reagan's administration is thus evidently striving to involve us in some form of economic dependence, with us joining the appropriate spiral of the arms race.

But it is obvious to the whole world, and to scientists above all, that today there are no unattainable objectives or some new unknown scientific ideas. The question only amounts to how to treat this problem. If we find courage, will and endurance, and if the peoples of the entire world actively joint the struggle for disarmament, we will evidently not need to take asymmetrical measures. But if the United States goes outside the conditions of laboratory research on new types of weapons under the SDI program, then, of course, the scientists of the Soviet Union will find the same approaches. Of course, these chances will always even out. So, to count today on U.S. military superiority is, of course, a backward view. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has said, new political thinking is necessary in our nuclear age in order to rid our planet of dangerous weapons forever.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1112

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GERASIMOV DENIES SOVIET LASER WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

LD301434 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS) — At a briefing held here today, Gennadiy Gerasimov, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, described as a "dead duck" a report in the West German newspaper BILD and then taken up by the Australian mass media, that the USSR was ahead of the United States on SDI and that, among other things, it had installed strategic defense lasers, one of which was located at Sarochiganak in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the Soviet Union, according to these false reports, is apparently using these lasers militarily and had shot down, or at least put out of action, three American satellites. On 29 October THE WASHINGTON POST carried an article that also mentioned the use by the Soviet Union of antisatellite weapons. It is claimed that over the past 6 months powerful rays of microwaves directed from Soviet territory into outer space, had more than once put American reconnaissance satellites out of action.

If the USSR is ahead of the United States in SDI, the Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman said, why does the United States not agree with our proposal to halt research in this sphere, open monitoring laboratories, and place everything under control so as not to create space strike weapons?

The Soviet Union, Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed, has no laser weapons. And the United States knows this full well, because the USSR has given it explanations in this regard. In Sarochiganak there is an experimental laser device, but this is not a weapon. It can neither bring down nor put out of action satellites, and its purpose is merely to survey space and track targets in space. Thus the West German BILD, U.S. WASHINGTON POST and Australian mass media have spread slander.

Gennadiy Gerasimov then discussed a report in the U.S. WASHINGTON TIMES — a newspaper known for its ties with the present U.S. Administration — which, quoting U.S. intelligence sources, has published fatuous fabrications suggesting that the USSR is intending to open consulates in the Mexican towns of Ensenada and Cuidad Juarez. The paper conjectures that a Soviet consulate in Ensenada would be the ideal base for communications with some Soviet network of agents functioning at numerous military enterprises in California. As far as the consulate at Ciudad Juarez is concerned, it would be very nicely placed to conduct Soviet radio and electronic surveillance on SDI tests carried out at U.S. testing ranges in Fort Bliss and White Sands.

This, said the USSR Foreign Ministry representative, is yet another example of the stoking up of spy mania. By circulating such absurdities, the United States would like to cast a shadow over the development of Soviet-Mexican relations. In fact, the issue of opening the consulates mentioned has not been postulated -- that is, there was no

such issue. It is all a fabrication, from beginning to end, off the top of the head, as the saying goes.

Answering a question concerning the arrest on 27 Octover in San Francisco of a certain Allan John Davis on a charge of spying for the Soviet Union, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: The U.S. FBI continues to play its games. They consist of FBI agents, pretending to be employees of the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco, enticing certain Americans to sell them certain secrets, and then arresting them as "Soviet agents." And this was the case this time. This is the way, he noted, thousands of "Soviet spies" can be found in the United States.

These provocative games, G. Gerasimov stressed, are being used to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria and spy mania in the United States and to discredit Soviet representatives. The Foreign Ministry representative added that none of the employees of the USSR Consulate General in San Francisco had ever met nor had telephone contact with Davis.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1105

USSR'S AGANBEGYAN NOTES ECONOMIC COSTS OF SDI, RESPONSE

AU051043 Vienna Television Service in German 2025 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Otto Hoermann report on a press conference given by Abel Aganbegyan, "adviser to Gorbachev and member of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's delegation to the CSCE Conference," in Vienna on 4 November -- videotaped]

[Text] Abel Aganbegyan is Armenian, thus coming from one of the southern republics of the USSR. He is 54 years old, thus belonging to the generation of the party leader. Asked the rather provocative question whether he, Aganbegyan, is the father of Soviet reform, Aganbegyan answers reservedly:

[Begin Aganbegyan recording in Russian with superimposed German translation] I would love to call myself the father of the reform. In the West people always want to identify everything with one person. Thus the 1965 reform was connected with Professor Liberman. He certainly did much for this reform, but whoever knows the process of decisionmaking in our country and the preparatory work, realizes that first and foremost this is collective work. Nobody can claim to have contributed to the main idea. I am participating in the work to change the economic management mechanisms, but others, too, are working on that. [end recording]

Aganbegyan, the pioneer and representative of a collectivist state, withdraws into the collective -- modest from the human point of view and prudent from the political standpoint.

Aganbegyan belongs to Shevardnadze's immediate Vienna delegation, but the journalists' interest is rather subdued. He is not expected to give any answers concerning human rights, but he does give answers decisive for the Soviet Union's future policy.

Until Gorbachev came to power Aganbegyan had mostly worked in the Siberian Academy of Sciences. Since Siberia is considered the motive force of the Soviet economy, he is, for instance, asked the relevant question whether the Soviet Union is able to endure — from the economic viewpoint — an arms race in space with the United States.

Aganbegyan recalls history and says that very often the Soviet Union's opponents have experienced a contrary effect. Difficult situations have mobilized the people's energy. Although Aganbegyan is a scientist, he is not free of the state-supporting emotions of the Soviet people. Defensive arms are cheaper than offensive weapons. The USSR will find a less expensive response to the U.S. Star Wars, says Aganbegyan. Therefore, this will be economically possible, he states, but thus confirms that the USSR would not be able to keep pace in the U.S. Star Wars arms race.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1105

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SAGDEYEV, KOKOSHIN AUTHOR BOOK ON SDI

PM191325 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 46, 16 Nov 86 p 7

[Vladimir Kyucharyants article: "Space Mirage: View from the Earth. Is the SDI 'Shield' Really Impenetrable?"; capitalized passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] It took seven [as published] days, according to the Bible, to create the world. It is absolutely unknown when this happened.

It took just one day to create a myth. And this date is known perfectly well — March 23, 1983 — when the US President announced the Star Wars programme. And since that day the world is being dragged into a new epoch — that of the Great Myth of SDI — an impenetrable space shield called upon to safeguard America against Russian missiles, and the whole of humankind — against the nuclear threat. The space-based antiballistic-missile system — "an ideal technical solution" — in Reagan's words, will contribute in the best possible way to terminating the arms race and even to nuclear disarmament.

However, the result of the meeting in Iceland has shown that in reality Washington has alloted an opposite role to SDI — that of a barrier on the road to disarmament. As to the theory about the SDI being an "impenetrable" shield, that has already been disproved by specialists who have taken a more close look at it.

If SDI Were a Soviet Idea...[subhead]

After Reykjavik it has become clear that the USSR and the USA can reach agreement on the most complicated questions of disarmament. The package of Soviet proposals, no matter how the West may try to interpret it now, offers a realistic way towards a nuclear-free future. Instead of an "ideal technical solution" with incalculable question marks, a political solution is proposed: not to wait, banking on SDI and Counter-SDI, till the end of the century.

Or in general, waiting till the End.

Scientists in both the USA and the USSR, as in many other countries, having studied the contents of the programme for "strategic defence", have arrived at this basic conclusion: the attempt to translate SDI into reality will considerably multiply the danger of nuclear conflict. In particular, this point of view is thoroughly substantiated in a book recently published by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat and entitled "Space Weapons: A Security Dilemma."

The Pharisaism of the White House's assurances about the peace-making mission of a space-based ABM system becomes obvious if one asks a question: What would they say in America if the SDI were a Soviet invention?

On this sore Caspar Weinberger said without beating about the bush that he could not imagine a more destabilizing factor for the world than the Soviet having mastered a perfect and dependable defence against ballistic missiles before America.

This admission by the US secretary of defense about the destabilizing and destructive nature of the influence of space weapons on the international climate needs no comment. However, comment is needed in relation to the myth itself about the "impenetrability" of the "space shield".

What Is an "Asymmetrical Reply"? [subhead]

Why do we say that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative destabilizes the world situation and creates a fundamentally new strategic situation?

First and foremost, because, while not providing an absolutely reliable defence against a massive first strike (according to the most optimistic assessments of experts who support SDI, the reliability of the space-based ABM system does not rise above 80-90 per cent), this system can produce the most dangerous/ILLUSION ABOUT A RETALIATORY STRIKE. AND HENCE AN ILLUSION ABOUT DELIVERING THE FIRST STRIKE WITH IMPUNITY/.

Therein lies the provocative substance of the offensive Strategic Defense Initiative, undermining an already precarious world balancing over a precipice and leading into a world of catastrophic fortuities and unpredictability.

Does all of this mean that we are scared by SDI? Mikhail Gorbachev put it unambiguously in Reykjavik: There will be an answer to SDI - asymmetrical, but it will be given. Moreover, we shall not have to sacrifice much.

In the book "Space Weapons: A Security Dilemma," edited by USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician R. Sagdeyev, director of the Institute of Space Research, and Professor A. Koboshin, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, one of the key chapters is devoted to the choice of optimal variants of a response to the deployment of a space antiballistic-missile defence system by the United States.

The book stresses that the principal task of the necessary countermeasures or measures of counteraction to space strike weapons is to preserve, /UNDER ANY/ variant of nuclear attack, the ability to deliver upon the aggressor /UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE IN A RETALIATORY STRIKE./

What are these likely counter-measures and means of counteraction?

In the opinion of experts from the Committee of Soviet Scientists, the most vulnerable elements of SDI are the following:

Space communications which can be disrupted, blocked or even totally disabled.

Combat control systems, where the main targets are the central control computers, which will be deployed in a limited quantity owing to their complexity and high cost;

Different energy fuels and energy systems (nuclear power plants, explosives, fuel and combustibles).

In the character of their effect the return measures taken to neutralize the multilayer system of space anti-ballistic-missile defence may be/PASSIVE/ or /ACTIVE./ Moreover, they are easily realizable, relatively cheap and highly effective.

What are the measures included, for instance, in the category of passive ones?

As we all know, one of the cardinal ideas of an echeloned space defence is the destruction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM) on the active leg of their flight. Immediately after re-entry from the atmosphere the missile is hit with a chemical or X-ray laser mounted on a space platform. However, calculations indicate that the /SURVIVABILITY OF IBMS CAN BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED by REDUCING THE DURATION OF the ACTIVE LEG OF THEIR FLIGHT TRAJECTORY./ According to experts' opinion, it can be compressed into 40 seconds and completed at altitudes not exceeding 80 km. This will create additional difficulties for the detection, tracking and guidance systems and, naturally, lower the effectiveness of SDI.

All other methods of opposition to the ABM system on the active trajectory leg boil down to measures hampering the targeting of anti-missile means and to reinforcing the protection of the rocket body.

For instance, the laser's guidance system locates the missile's position relative to the flame of its engine by infrared radiation.

Consequently, it is not so difficult to "mislead" a laser by compounding its targeting capacity and fixation on the rocket body. It is enough to alter the configuration and intensity of the flame by adding different additives to the rocket propellant.

The methods of protecting missiles against laser beam are also numerous. It is possible for example, to reinforce the body with reflective or absorbing coatings or to impart to the missile rotary motion around its own longitudinal axis, which hampers fixation of the laser beam on one point of the body. It is possible to effect the launching of sham targets, and many other things. In short, enhancing the survivability of ballistic missiles on this leg will greatly compound their interception by space-based systems on all subsequent phases of their flight, where, incidentally, a whole spectrum of passive countermeasures is also possible.

For instance, in the event of a massive strike, the number of warheads and sham targets accompanying them may reach several tens of thousands. Such being the case, the detection system will be hopelessly mixed up and most warheads, which can be manoeuvrable and high-speed, will reach their targets.

One of the highly effective passive countermeasures, neutralizing the work of the sensors of the space antiballistic-missile system, is the use of various means for creating electronic jamming. In short, the spectrum of passive countermeasures alone is vary broad indeed.

Action Stations in Orbits - Excellent Targets [subhead]

The fundamental work by the scientists and experts from the Committee of Soviet Scientists is also examining the active means for neutralizing and hitting a large-scale antiballistic-missile system.

Here are but some of them.

/VARIOUSLY-BASED SMALL MISSILES/ Their principal target can be a system of space action stations intended to hit strategic ballistic missiles.

/"SPACE MINES"/ - satellites put into orbits close to those of the enemy's action stations. Exploded on command from the Earth, they can simultaneously disable a great many stations.

/LAND-BASED HIGH-CAPACITY LASERS/ intended to suppress space-based action stations.

/"SPACE SHRAPNEL"/ - cloud of small objects moving at high speed in the orbits of action stations. This is a highly effective means of opposition because even a 30-gram particle of the "cloud", moving at a speed of 15 km/sec, can pierce an up to 15-cm-thick protective steel screen (or coating) around the station. This is not to mention such vulnerable spots of laser action stations as energy systems, fuel tanks and reflective mirrors.

Cheaper More Reliable More Stable [subhead]

Even a brief review of the possible means and methods for neutralizing and suppressing the pseudo-impenetrable "space shield" suggests an obvious conclusion: the opposing side should not necessarily set a task of totally destroying it. It is enough to weaken this antimissile defence by affecting its more vulnerable elements to preserve the power of a /RETALIATORY/ strike which is unacceptable for the enemy. The structure of antimissile defences in space is seen by SDI advocates as sufficiently stable because they proceed from the false premise about the independent functioning of the layers comprising the space antimissile complex and fail to take into account the entire diversity of possible countermeasures. In reality, however, the different layers of the space ABM system are interdependent at least because they draw on the common system of battle control. This is what constitutes the SDI programme's "Achilles' heel" and, by affecting it, it is possible to drastically lower the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

The conclusion is unambiguous: the combinations of active and passive means of opposition virtually offset the danger of military-strategic parity being upset by the deployment of SDI. And this "asymmetrical reply" is considerably cheaper - a mere several per cent of the cost of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Moreover, the means of opposition are considerably less vulnerable in their totality and by far more stable and reliable than SDI.

The aggressive nature of the illusory space shield is now clear to practically everyone: it is a desire to achieve military superiority, an intention to ensure one's own security. Lastly, what is it if not an attempt to somehow find the means of fighting nuclear war and winning it?

So that all of the President's assurances that the SDI is called upon to do away with the nuclear threat are nonsense!

/9274 CSO: 5200/1105

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: JAPANESE 'BROAD MASSES' OPPOSED TO SDI PARTICIPATION

OW131432 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Pavel Potapov Dispatch]

[Text] Broad masses of people in Japan are opposed to their country's participation in the U.S. Star Wars plan. Our Tokyo correspondent Pavel Potapov has filed the following report:

Since the Cabinet adopted the decision on Japan's participation in the SDI program on 9 September, the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] has markedly intensified a propaganda campaign to justify this decision. The LDP asserts that Japan's participation in the SDI program does not conflict with the Diet resolution calling for peaceful use of space, and that the decision of the government and the LDP enjoys extensive support among the people.

Facts, however, significantly contradict the LDP's assertion. This observation is supported by recent developments. The government decision had the effect of adding fuel to the anti-SDI movement that had been gathering strength. Presently, not only opposition parties and antiwar groups but many scientists and public figures as well are opposing the dangerous LDP policy.

In the past several weeks, more than 6,000 people including scientists and engineers of major science and technology organizations signed resolutions and appeals against Japan's participation in the SDI plan. This reporter met the other day Mr Minoru Kitamura, a leading member of the Scientists Council of Japan. He had this to say: First of all, it should be pointed out that Japanese scientists believe that their research should be one for peace. The SDI plan seeks to use Japanese scientific and technological capabilities for military purposes. It extends nuclear arms race to space. We, therefore, are opposed to the U.S. strategical concept itself as well as to Japan's participation in the SDI plan. There are other reasons, too, for our decision to rise in a struggle against the Star Wars plan. The United States is attempting to obtain and monopolize Japanese technologies, high technologies in the electronics area in particular, within the framework of the SDI plan. As a result, Japan will be unable to make use of the results of research. This will certainly be a heavy blow to Japanese science organizations. The day after the government announced its decision on the participation in the SDI program, we issued a statement protesting the decision, noting that Japan's participation is not in the interest of our country which experienced the horror of nuclear arms.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1105

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV TO ISSYK-KUL FORUM ON REYKJAVIK, NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN

PMO61147 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 86 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed "transcript of M.S. Gorbachev's conversation with participants in the 'Issyk-kul Forum'": "The Times Demand New Thinking"--first two paragraphs are LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Excerpts] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met on 20 October 1986 a group of world cultural figures who were in the Soviet Union at the invitation of writer Chingiz Aytmatov. The guests spent several days in Kirghizia, where they exchanged opinions on the most typical questions of modern times. This meeting was given the name "Issyk-kul Forum." Taking part in the meeting were: Turkish writer Yashar Kemal; Narayan Menon, president of the Indian Academy of Music and Drama; Cuban prose writer Lisandro Otero; Alexander King, president of the Club of Rome; U.S. playwright Arthur Miller; his wife, painter Inga Miller; Turkish composer Omer Livanelli; U.S. prose writer James Baldwin; French writer and Novel prize winner Claude Simon; Federico Mayor, Spanish public figure and literary worker; Augusto Forti, member of the UNESCO Secretariat; U.S. futurologist Alvin Toffler; his wife, philosopher Heidi Toffler; British writer, actor, and director Peter Ustinov; Ethiopian painter Afework Tekle; and U.S. actor David Baldwin.

We publish a transcript of M.S. Gorbachev's conversation with the participants in the "Issyk-kul Forum."

What will happen if we fail to avert the nuclear threat hanging over our pan-human home? Were this to happen, there would no longer be any opportunity to correct mistakes. Now we really are at a critical state of history, when it is obvious that the fatal danger can be eliminated only through joint efforts.

In his time V.I. Lenin expressed an immensely profound idea: It concerned the fact that the interests of social development and pan-human values take priority over the interests of any particular class. Today, in the nuclear missile age, the significance of this idea can be felt particularly keenly. It is much to be desired that the thesis of the priority of the world's pan-human values over all others to which different people may be committed be also unmderstood and accepted in the other part of the world.

It is necessary to speak out at the top of our voices about the worries of our age, to seek together the necessary solutions for the sake of the peaceful present and future, and to awaken each and every one's conscience and responsibility for the fate of peace. It is necessary to preserve civilization — despite all its difficulties and contradictions — for the sake of life, for the sake of man. As long as mankind survives, it will somehow tackle the contradictions.

This is why the paramount task is to preserve this world that may be unique in the entire universe. I do not counterpose the importance of the struggle against the nuclear threat to the concerns caused by ecology, the consequences of the scientific and technical revolution, and information problems.

Like you, I also share the opinion that we live in a world that is far from perfect. In any case, one cannot say that we live in a perfect world. [paragraph continues]

But I am convinced that it could be brought closer to perfection. And I do believe that intellectual potential and, as you said, scientific discoveries and technology — everything — can be made to serve the attainment of this goal. Before all else, however, it is incumbent upon us to save the world from the threat of nuclear destruction.

The common trepidation of people in the world with regard to the nuclear threat is what unites us all now, regardless of where we live, what ideology we follow, or what faith we confess. Let us leave this a matter of personal choice. But I do think that there is no task more important than becoming aware of reality, of the main reality of the nuclear missile age. These worries were at the focus of attention at the "Issyk-kul Forum," and they were reflected in the declaration it adopted, expressing the desire shared by all its participants to develop the forum's ideas and move forward, rallying increasingly broad circles of today's intelligentsia, the progressive intelligentsia which is concerned with the problems of today's world. In my view, this is a major matter. Every politician has his opportunities, and every representative of art has his own, no less opportunities in his own sphere.

What can cultural figures set in opposition to the forces nudging mankind toward catastrophe? Similar problems greatly perturbed Leo Tolstoy on the eve of World War I. And this is applicable to our age. That 80-year old patriarch of world literature sensed the approaching war. He said that those for whom war was profitable held in their hands money by the billion and troops by the million. The writer, however, held in his hand just a single, but powerful weapon — the truth. And this provides sufficient ground to say: The struggle is not hopeless!

The "Issyk-kul Forum" is a great argument in confirmation of what the new thinking yields. We perceive new shoots in the political field, we perceive these shoots on the cultural front, and this is most encouraging.

Almost everyone here spoke about the fact that new thinking is necessary for acquiring a proper awareness of today's realities. On this basis, we went to Reykjavik with proposals that have never before been submitted by the Soviet Union. Even so, there was a shortage of this new thinking in Reykjavik. I posed the question there as follows: We have not come to present demands and ultimatums, but have brought along proposals, far-reaching proposals, expecting the same from the U.S. President. Much has already been said about Reykjavik. That was no failure, it does not signify hopelessness, and we moved quite far ahead. That meeting showed that it is possible to reach agreements that could mark the beginning of the liquidation of nuclear weapons. The program of new proposals submitted by the USSR does not close, but opens the door for a quest for mutually acceptable solutions. It offers a realistic opportunity to break the deadlock. But the meeting showed at the same time that we have to overcome considerable difficulties along the path to agreements.

M.S., One of the main lessons of Reykjavik is that the new political thinking corresponding with the realities of the nuclear age is an indispensable condition for overcoming the crisis situation in which mankind has found itself at the close of the 20th century. Profound changes are needed in the political thinking of the entire human community. Of course, propaganda, the interests of various groups and groupings, elections, and so on have now interfered greatly with the assimilation of Reykjavik's results in the United States. There is nothing to be done about it. But the elections will pass, the problems will remain, and thought must be given to the quest for ways to solve them.

/8309 CSO: 5200/1097

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: U.S. REYKJAVIK STANCE SLOWS ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS

PM271547 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Oct 86 First Edition p 1

[Gennadiy Shishkin "International Review": "Washington's Metamorphoses"]

[Text] In his speech on Soviet television on 22 October M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, dealing with the stance taken by Western politicians since the Reykjavik meeting, stressed: "How much talk there has been that it is necessary to get rid of the nuclear nightmare and how much easier it would be to breathe in a nuclear-free world if only the USSR and the United States broke the deadlock on the problem! But it only takes a ray of hope to appear and many of those who just yesterday cursed nuclear weapons and swore their commitment to the idea of a nuclear-free world run for cover." The prime example of this "running for cover" is provided by representatives of the U.S. Administration. Astonishing, or more accurately, unscrupulous metamorphoses are now occurring in Washington. Their purpose is to pass off black for white and vice versa, and the object of such transformations is the results of the meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders in Reykjavik.

We know from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's press conference immediately after the Reykjavik meeting and from his television speeches on 14 and 22 October that thanks to the Soviet side's persistence and boldness the USSR and U.S. leaders came really close to reaching agreement on a radical reduction and, subsequently, the complete elimination of nuclear arms—both strategic and medium—range. We also know, unfortunately, that it did not prove possible to embody these accords in binding decisions. The sole reason for this was the U.S. Administration's stubborn reluctance to renounce the transfer of the arms race to space, that is, to renounce its dangerous and adventurist "Star Wars" plan.

The U.S. President proved incapable of making this obvious and sensible step, of resolving the disarmament problem on a large scale and moving toward the Soviet side so as to give real impetus to the Geneva talks. Thereby he missed a historic opportunity to serve the ideal of peace not in words but in deeds.

Immediately after the Reykjavik meeting the U.S. delegation sounded the funeral knell. All of us who were there well recall the U.S. press conference and the dispirited and confused Secretary of State G. Shultz who, in a trembling voice, announced that the Soviet-U.S. meeting had ended in disappointment.

All that happened on the Sunday. We moved on to Tuesday. Shultz had already had time to complete a lightning trip to Brussels to inform America's NATO allies about what had happened in Reykjavik. In Washington by that time there had been a 180-degree turn in the administration's assessment of the Soviet-U.S. meeting's results and a grandiose propaganda show was staged involving the most high-ranking White House representatives. Two speeches in one day by Reagan, five speeches by Shultz.... Poindexter, Regan, Buchanan, and Perle besieged journalists, forcing their speeches on them. All these speeches in their different forms voiced one idea, which was expressed by R. Reagan on Monday: that the meeting in Reykjavik represented major progress which must be continued.

It is not hard to guess why that 180-degree turn took place. Shultz' trip to Brussels showed the Europeans' indignation primarily at the fact that through the U.S. side's fault no accord had been reached in Reykjavik on medium-range arms in Europe. In the United States itself it is believed, not without justification, that the more tense relations between the USSR and the United States are, the weaker the administration's domestic political position is. This is particularly dangerous now, on the eve of the mid-term congressional elections and in the context of the next presidential elections in 1988.

It is also obvious that the discussion of the Reykjavik results in the Unites States is leading to a noticeable polarization of political forces and to an intensification of the debates in the country on questions of security, armed forces building, and related issues. Within opposition liberal democratic circles there is an increasing demand to step up the opposition to the Pentagon's military programs. At the other end of the spectrum the rightwing forces are becoming more active. They are congratulating the President on not "letting himself be trapped" into involving the United States in implementing the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament. Clearly prompted by the military-industrial complex, the idea is taking shape that since the Soviet Union attaches such great significance to "Star Wars" it must be valuable and thus must be accelerated.

However, the prevalent mood in the United States in favor of actively seeking ways to disarmament and the pressure from the European allies are prompting the Washington administration to maneuver and seek ways out of the impasse in which it has found itself. Hence Washington's metamorphoses, the 180-degree propaganda turn, and the many speeches and interviews by leading White House figures who, according to the evidence of administration representatives themselves, are aiming to pin the blame for the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting on the Soviet side.

The U.S. President and his entourage are shamelessly trying to take the main credit for all the positive things that were done in Reykjavik. It is being persistently dinned in the public that it was the United States rather than the Soviet Union which put forward a concrete program for eliminating nuclear weapons. Admittedly, however, whenever the White House issues such promising statements to the public a familiar howl goes up from the ranks of the conservatives and extremists and the administration has to reveal its true hand.

That is how the White House's enforced admissions surface. What, for example, is the significance of the following statement by the president's national security assistant, Poindexter: "In January 1986 M.S. Gorbachev proposed that the two sides agree to carry out a three-stage plan envisaging the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. We did not agree to that then and we do not agree to it now, because we believe that before we can examine the question of eliminating all nuclear weapons we must establish a balance of conventional forces and we must see changes in the political climate in the Soviet Union." This is an old theme. But there is no imbalance in conventional armaments between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This fact was publicly acknowledged after Reykjavik by President R. Reagan and Secretary of State G. Shultz. The point lies elsewhere.

Washington clearly does not want to rid the world of the nuclear threat. Hiding behind talk about a readiness to "go the extra mile toward each other for the sake of peace," Washington is feverishly devising ways to destroy the package of constructive solutions placed on the negotiating table in Reykjavik by the Soviet Union. The aim behind this is no secret either. Those people across the ocean would like to salvage from the package the things that suit the Pentagon and leave aside everything which prevents the United States from achieving unilateral military superiority over the Soviet Union. Poindexter again, trying to pacify the U.S. generals, says that the 50 percent reduction in the nuclear triad will be carried out only in the first 5-year stage and that in the second stage to 1996 the United States intends to eliminate only ballistic missiles whereas the bombers with cruise missiles, in which the United States has a clear superiority will be left untouched.

It is now clearer than ever before that the U.S. Administration's actions are dictated primarily by the military-industrial complex' selfish interest in continuing the arms race and not by U.S. national interests. And no matter how sophisticated the White House's use of peace-making phraseology now, it is clear that progress toward disarmament is being slowed down by Washington, not Moscow.

Whether or not they like it in the U.S. capital, the meeting in Reykjavik was an important event in international life. Thanks to it, a qualitatively new situation has been created and the struggle for nuclear disarmament has risen to a higher level from which all people of goodwill intend to go on increasing their efforts aimed at achieving radical reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

/8309

cso: 5200/1097

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS COMPLAINS OF U.S. SALT, ARM TREATY VIOLATIONS

LD042358 Moscow TASS in English 2346 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

The record of the current U.S. Administration in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction demonstrates that in the past six years Washington formally complied with the earlier agreements only for as long as the Pentagon top brass hoped to conceal from the world public instances of U.S. violation of its comitments under the treaties.

But as soon as it became impossible to conceal U.S. violations Washington officially renounced the corresponding treaty.

Washington followed precisely that script in May 1986 having derailed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. It proved too difficult to conceal from the public plans to go beyond the limits on the deployment of air-based cruise missiles.

However, before that the Pentagon had violated SALT-2 as well, specifically, by starting the development of two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, Midgetman and MX, and by ignoring the SALT articles banning the deliberate camouflage of the strategic systems.

This kind of approach of the U.S. Administration to international treaties brought it the notorious reputation of an unreliable partner in the disarmament talks and seriously undermined the trust of other countries in the U.S.

Since March 1983 when President Ronald Reagan announced his "Star Wars" plan U.S. violations began to assume a crying character.

The plan is in contradiction with virtually all basic provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty).

The ABM treaty sealed reliably a very dangerous and expensive channel of the race in anti-ballistic missile weapons in space, prohibited the transfer of ABM systems or their components to other states or their deployment outside the national territory, and put up other stout barriers in the way of preparations for war.

The Pentagon has already embarked on the practical implementation of the "Star Wars" program by carrying out intensive work to develop mobile ABM radars, by deploying multiple warheads for interceptor missiles, and by using Pave Paws radars for ABM radar coverage of a greater part of the U.S. territory.

The Pentagon is violating the ABM Treaty by testing Minuteman ballistic missiles with a view to giving them capabilities of interceptor missiles.

During the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva the sides pledged to prevent an arms race in space.

However, Washington, approach to that accord was irresponsible, and it continued to carry out intensively its program for turning near-earth space into a site for deploying strike arms.

The U.S. Administration is evidently working to remove whatever barriers remain in the way of the arms race. The U.S. side wants to have a free hand in implementing its illusory plans for achieving military superiority.

This is the reason why the United States is now violating its commitments under the treaties so unabashedly.

The U.S. Administration embarked on a dangerous road of weakening the security of its own country and increasing the threat of a nuclear war which can have disastrous consequences for all peoples on this planet, the American people included.

/8309 CSO: 5200/1097 U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: COMMENTARY ON REYKJAVIK, ARMS ISSUES EFFECT ON U.S. ELECTIONS
'Top Priority' Program

LD081138 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 8 Nov 86

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada]

[Excerpt] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority". With me on the panel as usual are Doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's USA and Canada Studies Institute, and although probably we'll look at this particular issue in greater deal in one of our next, in one of our future programs, I would like you to give at least a brief reaction to the midterm elections in the United States which saw undoubtedly a victory for the Democrats and what would have to be called a blow struck against the Administration. Dr Bogdanov?

[Bodganov] Yes, my point is that, I would prefer to talk about that at length maybe some other time, maybe we will devote a special, you know, time to share our views with our American listeners over there, but my first reaction of course is, is of taking into account a very major fact, of the shift and change in the American public opinion. That's what I'm taking as a very serious, you know, sign on the American political scene. And I would like to let out a secret to our American listeners over there. Just one day before the elections we at our place gathered a group of very knowledgeable experts and we have made a blitz, if you like, a blitz analysis. What do we expect? And we have a rather, you know, division of opinions; myself and my friend Dr Plekhanov, we were on the side of people who believed in Democratic victory, not because we are (?telling) it now but really as a student of America, students of American political, you know, domestic politics, we were of very strong opinion that the Senate will be captured by Democrats.

[Pozner] OK. So your view is that these elections, without going in to further detail, these elections speak of an important change in the minds of the average American.

[Bogdanov] Let me put it like that: It's a major shift in the American public...

[Pozner, interrupting] OK, Dr Plekhanov, what would you say, as briefly as possible?

[Plekhanov] I think that this is a cyclical phenomenom. Usually the party in power, after 6 years in power, loses control of the U.S. Congress. Now, of course Republicans never actually gained control of the House of Representatives, but they did have control of the Senate for 6 years, and they've now lost it, which was very predictable. I think an important aspect of the election is that Mr Reagan chose to make Star Wars the issue in a number of important states, and as far as I know about the results, almost nowhere that worked. In fact it may have had the opposite effect. So, if, to the extent that a majority of American voters are on the negative side of that issue.

[Pozner] Well that's a very interesting point, that you draw that conclusion, when you consider that shortly after Reykjavik there were polls conducted, as you know, in the United States that seemed to indicate that up to three-quarters of the population supported SDI, and if you're right, Dr Plekhanov, then when you say that SDI was an issue and it was an issue, because clearly President Reagan made it an issue during the campaign, and if you're saying that not only did that issue not work but it backfired...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] May have backfired.

[Pozner]...may have backfired, then those polls were clearly not accurate, perhaps because of the way the questions were asked or for whatever other reasons.

[Bogdanov] Ah, you know, my point is that the questions, first of all the questions were wrong.

[Pozner] Well, that's what I said.

[Bogdanov] Yes, then the major problem was that the Americans, the American public opinion was not informed what the President has rejected [as heard].

[Pozner] In other words, they were not told what the Soviet offer was?

[Bogdanov] Exactly, they were not told what the Soviet offer was. And I'm sure, I'm absolutely positive, that if Americans knew what all, what has discussed in Reykjavik, what Gorbavhev has thrown on the table, their answer would be very much different. That's my point.

[Pozner] Are you saying that they might have learned more between at the end of Reykjavik and the elections and that because of what they learned they were not so much supportive of SDI as they might have been? Is that what you're saying?

[Plekhanov] Let me say a couple of words on that. I think that there was a negative reaction to the appearance of the President, of President Reagan, either not being really much to the point as to what went on in Reykjavik, not really very well informed or maybe forgetting what he had agreed to at the talks with Mr Gorbachev, or simply trying to cover something up. I think the maneuverings, the various versions which were put forward by the Administration in the weeks after Reykjavik, I think have made a negative impact on American public opinion. But the important thing is that the election was decided not so much by foreign policy but by economic, social issues; by personalities. I think we should not overestimate the impact of foreign policy issues on this election.

[Bogdanov] Sergey, let me disagree with you. You know, I agree with you basically that foreign policy issues were not on the core of the campaign. But the Administration and the President himself were trying to make foreign policy issues main issues of the campaign, and my impression was that they were trying to cover all their difficulties with economy, with the industrial growth rate and with everything, you know, by foreign policy issues. Trying to pose as big winners in the eyes of the electorate. In that sense I do not agree with you that they were not upfront. They were, but the electorate didn't accept the Administration's position.

[Pozner] Thank you, both of you. We've said that we will examine the elections in greater deal in another program. We've used up about half of our time already. [passage omitted]

Posner Comments Further

LD071133 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 6 Nov 86

[Text] The results of the midterm elections in the United States, in which the Democrats retained their control of the House of Representatives and won a majority in the Senate, are widely discussed in the world (?press). Nikolay Borin has asked the political observer Vladimir Posner (?for an assessment of the Soviet) reaction to the election results:

[Posner] I'd say first of all that the Soviet reaction has been very cautious. There is a general feeling that evidently President Reagan has been dealt a serious blow. I have not yet heard any kind of majority opinion here as to the reasons for this, although there seems to be a general, I would say, understanding of a link at this point between the way the President tried to sell the Republican candidates on the idea of SDI and telling the voters that by voting for candidates who supported SDI they were (?voting for President Reagan). And that seems to have backfired. (?I think) the Soviet assessment has been one of great caution [words indistinct].

[Borin] (?So you) share the opinion of (?influential) [words indistinct] which ways that the Democrats are likely to use their new strength to (?support Reagan's Star Wars program).

[Posner] Again, I would [words indistinct]. I don't think that the Democrats are a party are against SDI. Among the Democrats you have your conservative element and you have your more liberal element; you have those who have been consistently against SDI and you have quite a strong segment that has been pro-SDI. [passage indistinct]

Gradually, as the American people have begun to learn that SDI was the major if not the only roadblock along the road to an historically important (?agreement) that would bring about nuclear disarmament [words indistinct].

[Borin] [Words indistinct] by American polls after Reykjavik that supposedly three-quarters of the American population support SDI?

[Posner] I have a strong feeling that that is not the case. My feeling is that the questions were asked in a way that brought about this kind of reaction. (?I'm almost certain) people were asked if they thought that some kind of detente against nuclear missiles was a good thing, and of course most people would say yes. But had they been asked, [words indistinct] Reykjavik, had they been asked: Would you support limiting SDI to the confines of a laboratory for 10 years in exchange for the total abolition [words indistinct] of all Soviet and American offensive nuclear strategic weapons, I'm certain that more than 75 percent, 90 percent of the people would have said yes.

So, when we get back to the Democrats, the Democrats now in power are going to look to this [word indistinct], that is to say to the popular view, and in one way or another reflect that view, so I do think that President Reagan is going to run into more trouble with SDI than he has (?before), but it would not be right to say the Democrats are [words indistinct], that would be a simplification.

[Borin] Vladimir, do you think the Democrats really want to change the (?course) of United States foreign policy, or has American society become [words indistinct] imperial privileges?

[Posner] That's an interesting question. I do think that America has become very conservative, there's no doubt about that. (?If you look) over the past 10 years or so you'll see the pendulum swinging to the right and of course the fact that President Reagan was elected in 1980 and reelected in 1984 is a confirmation of that. On the other hand we cannot and should not forget where America comes from, it (?started off) from a very liberal beginning. [passage indistinct]

Now do the Democrats want to change the course of foreign policy? Some do. (?Now this) is not necessarily a (?better way). They may want to change it in a way that is not good (at all). But generally speaking I would say that the Democrats are less inclined to [word indistinct] a very aggressive foreign policy in the sense of intervention in Latin America [words indistinct], run counter to the very, very conservative, right-wing policies that we've seen coming out of the White House over the past (?years). And again, as far as American society goes, while it is now quite conservative, I don't believe that we should write it off and say forget about America, [words indistinct]. I think it will come back.

[Borin] Thank you, Vladimir Posner.

[Posner] Thank you.

PRAVDA Views Impact on SDI

PM101222 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[T. Kolesnichenko article: "Sobering Up"]

[Text] In the U.S. political arena, silence has fallen, as if after a noisy carnival. Portraits of candidates from the rival parties still smile out of the store windows and brash election slogans still cover the house fronts, but the slanting November rain is already washing them under the feet of passers-by, who trample them indifferently into the fall slush. Who needs yesterday's promises? People hardly believe them even before the elections, and they forget them the day after the votes have been counted...

However, the election results are being thoroughly discussed and evaluated. They have moved, so to speak, from the street booths to the computer laboratories and the "analysts'" offices, where the total sum of votes is broken down by states, districts, and counties in order once again to recreate the overall picture of the countrywide vote.

This will take not days, but weeks. But it is already clear that this year's elections to the U.S. Congress were an important milestone in the country's history. Their main peculiarity is that the Republicans' and Democrats' election campaign was not conducted solely or mainly around the traditional domestic problems. This time the struggle was focused on the administration's foreign policy, and above all the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). That is not surprising. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik was a "moment of truth" which showed who is who and what is what. Even the most political Americans wanted to know why a unique opportunity was wasted in Reykjavik, although the sides were on the threshold of adopting historic decisions in the disarmament sphere, and whether SDI, which was the stumbling block, was really worth renouncing the elimination of nuclear weapons, which threaten to destroy all mankind, including, of course, America itself.

This fact itself determined the Republicans' strategy for the elections. The task set was to use any available means (including outright deception and disinformation) to distort the meaning of the Reykjavik talks and depict the meeting as a "victory for the United States." This applied particularly to SDI, all the more so in that the Democrats, catching the voters' mood, opened precision fire against it. Then the U.S. President himself intervened in the election campaign. Like a real traveling salesman, he traveled around the country (more than 25,000 miles), visiting 23 states and delivering 54 speeches. In every speech the emphasis was on SDI.

It appears that SDI has two "faces." One is turned toward the outside world, above all the Soviet Union. We are assured that SDI is by no means a "Star Wars" program, nor the insertion of new weapons into space, nor, of course, a first-strike weapon. In general, what is so bad about destroying not people, but only ballistic missiles?

But then the President addresses an American audience, and everything falls into place. Now the dark face of the god of war shows through SDI's "defensive" mask. It is strategic might, America's "invulnerability," its position of strength. But I will not make unsubstantiated remarks, let us hear the U.S. President himself.

This, for instance, is a quotation from his election speech in the city of Tampa (Florida): "Florida does not need a senator who doubts the need for SDI (meaning the Democratic Party candidate — T.K.) — an insurance policy in the sphere of security. A few days before I set off for this rally, the liberals in Congress tried to cut SDI appropriations as much as possible. While I was preparing for talks with the Russians, they were trying to eliminate one of the factors which was of prime importance in making (?!) the Russians go to the talks... We have made great progress — despite the fact that meanwhile the liberals were rebelling, wailing, and fighting us — in the matter of renewing and restoring our military might... Permit me to add: Nothing gives me greater pride than the 2 million young men and women who serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. [paragraph continues]

And if we ever have to call on them to put their lives on the line for the sake of America, than they deserve to be provided with the best weapons and equipment that money can buy."

Forgive me this lengthy quotation, but in my view it is worth it, in order to hear from the President's own mouth, at last, that SDI is "the best weapon that money can buy." Especially since this phrase is a word for word repetition of what R. Reagan said earlier, at an election rally in Grand Forks (North Dakota). In general, R. Reagan's rhetoric on the subject of SDI does not sparkle with variety. Here is what he said in Baltimore (Maryland) on 15 October: "SDI is an insurance policy for America that the Russians will start observing the arms control accords they have agreed to. SDI was one of the main reasons which prompted the Russians to go to the summit meeting, and is one of the main reasons why they will go there again.

"SDI is the key to peace. Don't let the liberals in Congress give it up."

All these propagandist invocations, it seemed to the White House, were falling on well prepared ground. Public opinion polls carried out before Reykjavik showed that some 70 percent of Americans consider SDI a "good idea." Apart from "invulnerability." as has been instilled into the Americans, SDI will lead to an economic boom for America and will virtually eliminate unemployment. Even in the first days after Reykjavik support for SDI in similar polls was very weighty.

So why did a sobering-up tendency follow, why did the elections, which the President himself had practically turned into a referendum on his policy, and first and foremost on SDI, bring the Republics defeat and put the Democrats in front? There are a number of reasons for this, it seems to me.

First, the "echo of Reykjavik" and above all Moscow's accurate and honest exposition of the facts about what happened at the talks in the Icelandic capital, reached America and revealed the full adsurdity of Washington's propaganda campaign and its distorted logic. To the credit of many Americans, they did not believe the fairy tales that the "position of strength" expressed in SDI "led the Soviet Union to the talks and to concessions."

Second, practical Americans subsequently began to realize that their President had lost, substituting a chimera for the Soviet Union's real proposals on an unprecedented scale, proposals which, unlike SDI, would ensure universal security, including U.S. security. It was this that the Democrats mainly focused attention on. Their potential candidate for the 1988 presidential elections, Senator Hart, made a special statement. "'Star Wars.'" he said, "is now the main obstacle in the path of the most promising arms control agreement ever to have been proposed." He is echoed by THE NEW YORK TIMES, which traditionally supports the Democrats. In connection with SDI, it observes: "The administration's position is dictated by the pursuit of the illusion of possible superiority; it is provocative and is detrimental to America itself, since it leads to the acceleration of the arms race, the cost and danger of which are matched only by its futility."

It may be said that the voters finally saw, too, that the SDI program will not deliver them from their domestic problems, but will only aggravate these, exacerbate the state of the economy, and lower their living standard. Billions of dollars have been flung into the Pentagon's bottomless coffers on the pretext of "strengthening the country's security." But where is that security, has it really been achieved? Now the taxpayers are asked to spend, from their own pockets, not billions, but several trillion dollars on the development of SDI. [paragraph continues]

America is already in debt because of its fantastic budget deficit. So SDI is not an "insurance policy," but a "bankruptcy policy" (as the Democrats have shown), a path leading into an even deeper pit of debt.

Last, but perhaps most important: The Republicans hoped that the President's personal popularity (and this phenomenon exists and is still not fully understood) will make it possible, with his participation, to fool the voters, pass off black as white, and misrepresent the essence of the Reykjavik talks. But this did not happen. In an article "Charm and Facts," published on the eve of the elections, THE WASHINGTON POST, analyzing the President's election rhetoric, comes to the conclusion that he had not succeeded in convincing many voters of anything. "The President's political approach to the summit meeting in Iceland is more appropriate to a movie scenario which rejects the happy ending than to a situation where you are dealing with facts...

"But he knows, or in any case should know, that it is irresponsible to present the results of the summit meeting in a false light, guided by considerations of party advantage."

Even after the elections the same old songs have been heard from the White House. The President repeats that he will pursue a "position of strength" policy, that SDI is one of the main supports of the "bridge to a just peace." It is not impossible that the indoctrination of Americans over SDI will take on an even larger scale. The administration has evidently decided to keep right on. But is that what the Americans want?

By way of conclusion, let us quote R. Byrd, Democratic leader in the Senate. "The President saw the elections as a referendum on his policy, and the election results should be a warning to him." Those who have ears, let them hear!

/9604 CSO: 5200/1104

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV DENIES U.S. 'VICTORY' AT REYKJAVIK

LD091908 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Nov 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Tomas Kolesnichenko]

[Text] The symbol for last week was Great October. The domestic and foreign policy of our party and of the Soviet state are permeated with its revolutionary ideas and behests. The major turning point in the development of our society is also determining the dynamics of the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union. The new thinking is being given concrete embodiment in the new diplomacy of which the Reykjavik meeting is an example.

Whey do we keep on and on going back to Reykjavik? Primarily because the Reykjavik meeting became a sort of touchstone of the policy of the two most major nuclear powers. It showed the whole world who's who. In the Icelandic capital the Soviet Union laid bold, innovative, and concrete plans on the negotiating table for a sharp and balanced reduction in nuclear potentials and subsequently for their elimination in the short term.

What about the United States? Just before the meeting President Reagan promised to go the extra mile to meet the Soviet Union in Reykjavik. However, during the talks the United States showed its inability not just to go this mile or even halfway — they just didn't budge at all, and for the sake of the mythical Strategic Defense Initiative program calculated to achieve world domination it sacrificed real disarmament.

Almost a month has gone by since the Reykjavik meeting but there has not been a single day when the President himself or one of this entourage has not trumpeted the victory, as they put it, achieved by the United States in Reykjavik. However, nothing is being achieved apart from confusion. Indeed even today it is not clear in Washington who said what in Reykjavik on the U.S. side. That concerns the position of the President himself in particular. Either that wasn't what he said or he has been misunderstood. It is high time to evaluate this position. There is no misunderstanding here, neither is there any lack of clarity. What there is definite policy — to go into reverse and fall back from the high level reached by the Reykjavik talks.

This is expressed concretely in the instruction that the U.S. delegations at the Geneva talks has now received from the White House. Once again they contain limits and sublimits, a crossword puzzle of figures as if Reykjavik had never been, as if the issue of actual elimination of nuclear weapons had never been discussed here.

But history cannot be turned back. The gains made in Reykjavik have already gone down firmly in history as an example of the fact that disarmament is realistic and possible. This process is irreversible despite all the efforts made by Washington. Furthermore, it has now become especially clear that it is indeed SDI that is the main brake on disarmament. This is becoming clear to the Americans themselves. This emerged very prominently during the Congressional elections that have just taken place over there.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1097

USSR'S BESSMERTNYKH DISCUSSES POST-REYKJAVIK, ABM TREATY, SDI

AU101341 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP (supplement) in Hungarian 12 Nov 86 p 5

[Interview given by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, to MAGYAR HIRLAP staffer Pal Bokor: "After Reykjavik" -- date and place not given]

[Text] [MAGYAR HIRLAP] What is the future of Soviet-American relations? This seems to be the most important question among those of key importance relating to world political affairs after Reykjavik, and after some other events taking place since then. You were the head of one of the Soviet delegations in Reykjavik. Great expectations were attached to the summit and it was only natural on that particular Sunday that journalists — I am not talking about diplomats — were somewhat disappointed. Since then, however, we have heard nothing from either side other than there is no need for disappointment, Reykjavik was a success after all.

[Bessmertnykh] Such an analysis can only come from Geneva. There we agreed on three things. First: We will endeavor to improve Soviet-American relations. Second: We will speed up the disarmament talks in Geneva. Third: We will not endeavor to obtain military superiority and will try to exclude the possiblity of a nuclear war.

Following the Geneva summit the months of November and December passed. In January the Soviet Union came up with a comprehensive program of disarmament, giving the Americans a chance to join us on the path of action in the most important sphere of relations. This was followed by our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and by the initiative of the socialist countries concerning conventional weapons. This means that for our part, in the spirit of the Geneva agreement, we drew up a broad and concrete program for action, for both the Americans and the whole world to see. We did this in the belief that the continuation of this process would also include a summit meeting.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Mikhail Gorbachev's Washington visit was almost certain.

[Bessmertnykh] The reaction of the American Administration, however, was unfortunately not to our liking. As you know, the main characteristic of our relations is that for us the central issue of the whole system of relations is composed of security questions, where questions of nuclear and space armament represent the axis. I only mention this to indicate that people could judge the situation of Soviet-American relations by the Geneva issue. While economic, humanitarian, cultural, and other issues may indicate the degree of relations with other countries, these issues are only of peripheral value in Soviet-American relations. We cannot judge the level of

relations by the number of ballet performances and exhibitions. For us the most significant index has always been the questions of nuclear and space weapons. If there is progress in this field, then relations are improving and if there is no progress. they are stagnating. Returning to the issue of Geneva, we reached a stalemate. The Americans were performing a ritual dance around their own proposals submitted on 1 November, and we could not take a single step forward. Then, at the beginning of the summer we decided to unlock the process of normalization and create a mechanism -- this was Comrade Gorbachev's idea, and he explained it in his letter to Reagan -- for preparing the foreign ministerial meeting in the fall. This was an almost unprecedented solution, involving the operation of around 10 working groups in the most The most important group, of course, was the one dealing with nuclear diverse areas. and space weapons at the expert level. Both of the groups were working with experts. [sentence as published] The American side agreed to this and, as a result, we have had a rather hot summer. In August and at the beginning of September our experts were busy discussing nuclear weapons, including space weapons, as well as regional and bilateral In this way it was possible to create good practical conditions for a serious and objective discussion between Shevardnadze and Shultz. Yet all these actions were parallel to certain extremely unfavorable American actions, such as the expelling of Soviet diplomats working in New York, the attack on Libya, and the arrest of Zakharov. It was an extremely gross action to expel 25 Soviet citizens from New York just 1 day prior to the foreign ministerial meeting. This means that there were two opposing processes going on at the same time. One for creating some kind of relations, and another for ruining it.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] In any case, nothing much has happened in Geneva where the most important issues should have been discussed.

[Bessmertnykh] Following the experts' discussions, the This is true. leadership again examined the situation and came to the conclusion that, in spite of an intensive effort, relations are still in a stalemate both in general and in Geneva. This was clear from our discussions with Nitze, Kampelman, and Perle. All three of them came to Moscow, and we held talks in the Foreign Ministry's dacha in Meshcherino near Moscow, and this was followed by our team's visit to Washington. However, nothing much was achieved by these talks. Therefore, Gorbachev wrote a letter to Reagan -this was on 15 September - which was then passed on by our foreign minister, In this letter, Gorbachev suggested an urgent working meeting in Shevardnadze. preparation for the Washington visit. In his letter Comrade Gorbachev explained clearly that the situation of the talks is disturbing, and the talks need a strong political push to move forward, and this can only be done through a meeting and a dialogue on the highest level. This is how the idea of Reykjavik was conceived. Americans chose this town, but we also proposed London. They also accepted the date, but we told them that we would be ready to lay aside all our work to make this meeting.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Our readers know what the Soviet proposals at the Reykjavik meeting contained, but opinions differ as to their meaning and aims. As a member of a Soviet delegation, what do you see as the unusualness of these proposals?

[Bessmertnykh] They differ above all because we have come up with a completely new idea regarding the curb on strategic arms. [paragraph continues]

The 50-percent reduction mentioned here is different from all the previous 50-percent reductions proposed by either the Soviet Union or the United States. The Soviet side had previously referred to a 50-percent reduction of those strategic nuclear weapons that are able to reach the territory of the other side. In other words, it referred to the so-called forward based systems [eloretolt allasban] and to the medium-range missiles. When the Americans spoke about a 50-percent reduction of strategic arms, they were thinking above all about ballistic missiles. Our present proposal refers to all kinds of weapons included in the triangle of strategic arms: a 50-percent reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a 50-percent reduction of submarine launched ballistic missiles, and a 50-percent reduction of heavy bombers This concept means the following: Nuclear confrontation will be reduced to one-half, while the structure of the historically developed strategic offensive weapons will be maintained completely. This is simple, but this simplicity gives the idea its brilliance, and this is the particular element that most commentators somehow failed to notice. At the Reykjavik talks on medium-range missiles -- this is, of course, a paradox -- we insisted on the acceptance of the American proposal.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] That is, on the acceptance of Reagan's zero option.

[Bessmertynykh] Yes, the zero option. The President and the secretary of state became stubborn for a while and insisted on an initial solution that would, of course, assume the retention of a certain number of missiles in Europe. As a result of an intensive dialogue, however, the Americans agreed to a zero option in Europe. In the meantime, we agreed to significantly reduce the Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia. What we wanted was to set off a concrete process of reducing nuclear arms. This aim is noble enough for us to agree to concrete concessions. We also heeded the interests of Western European countries, the whole of Europe, that is, the interests of Western and Eastern Europe, both of which would like to live without weapons. Furthermore, we considered the interests of the Asian countries and, of course, those of the entire socialist camp. This is how we arrived at working out a series of very interesting and, what is more, very realistic formulas concerning the medium-range missiles in Europe. The Americans received the right to fit as many warheads to medium-range missiles here in our area [nalunk], on the continental part [kontinentalis reszen] of the United States, as we do, that is 100 warheads. [sentence as published]

Of course, we also discussed the question of endearing the ABM Treaty, and here we had a clash of two concepts. Afterwards Reagan asked us why we refused the agreement due to one single word. Well, in this case, each single word has a strategic importance.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Why was it necessary to endorse the ABM Treaty if it has been in force without a deadline since 1972? Yet the Soviet Union has put a sharp accent on this question.

[Bessmertnykh] This is very simple. It was necessary because we agreed to a 50-percent reduction of strategic arms over 5 years and the total elimination of these arms over the following 5 years. Therefore, the Soviet Union as a responsible power cannot accept the making of such vital steps in nuclear disarmament "without securing its hinterland", and without securing all the conditions that would enable us to endeavor to acomplish these deep cuts in a peaceful manner, without mutual distrust, and in an atmosphere of confidence. This is obvious, and it would be strange to accept the reduction of the most significant weapons or even their total elimination, while the other side could acquire new types of weaponry threatening the security of the Soviet Union.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] I think we seldom hear about the SDI, the space defense initiative, being presented to international public opinion as a purely defensive system.

[Bessmertnykh] As long as there are nuclear arms, the space defense initiative creates a danger for us, despite all its defensive nature. Looking at SDI in the presence of strategic nuclear arms, which incidentally are at present being modernized in the United States, it is dangerous precisely bacause of its defensive nature, since it provides a first-strike capacity to its possessor. The side hiding behind such a system is trying to exclude the possiblity of a counterattack. If we assume circumstances without strategic nuclear weapons, SDI would still continue to be a danger because there are offensive elements in the system itself. If somebody is trying to use a new physical phenomena in destroying nuclear warheads in outer space. he could obviously also use the very same systems under atmospheric and terrestrial conditions. This is all the more true, because the Americans themselves are talking a lot about developing systems to destroy missiles in their climbing phase. These systems, therefore, have their own offensive potential and not even the American side In this respect a question has arisen, which was put to Ronald Reagan by Mikhail Gorbachev: All right, you say that SDI is aimed against ballistic missiles and indeed, this is the concept of the program. Nevertheless, if we have now agreed on eliminating all ballistic missiles without exception, along with the rest of the strategic triangle, thus approaching the practical elimination of all nuclear arms. then what is SDI for?

The Reagans' advisors have prepared two versions of the answer. One of them says: What happens if one side wanted to cheat the other? This answer is unacceptable, because we are the side promoting the stricter verification measures. We are prepared to jointly work out a system of verification that would make the above-mentioned assumption impossible, that is, one side cheating the other.

The other answer by Reagan was that, despite a realiable system of verification, a madman could acquire an atomic bomb, and in such a case the United States could only protect itself with the SDI. This sounds like a joke, but we have indeed heard this argument, and it was repeated several times in Reykjavik alone. In our answer we explained precisely and clearly that our 15 January proposals included the concept of creating a global system of verification and guarantees which would prevent nuclear terrorism. Thus, it is beyond doubt that this question can be solved.

It is probably, therefore, that this was not the case at issue. Our analysis is unambiguous. We have reviewed all possible variations and reached a definite conclusion. There is a fresh attempt to gain superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist community. We have, however, told the American partners that this will lead nowhere, they should not waste their money.

As for the ABM treaty, we requested that none of the parties would use its right to discontinue the observance of the treaty. Thus, the treaty would remain as it was, without a deadline. Of course, the participating parties would not be able to carry out tests on elements of antimissile weaponry in space. This is namely prohibited by the agreement. So this was our condition, and we even emphasized that research and testing may continue under laboratory conditions.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] A few days ago, THE NEW YORK TIMES carried a report according to the Soviet side, at the next meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz in Vienna, could perhaps even declare tests on SDI outside the laboratory to be acceptable.

[Bessmertnykh] In our view it is possible to carry out tests in the area of antimissile defense by way of land-based, stationary systems. This is permitted by the treaty. However, it categorically forbids testing in outer space. The Americans have insisted on allowing the parties to develop a space defense system after the 10 years have expired. But first, this again could only be possible by completely upsetting the ABM Treaty. [paragraph continues]

Second, it would also assume that not only the United States but even the Soviet Union has been preparing to set up a space defense system. However, if the Americans do opt for setting up this system, we will be choosing another way. We have our own calculations, which are not the same as those of the American plans in an engineering, technological sense. It will be a worthy and suitable answer.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Let us now return to the prospects for Soviet-American relations after Reykjavik.

[Bessmertnykh] We are willing to wait. We are willing to wait for the American Administration to carefully examine the results of the Reykjavik talks and decide upon the path it intends to go in the future; or put more simply, until it has solved the question of whether the American Administration is able to extract itself from the net of the military-industrial complex. It was clearly evident in Reykjavik that such a net exists. The President was not able to make decisions on his own. One could feel that he did not have enough power. We must wait and see what the future brings. We on our side are still willing to adhere to the agreements which were reached in Reykjavik. We are ready to follow the path of nuclear disarmament and peace in space, and at the same time to participate in solving other problems, the questions of chemical weapons, and of conventional arms. In other words, the question is: Are the Americans capable of changing their approach to today's problems according to the demands of the end of the 20th century? If they are, all roads toward settling our relations are free.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] You have mentioned that Reagan was not, in fact, free to make decisions. On the other hand, there are also more moderate forces in American political affairs. For instance, just a few days ago former President Carter strongly criticized the policy of his successor, referring precisely to the space defense initiative. Here is the question: Based on purely diplomatic assumptions, would it not be more favorable, more reliable, to simply "play a waiting game" until the political conditions of power in the United States have changed?

[Bessmertnykh] As to your question, the answer is negative. In general, our tactical approach is that we do not adjust our foreign policy and diplomatic considerations to actual American domestic struggles at a particular moment. This would bear no results, and for us the golden rule is to work with a government that is elected by the American people. Therefore, we do not intend to freeze the movement toward agreements, we do not intend to put the already emerging trends on ice. This would only cause a great loss of time. In addition, we do not believe that the present American Government has exhausted all its resources in terms of common sense and rationality; and it is possible that if it calmly evaluates all circumstances, it will still find it possible to give a favorable answer. Thus, we are willing to work with this government, and will be working with it.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] In this respect, could we say that the preparations for Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington are still going on?

[Bessmertnykh] The greatest step in preparing the Washington trip was made in Reykjavik. We will see how things turn out. The most important thing is that the question of the Washington visit by the general secretary of the CPSU is still on the agenda. Preparations are continuing for this important event. At the same time, what we can expect from this visit is well-known, since this is why we met in Reykjavik. It is inadmissable that, following the meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, the official visit of the CPSU general secretary to the United States should end with no results. Preparations must be made and guarantees must be given that the hopes of the people we have been talking about will come true, that the world can breathe easier, and that we will finally reach some agreements. [paragraph continues]

Well, the prepartory work will continue, but this work must go on on both sides; and it is very important for the American Administration to also actively participate in preparing Comrade Gorbachev's Washington visit.

/9604 CSO: 5200/1102

TASS: VOLSKIY TO SWEDISH COMMUNIST CONGRESS ON REYKJAVIK

LD081340 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0755 GMT 8 Nov 86

[Excerpt] Stockholm, 8 Nov (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Vukolov reports:

The essence of the changes taking place in the USSR is determined by two broad concepts: restructuring and acceleration, stated Arkadiy Volskiy, the head of the CPSU delgation, a member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Machine-Building. He spoke here on Friday at the 28th congress of the Swedish Workers' Party (communists). There can be no acceleration without radical change in all spheres of life, without a fundamental restructuring of style and methods of work, and new approaches to the resolution of urgent problems. Restructuring is the only true path to acceleration.

Boldness and innovation, so characteristic today of the policy of restructuring and acceleration in the life of Soviet society, he went on, are just as characteristic of our course in foreign affairs. New political thinking is the basis on which the land of the Soviets now operates in the world arena. The Soviet Union has set forward a precise program for the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass-destruction by the end of the century.

The new political thinking, A. Volskiy stressed, made itself plainly apparent during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. Our country presented a package of initiatives at this meeting, and the implementation of these would make it possible to rid the world of the menace of a nuclear apocalypse as early as the coming decade, following the total elimination of nuclear weapons. At the present stage, a possible accord on the resolution of this central problem was wrecked by the U.S. side. The U.S. Administration proved incapable of renouncing old, outmoded modes of thought, and of sloughing off the chimera of breaking through to military superiority via the SDI program. Following Reykjavik, however, a qualitatively new situation has arisen, and the struggle for mankind's most basic right, the right to life, has risen to a new and higher level, opening up the possibility of a sharp turn in the development of international relations.

/8309 CSO: 5200/1098

TASS CRITICIZES THATCHER SPEECH SUPPORTING REAGAN

LF110203 Moscow TASS in English 0155 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Text] London November 11 TASS — British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has addressed a speech to the traditional banquet given by the lord mayor of the British capital. The bourgeois press publicized in advance the speech by the head of the Conservative cabinet as being "extremely important" and of "key significance". Yet as follows from an analysis of the speech, it was a thoughtless repetition of the statements by the U.S. President on the need for a "tough policy" in relations with the Soviet Union. Thatcher has expressed, in particular, support for Reagan's stand at the summit meeting in Reykjavik, as a result of which, as is known, the attainment of a history-making agreement in the field of arms cuts was frustrated through the fault of the U.S. side. She has also expressed support for the intention of the USA to spread the weapons race into outer space. Her ability to evaluate the realities of the contemporary world did not differ from that of Washington. Echoing the overseas "experts", head of the Tory cabinet claimed that it was precisely the existence of nuclear arsenals, which had prevented over the past 40 years the outbreak of nuclear and conventional wars in Europe.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1098

USSR ANALYST VIEWS KOHL'S BUNDESTAG STATEMENT ON REYKJAVIK

LD062248 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT 6 Nov 86

["With an American Accent"--TASS take identifier]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS -- Political news analyst Aleksey Shestakov writes:

Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a government statement in the Bundestag today on the results of his trip to the United States and conversations with President Ronald Reagan.

This document is of interest for many reasons. Because Kohl was the first West European head of government to visit Washington after the Soviet-American summit and represented in the American capital, as he said himself, the security interests not only of the FRG but also of France, Britain and other West European countries. And also because for the first time ever the chancellor had presented with sufficient fullness the view of the ruling circles of the FRG, America's chief military partner in NATO, on the range of issues discussed at the meeting in Reykjavik. And also because the statement by the head of the cabinet spelled out the role that Bonn intends to play in solving those pressing international problems that are of concern to Europe in the first place.

Let us try to single out the key moments in the West German chancellor's statement without lingering on his numerous and already traditional expressions of gratitude to President Reagan and assurances that all members of the Western community are following the United States in closely bunched ranks.

Likewise there is hardly any need to comment on the quite obvious truths expressed by Kohl that the meeting in Reykjavik was an important stage in the East-West dialogue and that never before had the positions of the two great powers just as, may I add, the possibilities for concluding large-scale agreements been so close.

Let us turn to the main problem of Reykjavik. So what is Chancellor Kohl's stand on the American "Star Wars" programme?

The United States does not want to make the substance of its SDI research programme a subject of the Geneva disarmament talks... The United States wants this programme to be regarded as a necessary guarantee of security against a possible violation of agreement... But who is saying all this? Ronald Reagan? Yes. But in this case this was said by Helmut Kohl who quite approves of Washington's actions.

He also stressed West Germany's "exceptional interest in an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe" and added immediately that such an agreement is possible if the USSR goes back on its "condition that problems be solved in a package" because this stand is "Harmful to the matter at hand". So again we have a literal translation from

English into German, again we see the desire to present the major Soviet proposals not as a package of compromises but as a package of conditions.

It was none other than Bonn which only three years ago loudly campaigned for Reagan's "zero option". But when today there appeared a real chance to clear Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles owing to the bold and in some ways even risky backpedalling or, to quote Helmut Kohl, are "fearful of their own courage". Nothing else can explain the stubborn desire to rip apart the package of Soviet proposals and then to reject them one by one.

The people in Bonn spoke just as loudly only eighteen months ago about the need to stop nuclear testing. For already exactly one year and three months the USSR is observing its moratorium while nuclear blasts continue to rock the Nevada desert in America. What has Chancellor Kohl to say on this score? He says that he "encouraged the United States President in his advance along the road of gradually solving problems".

The government statement read out in the Bundestag contains the words that the FRG's relations with the USSR and other socialist countries carry "special weight" for Bonn. It is also said in it that the West German Government remembers the losses suffered by the Soviet people as a result of Hitler's aggression. But the question arises: How can one remember this and yet constantly proceed from the premise of "Soviet aggressiveness"? How can one speak of strengthening trust and at the same time create a shortage of it be it because of the notorious Atlantic solidarity or because of considerations of election campaigning? All this is far from the new political thinking which is the only guarantee that mankind will not cross the final line of danger.

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CSO: 5200/1098

SOVIET CSCE FIGURE COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK

AU121407 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 3 Nov 86 pp 5, 7

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[Statement by Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Soviet CSCE Committee, specially dispatched through NOVOSTI, in Moscow, date not given]

[Text] Less than 5,000 days separate us form the end of the century and from mankind's entry into the new millenium. How will mankind reach this new stage in history—will it still carry the burden of the deadly threat of nuclear armed forces, or will it have implemented the nuclear disarmament program? This, precisely, was the essence of the Reykjavik dialogue.

This dialogue, unfortunately, did not bring any specific agreements, which was not our fault. However, it will be pursued. It must by all means continue, since there is no other sensible alternative in this missile-nuclear century. This dialogue will not begin at point "zero," but will be based on accomplished work, in the awareness of the opportunities that have emerged.

As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his speech on Soviet television on 22 October 1986, as a result of the Reykjavik meeting, it has been possible to achieve a qualitatively new climax in the struggle against nuclear weapons. This is precisely why the results of Reykjavik are encouraging for all those who aspire for a change for the better.

I consider the comparison recently made by a Soviet writer talking about Reykjavik as absolutely justified. He compared the meeting to the conquest of a high mountain peak by mountaineers. They had only covered part of their ascent, but were interrupted by bad weather. As soon as the clouds surrounding the mountain peak disappear, the mountain climbers will be able to continue their ascent, no longer from the foot of the mountain, but from their base camp. It is the duty of all peace-loving forces today to help disperse the clouds.

We can see how the discussion about the results of the Soviet-American summit is spreading throughout the world and is being intensified, mobilizing broad social and political circles and with the aim of turning the opportunities that emerged in Reykjavik into real deeds. Another trend, however, is appearing along with this. The forces linked to militarism are trying by all means

to confuse public opinion and to prevent the governments from adopting an unmistakable stand at this moment of decisive importance.

In pursuing htis goal the disinformers, among whom there are also influential people from official Washington circles, are spreading a whole pack of lies, half-truths, and omissions, in order to justify the U.S. stand at the negotiations and to distort the Soviet position, as well as to indoctrinate the masses by insinuating that the United States, in relying on the position of strength, allegedly "almost extorted" the consent of the Soviet Union to achieve an agreement based on the American conditions. We are thus witnessing a new revival of the legacy of the former U.S. administrations—"That the government is entitled to its lies"—a legacy which was developed to perfection during the period of the "dirty war" in Vietnam.

In other words, the White House and its close associates are trying to drown the great cause adopted by the Soviet side in a sea of petty politicking.

However, times have changed. The peoples' masses are increasingly becoming an influential factor in worldwide politics and it is by no means easy to deceive them. In the days of the Reykjavik meeting people had the opportunity to become aware of the fact of how great a price the Soviet Union is prepared to pay for lasting peace and to become convinced of the USSR's unshakable will based on principle to defend the peoples' vital interests. This even more enhances the moral and political prestige of socialism in the eyes of the peoples' masses.

This is the basis for one of the main lessons to be learned from Reykjavik. This lesson, as Mikhail Gorbachev stated, consists of the fact that the new political thought conforms to the realities of the nuclear century, that it is a necessary prerequisite for finding a way out of the critical situation confronting mankind at the end of the 20th century.

We all know how fast the rate of technical development is today, a rate that human thought is hardly able to keep up with. As one of the participants in the "Issyk-Kul" forum pointed out, the French engineer who designed the aircraft with which Bleriot crossed the Channel lived to see the first man land on the moon. During the short period of a lifetime the atom dressed in military uniform has vigorously developed. Is it not high time to strive to achieve profound changes in the political thought of all mankind? Is it not time to adopt a new approach in great politics by giving the greatest, irrefutable priority to the people's right to live in peace?

There is only one conclusion to be drawn: as the Soviet leadership has pointed out on several occasions, it is necessary to start thinking and acting in a new way.

As a result of Reykjavik, the notorious SDI is increasingly emerging as a symbol of obstruction to the cause of peace, as the concentrated expression of militarist intentions.

There is no doubt at all that under the conditions of a qualitatively new situation, the experience of Reykjavik will also be felt in Vienna at the forthcoming session of the CSCE participating countries' representatives. Europe, where the new way of thinking is beginning to blossom, where the sense of responsibility for the consolidation of our "European home" is growing, could not remain a passive observer at the Soviet-American dialogue. This dialogue directly affected European interests. It is no coincidence that the deputies of the European Parlaiment, which includes representatives of 10 countries from Western Europe with a population of 270 million people, welcomed the Reykjavik meeting and expressed themselves in favor of the USSR and the United States reaching an agreement envisaging the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles from our continent.

Eruope today has to cope with numerous difficulties. Among these is the great concentration of armaments, which is 20 times higher than the average concentration of armaments throughout the world. The NATO projects in Europe and the efforts of the rightwing forces to undermine the positive results of the Europe-wide process add up these difficulties. Positive, new trends, however, are increasingly prevailing as well, which is confirmed by the success of the Stockholm Conference.

The USSR and the other socialist states are convinced that the development of the Europe-wide process must advance in all directions—in the military, political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural spheres. Vienna must give new impetus to this movement. In preparing for this meeting our coutnries are once more setting an example for the new thought: they are bringing a package of valuable ideas and constructive projects to this conference.

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cso: 5200/1094

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON REYKJAVIK, EUROPEAN RESPONSE

LD092144 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 9 Nov 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with political observers Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, and All-Union Radio Commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I think it is probably worth noting that on the occasion of the 69th anniversary, our country received a greeting from the leaders of the PRC, which seems to me to have been a few degrees warmer than the greetings we received on the 68th and 67th anniversaries. This also reflects in some way the progressive development of relations. Far be it from me to gloss over the problems that exist in the development of relations between the Soviet Union and China. They do exist, and we are not shutting our eyes to them; but that relations have moved forward is plain to see, and that is a very gratifying fact.

[Shishlin] Of course, the fact that relations among the socialist countries are becoming richer, fuller, and more fruitful is having its effect on the international climate generally. When we speak of the changes — and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has spoken of the qualitatively new state of international relations — this has to do, in a decisive way, not only with what has been happening, say, in the area of Soviet-U.S. relations, or schematically speaking, in the European area or the Asian and Pacific area; it is decisively the fruit of the work that has been done within the framework of the world socialist system. Although what may be called the build-up of the potential for peace has not led to a sudden breakthrough in the development of international relations, it has, of course, led to a really qualitatively new state of international relations.

Now what is happening? The United States is actually trying, well, if not to pull out of what happened in Reykjavik, then somehow or other to crawl quietly away from it. But they will not succeed — it is impossible. Already it is impossible. What Reykjavik has done, essentially, is to mark the possibility of breaking through to a qualitatively different state of international relations; and indeed, it has ensured that that breakthrough will happen. The achievement of completely real results, the materialization of the accords that were outlined in Reykjavik, is a task for the future; but that objective has now been established in such a way that, well, no one can lose sight of it.

[Kobysh] It seems to me that recently, beginning with Geneva, mankind has been experiencing an absolutely, qualitatively new state; new processes are underway, and we have indeed arrived at a hitherto unexplored situation which is new and opens great vistas. If one were to sum up what happened in Geneva and in Reykjavik, two extraordinarily important, historically important, states emerge: in Geneva, the U.S. President, together with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, agreed that nuclear war must not be waged; that no one can win such a war; and that nuclear rivalry is impossible. In Reykjavik, they actually got to the point of agreeing — and that agreement has practically been put on paper — that nuclear weapons can be destroyed. In other words, we are already talking about practical matters. Now, of course, they may slip out of that accord, they may befog the issue, but the agreement is there. It reflects the objective reality of today's world.

[Levin] Speaking at the reception for the 69th anniversary of the October Revolution, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said very clearly that now, since Reykjavik, a new situation has been created in international relations. The problems you have just been talking about, Vitaliy Ivanovich, reflect this. The struggle to abolish nuclear weapons has now been put on a qualitatively new, practical plane. On 15 January of this year, the Soviet Union put forward the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons by the year 2000; and at the time, many people said this was utopian. Yet at Reykjavik, agreement began to take shape on abolishing nuclear weapons in 10 years or even sooner.

So what I want to emphasize is that even the U.S. side no longer sees this as utopian, though the opposition on the U.S. side to realizing this concrete task is clearly in evidence. Here, of course, we come to a very interesting and very complex question: Why is the United States so keen to back-pedal? Why? The meetings that Comrade Shevardnadze had in Vienna with Shultz also showed that the United States is trying to retreat from Reykjavik. This question is by no means devoid of interest.

[Kobysh] But then again, Viktor Nikolayevich, as a generality, it unfortunately has to be said that none of this comes as a surprise. Of course, Reykjavik, in this dramatic nuclear-missile age, has for the first time shown and proved that it is possible to reach agreement irrespective of the fact that, say, the United States may have its own opinion of our ideology and our view of the world, and we may have our opinion of U.S. ideology and the U.S. outlook, and for that matter, on the way the Americans conduct themselves in international affairs. But then what happens? The next thing that happens is that the Americans, having declared Reykjavik to be a success, start backing out of it. Not only do they themselves go into reverse, offering their own versions of what happened in Reykjavik, though it is always possible to prove what really happened in Reykjavik; but they start applying brakes which, frankly, one might have assumed existed, but one hardly could have expected them to be activated so quickly.

What I have in mind in this instance is the position of the West Europeans. We have had the French foreign minister declare that the abolition of nuclear weapons — including, by the way, nuclear weapons in Europe — would call into question relations between the United States and its European allies.

West German Chancellor Kohl starts talking with alarm about what will happen to poor Western Europe if there are no nuclear weapons and the gigantic preponderance — as they are fond of conventionally expressing it — of the Soviet Union will alter the situation to the detriment of Western Europe. In other words, these brakes are being applied as well, though it is the Soviet Union that, by proposing a zero in Europe for medium-range nuclear missile weapons, has taken account not only of its own interests, has not only taken into account the interests of the security of the United States, but first and foremost, has considered the security interests of Western and Eastern Europe.

[Shishlin] And yet, all the same, the question that Viktor Nikolayevich is asking is a very relevant question: What has happened? Why is it that they agreed, and then began back-tracking? Why are they now taking such pains to try and convince public opinion—and possibly themselves—that nothing of the sort was ever said at Reykjavik? Here I think there is a great internal contradiction in the policy of the present U.S. Administration.

Just put yourselves in the shoes of the U.S. President for a moment. The CPSU Central Committee general secretary says to him in Reykjavik: In the first 5 years, let us destroy 50 percent of such-and-such a weapon, including nuclear; over the following 5 years, let us destroy all nuclear armaments completely. In other words, in 10 years, we will rid the earth of nuclear weapons. Well, can a responsible statesman say no to such a proposal? He can not. He has got to think of something, he has got to produce reasons of some sort with which to justify his position. They came up with nothing, except to cling to the formula of the SDI. They wrecked the accord. In the eyes of public opinion, including public opinion in the United States, there they were, naked.

Immediately after that, there were elections due in the United States; not particularly momentous ones, let us not exaggerate their importance — mid-term elections, but elections nonetheless, on which the administration had staked a great deal. It had itself declared that these were the elections that would confirm, as it were, the vote of confidence in Washington, in the Washington administratation. What happened? What happened was that in effect — to use their terminology — a vote of no confidence was passed, and just on those very sore points on which the administration had hopes of obtaining support: SDI, the refusal to sign an agreement in Reykjavik, and in general the refusal to reach an accord on banning and destroying nuclear weapons.

[Levin] Reagan has repeatedly made speeches, especially in the last days before the elections. He visited 14 states and vigorously advocated, above all, SDI. He said; do not let into congress the liberals who want to take an axe to our splendid SDI. SDI is the United States' safeguard; SDI brought the Soviet Union to the conference table in Geneva and in Reykjavik; and only SDI will force, and so on and so forth, making propaganda for this thesis of peace through power [mir cherezsilu] — or rather, power over peace [sila nad mirom]

One has been getting the impression, even from some of the public opinion polls in the United States, that this thesis of reliance on strength is quite widely popular in the United States. The opinion polls indicated — especially the polls that were published by the White House — that the U.S. public supports SDI. But now the elections have taken place; and above all in the very states where Reagan was particularly active in campaigning in support of the Republican candidates, it is the Democrats who have won. Here we come up against another of those phenomena of U.S. politics: senior White House press spokesman Speakes makes a statement, and says: who says the elections have been a defeat for the President? No, this was a success for the President! You can only throw up your hands in astonishment. In some degree, it is the story of Reykjavik all over again.

[Kobysh] It is the same thing, the same thing.

[Shishlin] Allow me to quote what President Reagan said immediately after the elections, which the London FINANCIAL TIMES defined as follows: President Reagan has suffered his worst political defeat in the entire period since he came to power in 1981. So what did the President state immediately after the elections? The task now facing us is very simple. In order to complete the revolution we started so well, it is essential to realize a number of goals: We must make the United States more prosperous and more productive and our planet more peaceful. Well, isn't that splendid! He continued: We must preserve our military readiness, strive to develop and introduce new technologies, and this means SDI as well. In this way, the bridge leading to a genuine arms reduction and a just world — I am still quoting — stands on two supports: military readiness and the development of modern technologies such as SDI. There you have it!

[Levin] Yes, I am getting the impression that the White House administration is living They have created for themselves a specific in some sort of world of illusions. stereotype and are resolutely rejecting reality, rejecting the corrections life makes to this stereotype. Indeed you are correct in saying, Vitaliy Ivanovich, that U.S. elections are a complicated thing. While we are on the subject of complexity, I think it would not be out of place to quote a remark made by such an eminent U.S. politician as NEW YORK TIMES observer Reston. He has given a very juicy description of the 1986 election: He says that the elections were a genuine disgrace as they turned into a battle of money bags and television advertisements and a display of dirty tricks. The moral aspect of the election is here indeed described in a very clear and precise fashion; but at the same time, of course, there is a political note as well. The fact that the electorate denied their trust to those who support SDI indicates that the reality of the United States is not what the White House imagines it to be. This, it seems to me, is an encouraging factor, a factor indicating that our accords in Reykjavik and the Soviet stance set forth in Reykjavik will win over public circles.

Even now we can say, with every justification we are saying that the West European governments — Chancellor Kohl again — have adopted a negative stance. As I read recently, the British have decided precisely at this juncture to arm themselves with yet another type of nuclear bomb, which does absolutely nothing to help resolve the problem. At the time, however, one must pay particular attention to the fact that delegations from the SED and the SPD have reached agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone between the socialist and capitalist countries, a 150-km deep zone along the GDR-FRG border, i.e. a real and concrete contribution.

[Kobysh] In general that is not so much an accord as an idea taken up from the late Palme directed not only towards the GDR and the FRG, but in addition toward Czechoslovakia where there is also a dividing line between the two...

[Levin, interrupting]...But the Czechs have already supported it.

[Kobysh]...blocs. Yes. As for the U.S. elections and how they fit into the overall international situation, it seems to me that the outcome of the U.S. elections, these intermediate elections, is a sort of sign of destiny for the specific political course that has been pursued for 6 years. There is no denying that President Reagan is fairly popular among the U.S. public — and this is confirmed by the results of public opinion polls — but Reagan's personal popularity is not the same as the popularity of the policy being pursued by the U.S. Administration.

We are usually arguing the groundlessness of SDI and talking about the dangerous and destabilizing nature of that program, but under the surface deep-lying processes are taking place and are unfolding before us. After all, over these 5 years the U.S. economy and U.S. society have not acquired any kind of vigorous health by pumping up military muscles. The U.S. is now the world's top debtor; the U.S. federal budget deficit is growing; and the latent ailments that are now being exposed in the U.S. economy and that U.S. voters can feel, are, in effect, convincing people that the new political thinking — the need for which is compellingly embodied in all the realities of the nuclear space age — the need for this new thinking is being realized, even by those now going to the polling stations in the United States. The need for this new political thinking is not being realized by the political leaders of that country, who, indeed, today set the tone of U.S. politics.

The fact that such deep-lying movements are taking place in the U.S. public consciousness in my view indicates in general that the situation itself is indeed a qualitatively new one in the world as a whole. From this point of view, we do not underestimate the difficulty of the struggle that has begun and is now underway, nor do we underestimate the extent of the acuteness of these battles -- political battles -taking place in the world. We have to say that on the whole, 1986 has, of course, increased the potential for peace. This does not imply that we shall not come across complications in international affairs; we shall. Our poilicy is being marked by increasingly significant results -- without mentioning the fact that this policy is founded on an increasingly firm basis, as we noted at the beginning of our discussion -- the strengthening of the socialist countries' economies and the strengthening of mutual relations between the socialist countries; it is now the turn, of course, for other major steps and actions that aim both to improve the state of affairs in our country and the state of affairs in the world, and to implement our party's strategic aim, as determined by the 27th congress. It is now time for working not on our own, not in isolation, but together with the entire world community, because the cause we are struggling for -- the radical improvement of the world political climate -- is equally dear to the socialist countries, the nonaligned countries, and indeed the developed capitalist states.

[Levin] In this connection, one should note, of copurse, that the Vienna meeting of participant states in the all-European conference which began this wekk, is acquiring particular resonance. Very great hopes are being laid on this meeting. The first stage of the conference that took place in Stockholm brought very tangible results in the area of strengthening military trust. Very bold far-reaching decisions were made there.

No less responsible tasks now stand before Vienna and the Soviet Union is actively striving to ensure that these tasks are resolved. The speech by Comrade Shevardnadze, our minister of foreign affairs, in Vienna marked out these tasks clearly. At the moment, attempts are again being made on the part of the West, in order to shift attention in world politics, to put the question on this plane, that without human rights there is no security. We are by no means evading the problems of human rights. Just the opposite, we are in favor of human rights, in favor of the right to live, the right to work, and in favor of all fundamental human rights which meet the interests of both the development of the human personality and the interests of consolidating peace.

[Kobysh] More than that, Viktor Nikolayevich. We cannot conceive of a world without the triumph of freedom. It is an utterly inseparable thing.

[Levin] Absolutely right.

[Sishlin] Freedom is made up of the freedom of every person. For us it is therefore the holiest of the holy, it is communism.

[Levin] Yes, and therefore at the Vienna conference we proposed to convene an all-European conference in order to discuss the entire complex of humanitarian problems and proposed Moscow as a place to hold such a conference. This idea was also put on the agenda. We introduced very far-reaching proposals — I have in mind the socialist community states — on limiting conventional weapons, the same conventional weapons over which there is now a great deal of speculation in the West, and a great deal of talk about the fact, as they say, that we are ready to cut back on nuclear weapons and even to eliminate nuclear weapons because we have an enormous superiority in conventional weapons. This is said by those who have had the proposals of the member states of the Warsaw Pact on a radical cut-back in weapons and armed forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, lying in front of them on the table since 11 June! We are proposing to cut back 100-150,000 in the first stage; and to cut back on another 25 percent by the 1990's; all in all the reductions will involve half a million people on each side. They are behaving as though these proposals!

[Kobysh] I think that we have the right to talk about, — to stop briefly on this note, because our time is limited — we are entitled to say that a turning-point has indeed really appeared. A very complicated struggle is underway and Vienna is also becoming an arena of struggle. But what aims are we pursuing in this struggle? The aims of peace, freedom, and peaceful cooperation. On the road, on the long and difficult road toward achieving these aims, several steps have been made, fundamentally important ones, which open up new horizons for affirming those radiant and noble ideas that were brought into the world for the first time by the Great October.

[Levin] On that note, we will end. Thank you esteemed listeners for your attention. All the best to you.

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cso: 5200/1097

USSR MEDIA REVIEW OF POST-REYKJAVIK SITUATION

NOVOSTI Roundtable

PM191543 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 46, 16 Nov 86 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Time to Make a Choice. Reykjavik and the Planet's Security"]

[Text] We live in a troubled world. Our daily cares are increasingly dwarfed by the thought that they might vanish in a flash...

People separated by continents and oceans are united in wishing to prevent global nuclear catastrophe. They are urging politicians for a speedy and just solution. The solution can be made if a new mode of political thinking essential in the nuclear age prevails.

Guided by this thinking, Moscow invited Washington to talks in Reykjavik. A historic decision was a step away. Why was it not made?

This was the subject of the round-table discussion at the NOVOSTI Press Agency: "Moratorium, disarmament, and new political thinking in the nuclear age".

The discussion that ran for nine hours over two days brought together: Michel Tatu, analyst of the Paris newspaper LE MONDE; Pierre Salinger, Paris correspondent of American ABC TV; Juergen Jagla, editor of the West German newspaper KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU; Krishnan Kutti, deputy director-general of the United News of India; Tanzanian publicist Akile Tagalile; Harold Hamrin, Moscow correspondent of the Swedish nespaper DAGENS NYHETER. Soviet participants included Chairman of NOVOSTI Press Agency Valentin Falin, deputy chief of the Administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Maj Gen Yuriy Lebedev, Chairman of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Academician Nikita Moiseyev, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Georgiy Golitsyn, Daniil Proektor, D, Sc. (History), writer Ales Adamovich, Metropolitan Sergiy. The moderator was Nikolay Yefimov, first deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

No Margin for Error [subhead]

Valentin Falin: Today the price of a wrong decision, the price of an error is entirely different than 40 or 50 years ago. We live in a situation where the chances of correcting a mistake are ruled out. It is not enough to realize that it is no longer possible to live in the old way, that yesterday cannot give answers to today's and moreover to tomorrow's challenges. Our government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have arrived at this conclusion: all present political thinking should be fully replaced by a new one. Everything considered immutable yesterday should be re-examined.

The Soviet side has drawn a firm conclusion: in our day and age, settlement of problems between states including security problems, is only possible through peaceful means, through talks. The position-of-strength policy and the policy of violence have become totally outdated. Security in our age can only be security for all. As regards the USA and the USSR, it can only be mutual. Striving for military superiority is radically wrong. Such superiority is unattainable, and all attempts to dismiss this truth invariably lead to destabilization in the world situation.

Daniil Proektor: We live in an amazing world. On the one hand, there are stockpiles of staggering weapons of destruction. To me, there are no earthly standards to evaluate them. You must only use some cosmic standards. On the other hand, humanity has approached the point where it has to recognize that this fantastic power cannot be employed as a political means.

This leads to a paradoxical situation. This conclusion was made by the finest minds of mankind as early as the late 1940s — think of the warning made by Einstein and a group of other physicists. But correct conclusions take time to become general. It took the Caribbean crisis, to took the evolvent [as published] of the physical concept of "nuclear winter," medical research into the catastrophic nature of a nuclear conflict for the conclusion on the impossibility for modern armed forces to be a political means to receive broad recognition.

Why Package? [subhead]

Michel Tatu: The Soviet "package" in Reykjavik came to us as a surprise. Since all the issues ended up in a single package, the reaching of a separate agreement on Euromissilies seems to be no longer possible. To me it's a step back. Which is easier; to tackle all the issues simultaneously or one by one? If we attempt to settle all the issues together, then, I believe, we will be able to solve none.

Pierre Salinger: I think the USSR and the USA can agree on medium-range missiles if SDI does not come into the deal. I think the USSR and the USA can agree on nuclear tests if there is no direct linkage to SDI.

The package idea will probably not bring a success. If we break up the package and solve the individual probablems separately, I think it will enable us to reach accords.

Yuriy Lebedev: It is often asked in the West, why the Soviet Union is against solving the medium-range missiles issue apart from the other issues as was the case before. I would like to remind you in this connection of the far-reaching Soviet steps on limiting and cutting nuclear strategic offensive weapons and on scrapping nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe. In Reykjavik and at Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons we've made a big concession to the United States.

We have agreed to a 50-per-cent cut in all strategic arms and withdrawn the question of US nuclear forward-based weapons. As to medium-range missiles, we have put aside the question of British and French nuclear potentials. We have gone as far as to radically cut our medium-range missiles in Asia. Finally, we have agreed to start talks on missiles with the range of less than 1,000 kilometres and to freeze their arsenals. For this reason the solution of the question on medium-range missiles outside the package would give the US a chance to gain unilateral advantages. And we rightly expect that the USA will meet the Soviet Union halfway on the whole package of questions pending solution.

At a New Stage [subhead]

Georgiy Shakhnazarov: Following Reykjavik, the entire disarmament issue has moved onto a new stage. Before Reykjavik the disarmament issue appeared as a highly complex mathematical problem. It has become exceedingly simple. It takes half a page to describe it. This means that everybody in the world, even illiterate people, can see what can and should be done today. [paragraph continues]

And this is right firstly because not only politicians but all people should know what is to become of them. And secondly, not just the USSR and the US but the rest of the world, all the other countries also have the right to take part in the disarmament process.

Akile Tagalile: Africa should discuss disarmament because those who threaten the life of mankind threaten Africa too. It is for this reason that Africa has the right, together with other peace-loving peoples on the planet, to fight for disarmament and peace.

Obviously, a nuclear war, no matter on what scale, would not spare a single person on the planet, including those who would start the war. It is terrible that nuclear arms are being acquired by states which are in conflict with their neighbours. I mean Pakistan, Israel and South Africa. This means that anything can happen not just in relations between the two great powers. The whole world, and the Third World in particular, has a number of problems such as hunger and poverty. Nuclear tests should be stopped in order to do away with nuclear weapons. This should be followed by eliminating all existing stocks of arms.

The World is Different After Reykjavik [subhead]

Metropolitan Sergiy: We warmly welcome the efforts of those political figures who are persistently trying to rid the earth of nuclear weapons, to prevent the deployment in the sky of space arms, to establish new relations between states and nations. For this reason we welcome the decision of our country's government to announce a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests. Sadly, this moratorium is unilateral, and the USA is carrying on its nuclear weapons tests in Nevada. This cannot but worry us because it as out of keeping with Christian principles so often referred to by President Reagan.

What is the significance of the moratorium from the Christian point of view? During the initial months some people viewed it as a natural technological pause in the creation of new Soviet types of weaponry, now it is obvious for everyone that this is a bold and unprecedented step linked with principled refusal to meet challenge by challenge. We welcome the scientifically-based and large-scale plan offered by our state for the phasing out of nuclear weapons until they are fully destroyed by the end of this century.

After Reykjavik the world cannot remain what it was before that meeting. The world has realized the dilemma facing it. Now it must make a choice, and the choice depends on what all people, what everyone of us decides.

Ales Adamovich: Forty thousand nuclear weapons are to be unleashed against the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev has said that even if we do not retaliate, the result will be the same: Europe will perish. I'm telling this to you as a representative of Belorussia which, unfortunately, was affected by the Chernobyl tragedy. The 40,000 missiles they are planning to unleash on us would, even if the Soviet Union does not retaliate, kill those who have designed and launched them.

SDI: The Crucial Question [subhead]

Yuriy Lebedev: Many people say that SDI will benefit humanity and help it get rid of nuclear weapons. That is what the US President and other SDI backers contend. The SDI problem has for quite a long time been literally rocking the world.

It has become a brake on the Geneva nuclear and space arms talks. It has emerged as the sole cause of the failure to agree in Reykjavik during the Soviet-American summit.

It only became possible to start strategic offensive weapons when work started on an agreement limiting missile defence, which was signed in October 1972.

The sides mentioned in the preamble to that tragedy that effective measures on limiting ABM systems would become a vital factor in restraining the strategic offensive arms race. This factor remains in force.

The ABM Treaty today is the foundation for the entire process of talks on limiting and cutting nuclear weapons. The American side's attempts to undermine this treaty made it impossible in Reykjavik to move towards the realization of the accords on strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles.

It is being alleged that the work on SDI is no violation of the ABM Treaty. It is maintained that SDI is a research programme. It should be remembered that 60 billion dollars are to be spent on this programme over the coming decade. This question is, having spent this money, can one renounce this programme? Besides, it is hard to determine the point where research ends and deployment of components of such a system begins.

In Reykjavik the Soviet side proceeded from the assumption that it was the research work that was conducted. The United States was offered to conduct the research and even tests but only if they are confined to the laboratory. The US attitude to this Soviet proposal revealed the United States true intentions. It became obvious that the US Administration was not simply conducting research but that it had specific plans to design a weapon in order to achieve military supremacy over the Soviet Union.

The work underway on the SDI plan fully contradicts the ABM Treaty and is intended to hamstring it. What will be the result? If a space-based missile defence is established, there can be no talk on cutting strategic offensive weapons.

Krishnan Kutti: Final agreement was not reached in Reykjavik. Yet this does not mean that all is lost. But where do we go from here? This question, obviously, worries all of us. I'm not very clear on technical details. The issue, as I see it, is how mutual suspicion can be removed. This could very well be the starting point.

One should not decline futher talks only because the Soviet package was not accepted by the other side. Nuclear weapons are an evil that should be fully destroyed. And if the Soviet Union has stated that it is prepared to do so by the year 2000, the statement should be fully trusted. SDI will spawn new types of weapons. And if the Soviet Union thinks that the work on SDI should be confined to the laboratory, this is sensible, I think.

Juergen Jagla: SDI holds two great dangers for peace on earth. There is an immediate danger of violation of the ABM Treaty. We don't know what consequences it may entail. Secondly, experts involved in the SDI project also produce spinoffs of military and technological importance. And these spinoffs may result in the designing of new methods of waging a conventional war. Conventional wars then would entail as terrifying consequences as an atomic war.

Valentin Falin: The Soviet proposal in Reykjavik on phasing out nuclear tests was made in conjunction with another proposal dealing with a stricter adherence to the ABM Treaty. American tests in Nevada constitute part of the SDI plans. If these tests are meant to create new nuclear technology, then the consequences are likely to be extremely dangerous for everybody.

The Soviet Union, like no other country, can parry this threat from the United States. So, this danger primarily threatens other countries. In our concept though, all that is destructive to security of "third countries" is destructive also to our security because security, as we understand it, can only be security for all.

Bogachev Condemns U.S. Stance

LD192339 Moscow TASS in English 2315 GMT 19 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 20 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR called on Wednesday on all parliaments and peoples to come out strongly for a practical start to creating a nuclear-free world and building reliable security to be shared by all countries on an equal basis. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR solemnly confirms that the USSR does not withdraw any of the proposals it made in Reykjavik, the proposals aimed at the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

As is known, during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik the sides have in principle reached understanding that progress in all the spheres of disarmament must be linked within one package. The United States, however, refused to solve the question of its "Star Wars" in the spirit of the agreed upon linkage of the commitments to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. As is known, precisely such a commitment was assumed by the USSR and the USA during the Geneva summit in 1985.

They in Washington now make attempts to get from the talks what is more advantageous for the USA and to ignore agreed upon provisions which for various reasons do not suit certain circles in the USA.

The United States insists on the revision of mutual understanding reached by Reykjavik and demands, for instance, that the inter-relationship between medium-range missiles, on the one hand, and strategic armaments, both offensive and defensive, on the other, be given up. Representatives of the U.S. Administration assert that the Soviet Union has allegedly made a step back in this matter, since it had earlier been prepared to resolve the question of medium-range missiles regardless of the solution of other matters.

The point of the matter is that the situation has changed. Striving to achieve large-scale arrangement on disarmament, the Soviet side in Reykjavik left aside nuclear arms of the United States' allies, even though Britain and France continue building up their missile potential and all their military activity is coordinated in the NATO framework. The Soviet Union met the United States halfway also on reduction of medium-range missiles in Asia. The USSR declared that with the elimination of the U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe, only 100 warheads on Soviet medium-range missiles will remain in Asia and 100 warheads on medium-range missiles will remain on the U.S. territory.

This was a major concession by the Soviet Union. And the Soviet side had a right to expect from the U.S. side the awareness of global danger with which the U.S. "Star Wars" programme is fraught. For it is pointless to eliminate armaments on a relatively limited scope of the earth, while opening the road to strike arms to truly unlimited space. Even more acute is the need to resolve the question of medium-range missiles in the package of agreements, in the interrelationship with the obligation of both sides not to use the right of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in the course of ten years.

During difficult talks and acute disputes in Reykjavik there emerged an opportunity to start working out agreements on strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles. The barrier to reaching agreement on the entire package of proposals arose as a result of the United States persistent wish to get from the Soviet Side, no matter what, a consent to the elimination of the ABM Treaty after a period of ten years, during which the USA would be preparing a system of space strike arms for deployment. The Soviet side, naturally, could not agree to this.

The United States refused to give up its plans for the militarisation of space and thus frustrated arrangements on disarmament, including medium-range missiles.

The Soviet Union contributed the maximum of goodwill to its proposals in Reykjavik. The Soviet side does not withdraw these proposals, also as far as medium-range missiles go. If the U.S. side is striving really and not in words, to make nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent, it must show the readiness to continue the work on disarmament from the level reached in Reykjavik — both political and positional.

Chnoupek Assessment

PM191014 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Article by CSSR Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek under the rubric "Echo of Reykjavik": "Time Waits for No Man"]

[Text] Prague -- There are certain events in history to which you have to keep returning in your mind. In order to draw conclusions from the past, correctly assess the present, and plan the future. It is absolutely certain that the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Reagan in Reykjavik was one such event.

The great political significance of the talks in the Icelandic capital is that thanks to the flexible and at the same time principled position of the Soviet side, the two states advanced so far in the quest for nuclear disarmament, probably for the first time in many decades. After all, coming close to a treaty on the radical reduction and then the total elimination of nuclear weapons — both strategic and medium-range — means, in effect, reaching a fundamentally new level in the struggle for the elimination of means of mass destruction.

It turned out that it is realistic, entirely possible, and, given good will, relatively quickly feasible to seek and find solutions to key problems. Here a comparison suggests itself. The road to the SALT I Treaty lay through intensive conferences of experts, lasting 3 years. It took another 7 years to sign the SALT II Treaty. Precisely similar talks taking place in Geneva during this decade have yet to yield results.

In Reykjavik only a few hours sufficed, so to speak, to reveal the sides' positions and bring about a substantial rapprochement. It is important that everything on which an accord was reached there on the basis of the Soviet proposals continues to remain the cornerstone of Soviet-American dialogue.

When you think about the circumstances which led to the summit meeting, you come to the conclusion that everything that has happened in the international arena, and especially in Soviet-American relations, objectively required that meeting. After all, time hurries on, and the conveyor belts of the arms race hurry along with it. That is why it was absolutely necessary to clarify where and to what extent the sides could move in this direction. That is what happened.

Although Reykjavik did not end with the signing of any agreements; it did, however, open up a broad path for intensive preparation of agreements.

In order to see why the American side was unwilling to formalize an accord, it is necessary to take into account the basic elements of continuity in the two states' foreign policy. On this occasion the world once again saw the two opposing political and philosophical approaches of the leading powers to tackling mankind's vitally important problems.

On the one hand, the Soviet Union, in the spirit of creative development of its peace program, puts forward large-scale initiatives aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing its transfer into space. The USSR takes these steps in the consciousness of its high degree of responsibility for the attainment of the main objective — the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. This desire is embodied in all the key Soviet initiatives: The 15 January 1986 proposal on the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century; the unilateral extension of the moratorium on nuclear explosions; and the program for joint practical actions by all states to use space for the benefit of all mankind.

Together with its allies, the USSR actively struggles for the implementation of the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact states on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe by 25 percent in the early nineties.

All this was reflected in the USSR's package of proposals submitted at the Reykjavik meeting. It included constructive projects which are the most radical arms limitation projects in the whole history of Soviet-American talks. The balance of interests and connections and interdependence in the sphere of security on both sides were taken carefully into account.

That is the policy of the world's first socialist state. Those are the ethics of true humanism!

But we also ask ourselves how it could happen that the United States, having demonstrated a considerable degree of realism, accepted a number of the Soviet side's proposals, and displayed an understanding of many of the questions under consideration, ultimately let this historic opportunity go, I think the answer must be sought in the sphere of the subjective and objective factors under pressure from which the Washington administration usually inclines toward negative positions in key areas.

It was again confirmed that the range of its political and diplomatic maneuvering is still too subject to the interests of circles of the military-industrial complex, who see before them the specter of fat profits and state-guaranteed long-term orders and who are oriented toward the new technologies for "Star Wars." This aspect, along with the efforts of extreme reactionary imperialist circles which seek to achieve military superiority and dictate their own terms to the "rest of the world" from a position of strength, is evidently the spearhead of the tremendous pressure under which the present U.S. Administration finds itself. It was this negative influence which prevailed when the decision was taken. Nor has that influence weakened now, after the meeting. This is indicated both by the open desire to misrepresent the course and results of Reykjavik, and by the regrouping of forces in the camp of the opponents of detente in connection with attempts to stifle the indications of a change for the better in international relations.

The Reykjavik meeting is also a lesson in the entire concept of modern-day diplomacy. The USSR's political will ensured that the meeting had important content oriented toward key areas. This made it possible to concentrate the dialogue on areas of fundamental importance. The world saw the nobility of the Soviet side, which takes full account of its partner's interests; the world saw its understanding of the exceptional importance of the moment, its respect for the main points of the talks, and its energetic capacity for eliminating all trivia and taking no heed of secondary facts which retard progress.

In a word, mankind witnessed a new approach, a new way of thinking, which is required by the realities of the nuclear and space age.

We value everyting that was undertaken by the Soviet Union's representative in the Icelandic capital for the sake of peace and security, in the interests of the socialist countries and all mankind. We regard the Soviet-American summit meeting as an event of paramount significance furthering the process of reevalutating old and no longer valid viewpoints.

There is also sympathy for the fact that the USSR, being sincerely convinced of the necessity and possibility of a further intensification of efforts to achieve normal relations in the spirit of coexistence between countries with different social systems, does not give way to pessimism or lose restraint. On the contrary, since the meeting in Iceland it has continued to develop tremendous peacemaking efforts and to step up political dialogue in all spheres, at all levels. Here the Soviet Union operates realistically on the basis that there are no insoluble problems, there are only those that have not been resolved over the years.

It is also of extremely great significance for us that in his subsequent speeches M.S. Gorbachev again raffirmed that the USSR's proposals remain in force, as does everything that was said to substantiate and develop them. We are inspired by the valuable lessons of Reykjavik. For Czecholsovak foreign policy and diplomacy, they are an important confirmation that even in the present complex international conditions it is possible and necessary to formulate bold new approaches which meet the interests of all sides and open up prospects for success.

This is the creed with which we approach all the tasks awaiting us in the sphere of bilateral relations and at multilateral forums. First and foremost this applies to the all-European process and the strengthening of security and cooperation in the spirit of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We prepared with a sense of great responsibility for the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states which signed this agreement. [paragraph continues]

We have formulated our own initiatives, which are designed to widen still further the field of cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process.

Together with the fraternal countries, as was stipulated at the Bucharest session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee, we wish to make the greatest possible contribution to ensuring that the important meeting in Vienna is constructive and that it adopts a document which will help to normalize the political climate and promote the return to detente. We would like all the positive lessons of Reykjavik, and first and foremost the proven good experience of "direct movement" toward the main objective, to be applied to the maximum extent in Vienna.

This would undoubtedly serve the most important aim of the Vienna forum: the drawing up of the mandate for the second stage of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe with a view to ensuring that talks are held within its framework on substantially lowering the level of armed forces and conventional arms and on other measures to strengthen confidence and security on the continent.

Zhukov Assessment

PM141609 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Yuriy Zhukov "Political Observer's Notes": "Reykjavik, One Month On"]

[Text] It is now one month since the day the Soviet-American working summit ended in Reykjavik. It was an important event in international life, since the new compromise proposals put forward by the Soviet side made agreement possible on such very important questions as the reduction and subsequent total elimination of nuclear armaments.

Now the U.S. side is doing its utmost to disown the accords reached in Reykjavik. But it has long been known that a word is not a bird, once it takes flight it cannot be captured again. Here, for example, are the actual words spoken by the U.S. President and recorded in Reykjavik:

"What I want to ask is do we intend -- and I believe it would be a very good idea -- to eliminate by the end of two 5-year periods ALL [word published in boldface] (my emphasis -- Yu. Zhukov) explosive nuclear devices, including bombs, battlefield weapons, cruise missiles, submarine armaments, intermediate-range weapons, and so forth? If we agree that all nuclear armaments should be eliminated by the end of a 10-year period, we can pass this accord on to our delegations in Geneva for them to prepare a treaty which you could sign during your visit to the United States."

An accord was reached, but... it was called into question because the U.S. side wanted at all costs to secure agreement to the elimination of the ABM Treaty after a 10-year period during which nuclear weapons would be destroyed, while, in the meantime, the U.S. side would have created space weapons giving it military superiority.

All this is common knowledge, you might think. But it has to be reiterated, since for a whole month now Washington has been waging a campaign of disinformation on a truly large scale aimed at distorting the results of Reykjavik and disavowing accords that have already been agreed. U.S. leading figures keep on saying that they agreed only to eliminate ballistic missiles, and that is not for certain either.

This u-turn, unprecedented in the history of diplomacy, away from the accords reached at the summit, is easily explained. The idea of creating a nuclear-free world does not meet the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex — the real boss in Washington.

There is no other way to explain the chain of ominous events over the past month: Provocative actions against the Soviet Embassy in the United States; the resumption of the "visa war"; the ostentatious declaration of the intention to raise the level of nuclear armaments above the level established by the SALT II Treaty; the further kindling of dangerous regional conflicts; interference in Iranian internal affairs and so forth.

Against the background of all this — obstinate attempts to rub out what the sides arrived at in Reykjavik and replace the accords reached there with a new package of questions that were allegedly discussed, but which have been pared down to the point where they are unrecognizable. Washington's "adaptation" essentially envisages Soviet unilateral disarmament measures, while guaranteeing the United States the "right" to military superiority.

What do these gentlemen intend? Do they not realize that at this time such plans are bound to fail! The results of Reykjavik cannot be rubbed out. After all, the peoples have seen that the ideas of eliminating nuclear armaments and preventing the transfer of the arms race to space are realistic and feasible.

"From this vantage point," M.S. Gorbachev said on television on 22 October, "it is possible to see new prospects for the solution of problems which we find so acute today — I am thinking of security, nuclear disarmament, prevention of new laps of the arms race, and a new appreciation of the opportunities on offer to mankind."

These opportunities are more obvious now than ever before and the broadest public circles all over the world are joining the struggle to realize them. The peoples of the socialist countries are in the vanguard of this struggle. As was stressed by the participants of the working meeting of leaders of the fraternal parties of the CEMA socialist countries, which ended in Moscow the day before yesterday, it is necessary to step up joint efforts in the interests of the struggle to eliminate nuclear and reduce conventional armaments and to strengthen peace and international security.

We are now joined in this struggle by the peoples of the developing countries and the broadest circles of fighters for peace in the capitalist states, and the success of the congress of peace-loving forces in Copenhagen as a vivid reminder of this. The Copenhagen appeal which was engendered there for the elimination of nuclear weapons, for the nonmilitarization of space, and for the banning of nuclear tests is becoming a stimulus for the mushrooming mass action in the struggle for the attainment of these goals.

Beglov Views European Stands

LD172223 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The lessons of Reykjavik and European security is the subject of the commentary by Spartak Beglov, APN political observer:

[Beglov] Hello, comrades! The recent trip by Margaret Thatcher, head of the British Government, across the ocean and her talks with President Reagan in Camp David took place at a time when the whole world is assimilating the lessons of Reykjavik. As far as Western Europe is concerned, the stance of the governments, especially of the NATO member states, is not identical. Some ponder the possibilities of coming closer to the prospect of a non-nuclear world, others — strange as it might seem — are concerned with ways of helping Washington to move even futher away from the boundaries approached in Reykjavik.

The echo of the debates recently held in the Bonn Bundestag on the results of the post-Reykjavik visit to Washington by another West European leader, FRG Chancellor Kohl, is still resounding. Kohl was made to face a serious, and an evidently just reproach. That is, Kohl, instead of encouraging the U.S. Administration to consolidate and develop what was achieved in Reykjavik, sought new arguments against total elimination of nuclear armaments, along with yet again expressing his solidarity with the SDI program. Judging from all, the same mood prevailed during Mrs Thatcher's conversations in Camp David.

In some NATO capitals, they are trying to pretend that nothing happened, as if the USSR had made not steps toward the United States and its partners on the issues of nuclear weapons, as if the proposals of the socialist countries on considerable, well-balanced cuts in armaments and conventional forces over the entire space from the Atlantic to the Urals do not exist for them. Is that a shortage of new thinking? Unfortunately, yes.

In the meantime, the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik are an example of a truly constructive and all-embracing approach to the issues of disarmament. The starting point of this approach is that it is no longer possible to rely on weapons, especially nuclear weapons, as a means of preserving peace and security. It was precisely Reykjavik that showed a turning-point toward a non-nuclear world and a non-nuclear Europe. The double game in the spirit of reviewing the outcome of Reykjavik and promotion of the SDI program are only capable of tightening the nuclear-space noose even more around the issues of disarmament. It is only possible to undo it through embarking on the path of mutually acceptable agreements in accordance with the Reykjavik package. That is in the interests of security of one and all.

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PRAVDA ROUNDTABLE ON REYKJAVIK, SDI, DETERRENCE

PM300945 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 86 First Edition pp 1, 4

[B. Kotov and N. Prozhogin report: "After Reykjavik: The Prospects for a Nuclear-Free World. International 'Roundtable' in the PRAVDA Editorial Office"]

[Text] The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik stirred the whole world. It brought the struggle against the nuclear threat to a new stage, raised the level of Soviet-U.S. dialogue, and for the first time in many decades advanced its participants a long way in the search for paths to nuclear disarmament.

But Reykjavik not only gave rise to hopes, it also spotlighted the difficulties on the way to a nuclear-free world. As a ray of hope began to dawn for many of those people in the West who only quite recently were loudly cursing nuclear weapons, they began to equally zealously demonstrate that nuclear weapons must not be renounced.

There is a continuing lively debate over Reykjavik, both over the gains associated with it and over the missed opportunities. The different viewpoints on these questions were also reflected in a discussion that took place recently in the PRAVDA editorial office.

The foreign participants were Leslaw Tokarski, chief editor of the weekly PERSPEKTYWY (Poland); (Rajah) Mohan, staffer of the Defense Studies and Analysis Institute (India); Yasuo Suzuki, deputy chief of the international department of the newspaper YOMIURI (Japan); Eva Karnowski, commentator for the newspaper VORWAERTS (FRG); and James Jackson, chief of TIME magazine's Moscow bureau (United States). On the Soviet side were PRAVDA political observers Yuriy Zhukov and Vsevolod Ovchinnikov. The international "roundtable" was chaired by Yevgeniy Grigoryev, the newspaper's deputy chief editor.

New Thinking -- New Modus Operandi [subhead]

Ovchinnikov: After Reykjavik it has become even more clear that the world has approached a point where the further continuation of the arms race could result in even strategic equilibrium and parity ceasing to be a deterrent factor. The problem of security cannot be solved by endlessly improving sword and shield. What is needed is not superweapons but superpolitics.

Nuclear weapons have changed not only the strategy and tactics but also the philosophy of war as a means of achieving political ends. [paragraph continues]

This is what Einstein had in mind when he said that the atom bomb has fundamentally changed the world and that a new way of thinking is needed for the new situation. The question "to be or not to be" is no longer something for individual reflection. It faces all mankind.

New thinking is the key to mankind's survival under the conditions of the nuclear and space age. The world split apart by contradictions must be aware of its integrity. I think the "Delhi Six" expressed this commonality of destiny well: "Each day of our life is alms, as though all mankind has become a prisoner in a condemned cell, waiting for the unknown moment of execution."

A new modus operandi must conform to the new thinking. The Soviet Union demonstrates this in practice — both by its moratorium on nuclear explosions and by the package of proposals in Reykjavik.

Jackson: I was born and grew up close to Los Alamos, where atomic weapons were first created. Perhaps that is why I cannot be a supporter of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, although, based on the equilibrium of fear, it has helped to avoid war for 40 years. Now the champions of even that joyless doctrine have a reputation as "doves," while the "hawks" are champions of SDI.

I agree that a new way of thinking is needed to get ourselves out of this dilemma. everyone would like to rid himself of the burden of nuclear weapons. But a cautious approach must be taken to this, so that peace and security are not vulnerable to conventional arms which are comparable with nuclear arms in terms of their might. We must seek to avoid both nuclear and conventional war. It is a pity that, owing to excessive emotion or tiredness, Reykjavik has become known as a conference which ended in failure. Its participants dispersed to their homes disappointed: Having gotten close to important accords, they were unable to secure them.

Nevertheless, a great deal was done in Reykjavik. The Soviet Union made important concessions. But the SDI program was a barrier that could not be surmounted. I hope that at the next summit meeting the U.S. and Soviet leaders will find a way to proceed from reciprocity of deterrence to reciprocity of trust founded on passive nonnuclear means of defense.

Mohan: As the only representative of the developing world here, I would like to say the following: Until recently the global problems of war and peace were considered the province of the great powers. I think the participation of developing countries in the debate on this topic should be welcomed. "Third World" countries cannot and do not want to remain detached observers. India has always been at the forefront of the struggle for nuclear disarmament and advocated a nuclear test ban. The initiatives of the "Delhi Six" have elicited a broad response. We are glad that the USSR responded to their appeal and extended the moratorium.

The problem of war and peace affects the interests of all countries. We need new political thinking in order to find the way out of a critical situation.

Karnowski: All peoples are interested in contributing to the cause of disarmament and participating in the discussion of problems of war and peace. The Soviet-American dialogue must take more account of the situatiuon in Western Europe. As a German, I represent the German land, where war could break out. Chemical weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons pose a special threat to us. Yes, we all need new thinking.

Ovchinnikov: Mr Jackson spoke of one of the reasons for his negative attitude to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. It really should be replaced. Only not by "passive nonnuclear means of defense." He seems to have in mind SDI, which would mean a new twist to the arms race spiral. It is another matter to arrive at a common understanding of the components of security in the nuclear age. A state's security used to be considered directly proportional to its military potential and was identified with strength. Now security can only be mutual, and on a global plane it can only be universal. It is this understanding of security that is the starting point of the new thinking.

Suzuki: I think that, as in the past, there will be periods of ups and downs in Soviet-American relations. I believe that now is a propitious time for reaching an accord. Unfortunately, agreements were not signed. But, in my opinion, there are hopes of success in the long run. Why? Although R. Reagan's administration has encountered very serious economic difficulties, it has managed to enlist support among Americans. On the other hand, the Soviet people pin great hopes on M.S. Gorbachev's administration, which is seeking to impart greater dynamism to the USSR's development.

I believe that the West will value Moscow's initiatives on their true merits and respond to them. I think the talks will proceed from the points reached in Reykjavik. A difficult dialogue lies ahead, but I would like to believe there will be progress.

Tokarski: I would like to return to what Mr Jackson said. In my opinion, it is not a matter of emotion or tiredness but of a different approach to competition between the two systems — capitalist and socialist. Will it be peaceful rivalry or a military clash tantamount to a global catastrophe? The West maintains that socialism does not display an innovative approach to new problems. But who, if not Washington, displays dogmatism, always relying on strength in everything? The socialist countries draw conclusions from the new situation and take a new look at what is happening in the world. The USSR and its allies have founded their international policy on the principle of peaceful coexistence throughout the postwar period. Hence their conviction that, despite the difficulties that came to light in Reykjavik, the dialogue must continue.

Zhukov: The participants in our discussion seem to agree on the need for new thinking. This is important because, unfortunately, old thinking is more characteristic of many mass media workers outside this "roundtable." I saw this for my self at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Copenhagen, from which I have just returned. There the results of Reykjavik were examined and the tasks of all antiwar forces determined, regardless of their ideological thrust. So, instead of creating an atmosphere conducive to the successful work of the congress, the Western press did everything to hinder it. It failed. The congress was a success. But the attempts to use the results of Reykjavik to fuel pessimism in the antiwar movement are revealing.

The work done in Reykjavik must not go to waste. It revealed the sides' agreement to totally eliminate strategic nuclear arms by 1996. I believe that it is the task of the mass media to help this to become reality. It is necessary to advocate the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. The United States is conducting a campaign of disinformation aimed at convincing the public that the USSR proposes the revision of that treaty. [paragraph continues]

In fact, the USSR's position is that the contries that are party to the treaty should not pull out of it for 10 years and should strictly observe all its provisions.

I agree that sight should not be lost of conventional arms either. But let us recall the proposal advanced in Budapest by the Warsaw Pact countries to begin talks on reducing arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Why has it still not met with a response from the NATO countries?

Moderator: I wish to throw several logs onto the flaring fire of debate. I will remind you that NATO generals were very concerned as soon as there was talk of the possible elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic arms in general. Some people in Washington also started saying that before abandoning the nuclear potential equilibrium should be established in conventional forces and, moreover, a change should be secured in the "political climate" in the USSR. But until this happens, they say, the nuclear potential must be preserved as a "means of deterrence." In short, in addition to shoots of the new thinking, there is also a thinking determined by the old categories of strength.

Jackson: I am no specialist in military matters. But it seems to me that the approach to arms reduction in Europe is of paramount significance. The Warsaw Pact countries are superior to NATO as regards conventional kinds of arms. So, I agree with those NATO generals who say that, before departing from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, it is necessary to find ways to balance conventional kinds of arms.

The proposals advanced in Budapest have been mentioned here. The West has made certain concessions regarding the rules for counting numbers. I think that the new thinking must also be applied to a considerable extent to the size of the armed forces stationed in Europe, as well as in other parts of the world. Without this it is difficult to speak of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Mohan: I am no great supporter of the concept of nuclear deterrence, which Jackson and Ovchinnikov have mentioned. Even in a world free from nuclear weapons the concept of deterrence would be fraught with great dangers. The tragedies in Chernobyl and Bhopall have made it obvious that in densely populated and industrially developed countries war will result in tremendous casualties even without nuclear weapons being used.

Ovchinnikov: Yes, it is also necessary to struggle against conventional war. But the nuclear disarmament program is just part of what the USSR proposes in putting forward the idea of an all-embracing system of international security. It incorporates both the elimination of chemical weapons and a deep cut in conventional arms.

Karnowski: I have a question for my Soviet colleagues. It is said in journalistic circles that the USSR is ready to agree to tests of SDI's ground components outside the laboratory.

Zhukov: The Soviet position has been clearly defined by M.S. Gorbavhev. Taking the U.S. President's attachment to that program into account, the USSR did not demand an end to work on SDI on condition that it does not go outside the laboratories. But the American side would like not just to tackle research but also to test these weapons, including in space, in order to start series production in 10 years' time. Agreeing to this would mean resorting to immense deception of public opinion. People would believe that the ABM Treaty was being observed, while in fact it would have been deliberately made null and void.

What Then Is SDI? [subhead]

Moderator: I will read out one of the numerous letters from our readers. Here is what N. Turov of Kiev writes: "I was struck by the fact that the American side, while being ready in principle to make significant reductions in the arms sphere, refused point-blank to curtail the SDI program. Why do the Americans cling so stubbornly to SDI?" We, too, ought to examine this question.

Suzuki: The Americans believe that SDI will reduce the danger of nuclear war. Why is the USSR against going over from offensive to defensive arms?

Zhukov: What do you yourself think, Mr Suzuki, why are we against SDI?

Suzuki: Perhaps because the energy of nuclear explosions will be utilized under the SDI program?

Ovchinnikov: SDI is a program for the creation [sozdaniye] of multipurpose space weapons designed to neutralize targets both in space and on the earth and, in particular, to destroy satellites — which would mean making the other side blind and deaf. What kind of a defensive system is that?

Tokarski: The question of disarmament is a question not just for the USSR and the United States but for all states. Poland has been active in this direction, starting with the 1957 Rapacki plan to create a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. Unfortunately, not everyone advances initiatives. Neutral European states have played a positive role at the Stockholm conference. They are also contributing to the holding of the Vienna talks. But no initiatives are to be seen from states such as the FRG, Britain, France, and Japan. Some Western states have agreed to participate in the development [razrabotka] of SDI. Is such a step legitimate, for example, for the state on whose territory Hiroshima stands?

Suzuki: President Reagan long ago wanted Japan to support the SDI program. Tokyo expressed understanding of that program and then decided to participate in it. The Japanese Government proceeds from the premise that SDI does not run counter to the ABM Treaty and is not a means of achieving U.S. military superiority over the USSR. As a member of the Western camp, Japan must make a contribution to strengthening its deterrent potential.

Japan would like not to participate in SDI. But, selling far more goods to the United States than it buys from there, because of difficulties in trade and economic relations with the United States Japanhas to make concessions in other matters. One of the concessions is participation in SDI.

Karnowski: When speaking of SDI, frequent mention is made of FRG support for that program. I think that mention should be made of the federal government, not of the whole country. There are different viewpoints on SDI in the FRG. There is a government agreement with the Americans on this question. But broad sections of the population and many political parties disagree with its position.

Zhukov: The American side maintains that SDI is being created [sozdat] exclusively against missiles. And yet an accord was reached in Reykjavík that nuclear weapons are to be destroyed by 1996. What, then, is the purpose of SDI? [paragraph continues]

I answer this question as follows: To hit targets in space and on the earth from space. Space weapons would be a totally new type of offensive weapon. And we are opposed to them.

Jackson: I am surprised that Soviet journalists and Soviet spokesmen believe that the purpose of SDI is to destroy targets on the ground. This is not the task set by President Reagan. The purpose of SDI is to use nonnuclear means to hamper the opposing side's use of offensive kinds of arms. It would be useful if the Soviet side agreed that this is the purpose of SDI.

But if it became possible to eliminate all types of strategic weapons by 1996, then SDI would really have no point either for defensive purposes or as an offensive system, so the Soviet Union believes. Therefore, in my view, what is needed is talks which will lead to the elimination of both sides' strategic weapons. When the existing strategic system disappears, the SDI system will also become pointless.

Karnowski: At the start of our discussion I was filled with optimism. We spoke of new thinking, and that encouraged me. But I am once again getting a pessimistic feeling. The United States does not want to abandon SDI, and the USSR says that the strategic arms talks will produce no result unless the United States abandons SDI.

How do you conceive the further development of events? As an inhabitant of Europe, I am concerned at the question: Will Pershings and SS-20's be kept there? Will Europeans have to continue living side by side with them? And another thing that troubles me — our Indian colleague touched on it: We say the USSR and the United States must eliminate their nuclear weapons and agree on their zero level. But is mankind ready to eliminate what is has created? And what about the nuclear plans of other certain states?

Mohan: In America there are different approaches to the SDI program. First, what was originally proposed by President Reagan was the creation [sozdaniye] of a space shield to cover the United States. Many scientists believe that it is practically impossible to create [sozdat] such a shield. Another concept is more likely — the defense of launch sites and command centers.

Another thing: I cannot understand what the United States is striving for at the talks. It was originally believed that the USSR would never accept the zero option for "Euromissilies.' But the USSR did accept it. What about the United States? A gap has emerged in its position. There is a discrepancy between the publicly proclaimed U.S. proposals and its true aims.

Jackson: I agree that statements by U.S. Adminsitration spokesmen are vague. But account must be taken of midterm elections to be held in the United States in November. This is the least favorable time for ascertaining the adminstration's clear political position. Perhaps my Soviet colleagues will not agree with me, but it makes sense to wait and see what happens after the elections.

Ovchinnikov: Mr Mohan spoke of different concepts of SDI. The idea of an all-embracing space shield is illusory. The variant defense of the positions of strategic missiles and command centers is more likely. But in precisely this way SDI would block disarmament by upsetting the established balance of forces.

Americans say to us: "Create [sozdavat] your own SDI system." But we want to disarm together, not arm together. [paragraph continues]

SDI can essentially have two purposes: to secure military superiority over us and economically drain us of blood. This has no prospects.

Suzuki: My colleague Mohan said that the USSR has submitted good proposals and raised the question of why the Americans have not agreed to them. We must acknowledge that mistrust exists between the United States and the USSR. Reykjavik showed this. There are contradictions that cannot be resolved immediately. Reagan deserves criticism, but he must be given time to think.

Tokarski: It is frequently said that just the elimination of nuclear weapons is the key to solving the chief problems of the present day. I think that the key can only be the comprehensive resolution of a package of problems: the elimination of strategic arms and medium-range missiles and the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. When it is said that Reagan needs time to think, I understand that it is a question of the time needed to realize that these problems must be examined as a package.

Zhukov: I agree that it is a question of interconnected problems. This does not mean that the USSR wants all or nothing. We consider it possible and necessary to examine each problem individually. This is why there are three groups in Geneva — on space weapons, on medium-range missiles, and on strategic arms. But logic demands that the decision be made as a whole, when accords have been reached on all three questions. To eliminate nuclear weapons while leaving space weapons — it is unrealistic to put the question like this.

Moderator: The SDI problem has led to more mistrust and has aggravated difficulties in world politics and international relations. It acts as a block on nuclear disarmament and has become a kind of symbol of unwillingness to take any specific steps in this direction. The ABM Treaty is clear and unambiguous on what is and what is not allowed. The USSR proposed adherence to its provisions. The U.S. side did not agree to this.

The question is: What practical steps are to be taken to move matters further toward a nuclear-free world. In this context I would like to ask: How, under the prevailing circumstances, do you assess the importance of such actions by the USSR as the termination of all nuclear explosions and our unilateral moratorium? What role could be played by the termination of nuclear tests altogether?

Suzuki: In principle, the moratorium is a positive phenomenon. We understand that it was not easy for the USSR to take this step. But the United States has its reasons for acting otherwise. It is difficult to demand that the United States terminate nuclear tests before a mutually acceptable solution is found.

Zhukov: Why is it difficult to demand it?

Suzuki: Because it is difficult to convince the Americans to change their stance.

Jackson: M.S. Gorbachev's political daring is admirable. It was not easy to announce and repeatedly extend the moratorium under conditions where the United States refuses to follow the USSR's example. I admire the moratorium as a political step. In my opinion, however, from a technical viewpoint the moratorium is like placing the cart before the horse. [paragraph continues]

Since both sides expressed in Reykjavik readiness to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals, it is necessary to correspondingly restrict nuclear tests. When nuclear weapons are eliminated, there will be no need for tests.

Mohan: From India's point of view, the termination of tests is a most important step toward curbing the arms race. We are pleased that the USSR has deemed it possible on four occasions to extend its unilateral moratorium. As regards the verification [kontrol] of moratorium observance, this, in my view, is no longer a problem. Recently the USSR has taken important steps in this sphere by agreeing to on-site inspections. But the point is, evidently, that the modernization of nuclear arsenals demands continuation of tests. They are being conducted for the sake of the SDI program's implementation.

Ovchinnikov; Our U.S. colleague approves of the moratorium as a political step, but considers that, technically speaking, halting the tests means "putting the cart before the horse." I am convinced that the "horse" is before the cart. And it is indeed the moratorium that could get the nuclear disarmament wagon moving. The most radical, simplest, and most universal method of halting the qualitataive improvement of nuclear weapons is to terminate tests of them.

Zhukov: Our moratorium was not just a political step, it was a serious practical measure. We still expect the United States to follow our example, just as all peoples demand it.

Difficulties and Hopes [subhead]

Moderator: Life is posing the question of the responsibility of governments, peoples, and the public for what happens to our world.

Karnowski: I agree. A broad discussion on this subject is going on in NATO countries. European states like Britain and even the FRG are not making full use of opportunities to influence U.S. policy.

And yet it cannot be said that West Europe and the FRG in particular are, on the whole, evading their responsibility. In my country there are forces, like, for example, the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], which are aware of their responsibility for the cause of peace. Let me recall in this context the joint SPF-SED proposal on the creation of a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons. I could cite the names of West European social democrats who have put forward numerous important initiatives — Willy Brandt, Olof Palme....

Mohan: India submitted in the United Nations a draft resolution pointing out the danger of nuclear tests and the buildup of nuclear weapons. For their part, the USSR and China have declared that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The majority of countries support this initiative and it is obvious that there can be further progress along this path. Efforts must also be made to ban chemical weapons. As a counterbalance to the SDI program, it would be useful to create a world organization which would serve the cause of cooperation between states in peaceful exploration of space.

Tokarski: G. Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party, spoke aptly about the public's responsibility in the contemporary world by describing it as the "third force." This assessment of the role played by public opinion is made not only by communist parties. [paragraph continues]

It is appropriate to its effectiveness. We saw that in the case of the public's struggle against neutron weapons. I believe public opinion also contributed to everything positive achieved in Reykjavik. I think that the opinion of public organizations and movements is very important for the subsequent stages of the talks.

Zhukov: Some 2,500 public representatives from all corners of the world attended the Copenhagen congress, and 1,870 of them gave speeches. There were many arguments. After all, it was an active dialogue between representatives of various ideological trends. Nevertheless, they reached agreement on the need to launch immediately a joint or a parallel struggle to achieve three specific objectives: elimination of nuclear weapons, prevention of the militarization of space, and termination of nuclear tests. Many participants in the congress signed an appeal which formulated these objectives.

Jackson: The United States is experiencing a difficult period in relations with the USSR, and the whole world feels this. But we recall some equally complex situations—the Cuban crisis, the war in Vietnam, and the events in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. But, for all that, there was no armed conflict. Crises were followed by periods of reduced tension, summit meetings took place, accords were reached. I want to express the hope that a new summit conference will take place and that effective accords in nuclear arms reduction will be signed.

Moderator: Allow me to read an excerpt from a letter received by PRAVDA from G. Mayorov, assistant diesel locomotive driver from the "Tsentrolit" Plant in Saransk. He recalls the history of inventions and pioneers in our country, from the Cherepanov brothers' steam locomotive to Korolev's rocket, from Lodygin's lamp to Gagarin's spaceflight. And then he addresses the U.S. President: "Do you think we have run out of inventors? You may threaten us with SDI, but do not think of us as weaker and stupider than the Americans. Bear in mind that our people will manage to give the the necessary response to any challenge. But what would such recklessness cost both countries, what calamaties would it bring to earth!" And he goes on: "Although our people and yours may have different ways of life, we have the same reflexes of life. Could the U.S. people want to commit suicide? We Soviet people want to live in peace. I wish you speedy recovery from political sclerosis." I wanted to tell you about this working man's viewpoint. It is typical of Soviet public opinion.

So, what next? Are we ready to take real steps toward a nuclear-free world? Can we expect common sense to triumph?

Mohan: It is necessary to ensure collective security for the whole world. We hope that future accords will be aimed at destroying nuclear weapons.

Having expressed this hope, I also want to say that even though the "Third World" countries still lack a broad movement of champions of peace like that in Europe, both the people and many governments in young states exert growing influence on the development of the international situation.

Tokarski: There has been too much pessimism in the world in the wake of Reykjavik. It stems from the fact that the struggle for peace and disarmament has been going on for a long time, while the progress achieved falls far short of the peoples' dreams. Yet Reykjavik did show that, given good will, it is possible to solve even the most complex problems. Optimism stems from the USSR's policy, its good will and desire to reach a compromise.

Jackson: We must be optimists. Significant progress was achieved in Reykjavik, marked by a striking volume of concessions. The leaders of the two powers discussed there the actual concept of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 1996. Reykjavik helps one to be an optimist.

Karnowski: I hope that pressure from the West European public will help us not to have to wait too long for a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and that the problems discussed in Reykjavik will be finally resolved.

Ovchinnikov: It is said that politics is the art of the possible, the art of compromise. But compromises must be mutually acceptable. Now the U.S. side is showing a desire to break apart the package of Soviet proposals, extract all the concessions from it, and give nothing in return. But, as the saying goes, "It takes two to tango."

Suzuki: The USSR and the United States should not chase each other into blind alleys, they should make reciprocal concessions. I think that, in such an event, there will be success.

Zhukov: Quite broad public circles in the West still have a fear of the alleged "Soviet threat." This does not make matters any easier. We do not frighten our people with an American threat. We do not have anti-Americanism as such. We do not have this gut fear of America, like the fear of the USSR that is cultivated in the West. We do everything for better understanding of and cooperation with one another.

I agree with my colleagues that there is a chance to save mankind from destruction. There is a realistic chance for a turnabout toward a nuclear-free world. A practical solution to this historic task is made possible by our "package" in Reykjavik, which is based on the program for the elimination of nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 announced in mid-January. Ultimately everything depends on the people, on the common sense and responsiblity of political forces and statesmen, and on energetic actions by people of good will.

The feature ends with the following boxed item carried under the headline "Strategic Disarmament Initiative: The Foreign Participants in the 'Roundtable Discussion' on M.S. Gorbachev's 22 October Speech on Soviet Television"]

- L. Tokarski: The Washington administration, succumbing to pressure from the military-industrial complex, thinks and acts in the old way. It is particularly active in using hypocritical arguments in defense of SDI.
- M.S. Gorbachev proved that such "arguments" are totally illogical. Contrasting the USSR's clear-cut stance with the U.S. Administration's cynical attitude, he named the problems which must be solved in the interests of all countries. This stance is fully shared by the Poles, a people familiar with the horrors of war.
- J. Jackson: It seems to me that the tone of M.S. Gorbachev's latest speech is much tougher than his speeches immediately after Reykjavik. But, despite all the complexities and misunderstandings in relations between our two countries, I imagine that the dialogue aimed at achieving agreement on arms control will continue.

E. Karnowski: M.S. Gorbachev said in his speech that each day after Reykjavik makes it clear that the meeting in Iceland was the touchstone for testing the real value of words.

When Washington backs the "SDI horse," this means the threat of a new round of the arms race.

West Europe and many of its politicians lack activeness in questions of disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament, decisiveness in distancing themselves from the SDI program, and consistency and persistence in solving the problems of conventional arms reductions.

Y. Suzuki: Mr Gorbachev's speech was simultaneously tough, considered, and constructive. It showed convincingly that the USSR has no intention of making unilateral concessions, that it is impossible to take from the negotiating table only that which suits the United States without giving anything in exchange.

Washington is evidently gripped by confusion. The daring and innovative nature of the Soviet proposals caught the U.S. Administration unawares.

It is pleasing that the Soviet Union does not slam shut the door on talks, considering that Reykjavik raised to a new level the dialogue between the USSR and the United States, between East and West. I would like to express the hope that talks will continue and that Moscow and Washington will pave with joint efforts the way to a nuclear-free world.

R. Mohan: M.S. Gorbachev's speech put in its proper place everything that occurred in Reykjavik, clearly reaffirmed the content of the Soviet proposals, and pointed out the reasons why the agreements that were virtually achieved failed to materialize. I fully agree that the implementation of the SDI program will involve the world in a new stage of the arms race and will destabilize the strategic situation. I would describe M.S. Gorbachev's proposals as a strategic disarmament initiative leading to a world without weapons and without wars.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ROUNDTABLE ON REYKJAVIK, SDI, NFZ, CSCE

LD022218 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 2 Nov 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with political observer Gennadiy Gerasimov; IZVESTIYA first deputy chief editor Nikolay Yefimov; and All-Union Radio Commentator Vitaliy Sobolev]

[Excerpts] [Sobolev] Hello, comrades. The names of the capital of Iceland, as before, remains on the front pages of newspapers. The whole world awaits: What continuation will there now be to the Soviet-U.S. dialogue? To put it briefly, the Soviet Union has said: Our proposals put forward in Reykjavik remain in force. Apropos of this, in Washington they have expressed total optimism and satisfaction and have replied, so to speak, on the basis of reciprocity.

[Gerasimov] They have replied in similar fashion. President Reagan has said that he has instructed Secretary of State Shultz to tell Mr Shevardnadze — they will meet in Vienna soon — that the proposals put forward by America in Reykjavik remain on the negotiating table. Here, of course, it is incomprehensible: What proposals did they put forward there...

[Sobolev, interrupting] Yes, and, in general, it is incomprehensible whether any satisfaction can be derived from it. This depends on a clarification of various circumstances. But I would like, first of all, to draw attention to two points.

Firstly, how to deal with the United States' refusal to limit itself to research and laboratory tests in the work on the Star Wars program? Some Americans, those who are nearer the helm of state, do not want to limit themselves, it seems. Others, also very authoritative people, say that it is doubtful anyway whether the United Sttes will go further in this research beyond the 10-year period proposed by the Soviet Union. THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper, expressing regret that the United States turned down the historic chance which presented itself in Reykjavik, notes that the United States forsook it for a dream about an invention which is difficult to understand even for Nobel prizewinners. THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper calls it a dream imposed by the Pentagon fortune-tellers, while the BALTIMORE SUN newspaper cites a dialogue between its observer and a specialist working on the Star Wars program. Can we launch into space a system that will knock down missiles, says the specialist. Of course. Can we knock down all missiles? No. We will never even come near this. And you want a

trillion dollars, maybe even more, for this? Well, needless to say, the main problem for the whole world is not the trillion, but the fact that this program begins a new round of the arms race and that this system, as it has been called, will hinder us in coming to an agreement on disarmament issues.

[Terasimov] And besides this, one should recall that in November last year, at their first summit meeting, President Reagan and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev agreed not only to stop the arms race on earth, but also to prevent the arms race in space. Here we can reproach the Americans for not adhering to the Geneva accord.

[Yefimov] I would also like to draw attention to two points. When you open U.S. newspapers, and you read the world information agencies' column, you get the impressio that, at the moment, 3 weeks on, they are writing no less, if not more even, than immediately after the Reykjavik meeting. They are writing a very great deal, the Americans in particular, and they are writing about why the assessments of what happened in Reykjavik are changing so abruptly and so frequently.

[Sobolev] Well, in connection with this, Nikolay Ivanovich, I would like to draw attention to the fact that a second doubt arises apropos of the U.S. program which has been passed on as instructions to the delegation at the Geneva talks...

[Yefimov, interrupting] ... new instructions...

[Sobolev] ...new instructions for the delegation at the Geneva talks. It refers already to a point on which, it would seem, agreement had been reached in Reykjavik, and later it turns out that this is not the case. Up until recently, official representatives of the U.S. Government have been arguing that the President agreed at the meeting to scrap not all strategic arms in 10 years, but only ballistic missiles. The difference here is fundamental inasmuch as, according to the U.S. version, the weapons in which the United States has a great advantage are out of the picture: strategic bombers and long-range cruise missiles. A few days ago, a high-ranking White House Official who expressed the wish to remain anonymous told a representative of the press from THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper that he would not begin to argue with the USSR's claim that President Reagan accepted General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal to ban all offensive strategic forces by 1996, and not just ballistic missiles.

[Yefimov] Here are a few facts -- and I will deliberately cite these facts from the serious U.S. newspaper, THE NEW YORK TIMES.

I quote: After the summit meeting broke off on 12 October, Secretary of State Shultz said at his press conference in Reykjavik that the President and Mr Gorbachev -- this is what THE NEW YORK TIMES writes -- had gotten close to scrapping all strategic weapons over 10 years. All this is what THE NEW YORK TIMES writes. This is what It goes on to write: Shultz said the same thing at a briefing for members of Congress on 14 October in Washington, and all this was published. That same day, Senator Sam Nunn, from Georgia, at a meeting with the President, asked him: Had he promised, i.e. had he given his consent, to do away with all strategic weapons? Reagan Yes, he had given his consent. It is only when the right-wingers and extreme right-wingers in the United States made a fuss over this issue and only then that the White House decided to recoup itself and began denying that Reagan had agreed to a total ban on strategic weapons. He merely agreed, but to something else: to scrapping ballistic missiles. People even started to write that Reagan does not understand the difference between ballistic weapons and strategic weapons.

The fact of the matter is that the stance almost adopted by President [Gerasimov] Reagan in Reykjavik simply does not suit certain circles. In fact, what I want to say is that the initial reaction from both the President and the Secretary of State was almost praiseworthy. It was a reaction of regret, of disappointment at not having managed to use this change which came up in Reykjavik. One newspaper wrote that Shultz had the face of someone whose favorite dog had just been run over by a car. expressions on these faces were recorded by the TV cameras of the world. Later, having returned home, they began to talk optimistically about the great headway that had been made in Reykjavik. Suddenly, reverse motion is now applied. Here is a report from Regardless of what happened in Reykjavik, official figures in the United REUTER: States say that at the moment they have a different stance, a stance, that is, only on reducing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of course, it is not a question here of the President's personal qualities, of his forgetfulness or his lack of understanding, it is not at all a question of this. It is simply a question of pressure on him...

[Yefimov, interrupting] ...by right-wing forces...

[Gerasimov] ...not only by right-wingers, but also by his dear allies. One observer, Mary McGrory, wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper: The West is making a fuss. Today Europeans are declaring: We want the bomb. I hope that she isn't right. I am convinced that European public is, all the same, against the nuclear bomb, but the leadership of very many West European countries is for the bomb. For example, the West German chancellor, Kohl, says that, no, we need medium-range missiles. He even uses a little blackmail: If there wont't be any, I shall be forced to increase the force of the Bundeswehr, in order to balance it out.

[Yefimov] Yes, of course, the point here is, what Europe? The Europe of governments or the Europe of peoples?

[Sobolev] In one word, it seems to mee that if one analyzes the statements of those conservative figures who have come to power both in the United States, and in part, in West European countries, then there is even more confirmation of those words spoken by Comrade Gorbachev as far back as his press-conference in Reykjavik, i.e. the striving by right-wing and extreme right-wing circles in the West to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Well, let's see, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR has said the following apropos of this, that in the United States they think that they will once again be able to be the only genuinely global military power.

It is precisely this that the neoconservatives in Reagan's entourage have always openly called for and tried to achieve, and at the moment they are doing it quite manifestly.

[Yefimov] You understand, in Reykjavik not only were certain technical matters discussed, to what levels to go to; essentially our side posed a fundamental question: What is the main aim which both states should pursue — and indeed, not only our two states? Do we want a non-nuclear world or do we want to endlessly continue the arms race to a sorry end?

[Gerasimov] But Reagan says he also wants a non-nuclear world.

[Yefimov] For this, specific actions are necessary and I would like to say that last week NOVOSTI press agency conducted a very interesting roundtable. The topic was: After Reykjavik. Taking part in the roundtable discussions were prominent Western journalists and this same fundamental issue was discussed: How do we want to see today's world and more so, the future world. On this issue the Western countries did give a precise, clear answer. Furthermore, already after the roundtable had ended, in tete-a-tete type conversations, they told us: You pose a question which is probably really the main one, really a very necessary one. But if you want our honest answer, we are not ready to give you a serious answer to your question, neither on a government level, nor on a journalistic level. Such is life.

[Gerasimov] An observer, Flora Lewis, from the paper THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote that unexpectedly the strategists have come up against the prospect that it is possible that they will have to reject their ideas and begin to establish an absolutely new principle and reference points almost from square one. This is the situation which is taking place if we follow the logic of Reykjavik.

[Yefimov] All this leads to the fact that public opinion generally is beginning to doubt whether the present American Administration is distinguishing itself by its consistency and competence, which are necessary for the solution of serious matters on disarmament.

[Gerasimov] Well, in any case, it distinguishes itself by a great love for propaganda. Now, in so far as such serious questions are being discussed, of course it is certainly necessary to return to the thesis of the Soviet military threat. And what do we see? We see that in the American paper THE WASHINGTON POST, in the West German paper BILD, and in the Australian mass media the following frightening article has appeared: That the Russians already have a strategic defense laser, that they have on the whole already left America behind in this area of Star Wars. Furthermore, that they have already put out of operation three American satellites.

[Yefimov] By means of a laser?

[Gerasimov] Yes, this is almost taking place, such a war is almost taking place.

[Yefimov] Well, BILD is a gutter paper.

[Gerasimov] But THE WASHINGTON POST is not at all a gutter paper, so one could think, they really have brought down three American satellites. Two points here.

First, if we are outstripping the United States in the sphere of the Strategic Defense Initiative, why then does the United States not agree with our proposal to stop research in this sphere and not to create space-strike weapons; and secondly, the Soviet Union does not have laser weapons, and the United States knows this perfectly well, because explanations about this have been given to the Americans.

[Sobolev] But official circles are silent about this. I think it is much more a measure of despair, because what we were only just talking about, this is after all taking place in the eyes of the whole world, everyone who has eyes can see. And we were talking about one side, say, about what conservative circles are doing, but there is the public also, they are, as it were, wide awake. After all, the Week of Action for Disarmament has only just ended. It is precisely now, when the pernicious role of the Star Wars program, the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative, has been revealed with special clarity, that the international public has directed its efforts with special energy to expose this initiative — especially the American public.

[Yefimov] Exposing what one might call the main obstacle on the way to disarmament, as was revealed in Reykjavik. And last week the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Cornell Univertsity in the United States polled all members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences — 450 members. more than 80 percent categorically came out against the Strategic Defense Initiative, against SDI. In their opinion SDI is the basic obstacle on the way to achieving agreement on reducing and completely destroying strategic arms. In the opinion of these scholars, conducting work on the SDI program contradicts the obligation taken on by the United States in the framework of Soviet-American treaties, bearing in mind, primarily, the ABM Treaty. The Democrat Senator Proxmire commented on this question in an interesting way. He said that SDI has been adopted by the present administration in order to wreck basic processes in arms control. The best minds in the country, that is, in the United States, he said, are coming out against SDI. It is being propagandized only by a small minority which, however, is in power.

[Gerasimov] A minority is a minority, but there are scientists working on SDI, and unfortunately, the majority of Americans, who do not understand the essence of the matter, support Reagan's idea to create a defense shield over the country.

[Sobolev] Then, what those American scientists who understand this problem are saying is all the more important.

[Yefimov] You have raised a very important idea. Up to World War II the person on the street understood, well, either all or much about the way. Weapons were understood; virtually everyone was familiar with them, the possibilities of these weapons, and so on. Today the situation is such that the arms race has reached such technical and scientific frontiers that it is no longer comprehensible to the ordinary person, and the best minds are needed to give wise advice to nations and governments. The fact that they support it, that the majority of Americans still give support, means that they are playing on the lack of knowledge of these people — on their technical and scientific, well, their inadequate literacy and so on — precisely on this.

[Gerasimov] That's correct, and on a sense of self-preservation, because after all, they promise to guard their lives and defend them.

[Yefimov] Recently in Budapest a session took place of the international commission, the Palme Commission, where a document was adopted on the advice of prominent experts from various countries: What To Do After Reykjavik? Also, a report was adopted on banning nuclear explosions. I would like precisely to return to this question; it has for some reason been a bit overshadowed. Nuclear explosions and their banning continues to remain a priority task and now rumors are going around that allegedly the Soviet Union has somehow changed its position on this question. No, as in the past we think that the stopping of these explosions is an urgent task and the appropriate step to nuclear disarmament. And we are prepared at any time to sign an appropriate treaty.

[Sobolev] We have already talked about the fact that the world public has undertaken vigorous action. In particular, we can mention in this connection the initiative which was advocated by the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany about a nonnuclear corridor in the center of Europe.

[Yefimov] This is a very important initiative. This initiative came into being several years ago in the Palme Commission, and the initiative envisages...

[Gerasimov, interrupting] Now, they have gone a little further -- 150 kilometers to the side, that is, 300 kilometers in width, a nonnuclear corridor of this sort.

[Yefimov] The aim of creating a nonnuclear corridor...

[Gerasimov, interrupting] ...is to set apart...

[Yefimov] ... to set apart two, so to speak...

[Gerasimov, interrupting] ...military groupings...

...military groupings so that there are no accidents. This is very Last week a symposium took place in Sofia which gathered prominent important. political and public figures, scientists, and writers from 23 countries. symposium a long-standing idea was discussed, an idea already partially implemented on earth: the idea of creating nonnuclear zones. The question of corridors was also widely discussed in Sofia. In particular, it was raised by Egon Bahr, a deputy of the FRG Bundestag and director of the Institute for the Study of Questions of Peace and Security in Hamburg. He is also a Social Democrat. He said that the time had come, the time had come to act also here in the center of Europe. And he expressed the hope that not only the GDR and FRG, but Czechoslovakia as well would join this initiative. At this symposium the issue of the creation of zones was widely discussed and, it so turned out, that while the symposium was taking place in Sofia, the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution in which the region of the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America has been declared a zone of peace and cooperation in the southern Atlantic. The resolution urged all states to observe the status of the region of the southern Atlantic, particuarly by means of reducing, and in the final analysis, eliminating the military presence there, the nondeployment there of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. twenty-four states voted for the resolution, eight abstained, and only one power voted against it -- the United States.

[Gerasimov] I think this riddle is easy to work out.

[Yefimov] The United States.

[Sobolev] I would like to point out that the United States, having voted against it, was by no means satisfied with this. The Pentagon reacted in this way to the Brazilian proposal: A highly-placed Pentagon official said: Does Brazil really think that we spend \$1 billion on military ships and submarines, arming them with nuclear weapons. to station them afterwards in the swimming pool behind the White House? Judging by this venomous irony the Americans are intending to station the aforementioned ships and submarines precisely where they should not be stationed in accordance with the decision of the UN General Assembly. An I would also like to point out that substantial friction has arisen between the United States and Brazil in the economic sphere as Well, here is one such sore point, as they call it over there. Brazil has banned the import of foreign electronic computer technology, the so-called information technology, during the course of the next few years, since its young computer industry cannot at present compete with American, Japanese, and other foreign giants. Japanese responded calmly to this law, but it provoked strong irritation in Washington; there they threaten repressive measures against Brazil all the time in the sphere of foreign trade, which pains the Brazilians a great deal in so far as the United States is its main trade partner and, besides that, its main creditor. Although Brazilians, making heavy cutbacks in everything, are successful in selling abroad goods at about \$10 billion more than they buy, they can barely manage to pay off only the interest on their debt. As for clearing off old debts which are now due, it is necessary to take more; foreign currency is very tight. And it is precisely now that multinational corporations operating in Brazil have brought the export of their profits out of the country up to the record sum of more than a billion and half dollars a year, and have sharply reduced new investments. They have dealt a blow, so to speak, at a sensitive spot in the balance of payments in the country. The withdrawal of foreign currency is a very effective method of putting pressure on a government to prevent it from adopting necessary measures in the interest of the state.

[Yefimov] But what is interesting, in Reykjavik—we began with Reykjavik, and, it is clear that this top will remain for weeks to come in the commentaries of observers—in Reykjavik, the evil empire, which the President of the United States Reagan presented us as being, put forward far—reaching proposals—to create a non—nuclear world. And this, of course, does create the impression, both on literate people, and on illiterate people throughout the world. It does so because what could be simplier——let's eliminate all nuclear weapons and every—one understands that after this, life cannot be worse. It can only be better. And what Gennadiy Ivanovich was talking about, this film pursues one aim: to create a foe image. It's as if they can't live without having a foe image, and that is sad.

[Sobolev] Well, on . . .

[Gerasimov] Soon, on November 4th, in the Austrian capital, an important conference will open, the meeting of the representatives of the states taking part in the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This is the third largest milestone after, it you recall, the long conference in Madrid, the large conference in Belgrade, and there was also the conference in Stockholm which ended successfully recently — in general, this is the continuation of the Helsinki process. And, in order to stress the importance of this meeting, we have proposed to open it at the level of foreign ministers. Comrade Shevardnadze will be going there and the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz also. For this reason, the Western press is full of suppositions about what will take place during their meeting next week in Vienna.

[Sobolev] And what will take place?

[Gerasimov] Well, there also will be discussion about what exactly is to be done after Reykjavik.

[Sobolev] Our broadcast has come to an end. Thank you, comrades, for your attention. All the best.

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: U.S. MEDIA SAY SALT II LIMITS TO BE BREACHED

Bombers, ALCMS

LD101751 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 10 TASS -- The Pentagon confirmed Sunday that the United States would soon exceed the limits of the SALT-2 treaty, NBC Television reported.

It quoted Pentagon officials as saying that the United States would exceed the treaty's limits as the 131st B-52 bomber was armed with cruise missiles.

The plane, the TV network said, would be transferred to the Air Force base in Fort Worth, Texas, this week.

THE WASHINGTON POST said that by officially adopting yet another nuclear-capable strategic bomber for service, the United States would be in clear violation of the Salt-2 treaty limiting each side to no more than 1,320 missile warheads and bombers with cruise missile carrying capability.

The paper quoted senior administration officials as saying the deployment of the additional cruise missile-carrying bomber would be in keeping with President Reagan's decision last May to stop respecting the 1972 interim agreement and the 1979 SALT-2 treaty.

The treaty has not been ratified by U.S. Congress but both the Soviet Union and the United States have complied with all its basic provisions.

THE WASHINGTON POST said that another B-52 and a new B-1B strategic bomber would be given cruise missile-carrying capability before the end of the year.

According to U.S. Air Force plans, additional cruise missile-carrying strategic bombers would be completed next year at about two a month, the paper said, adding that by the end of 1988 the United States would exceed the SALT-2 limit by 74 missiles and warheads.

JPRS-TAC-86-094 11 December 1986

Warnke Cited

LD100928 Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 10 TASS -- Paul Warnke, a notable U.S. politician and public figure and a former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has criticized the intention of the Reagan administration to derail the SALT-2 Treaty. In the next day or so, he told THE NEW YORK TIMES, the administration proposes to exceed SALT-2's limits by deploying the 131st cruise-missile-carrying B-52 bomber. "This will not bring us any meaningful strategic gains. On the contrary, it is militarily and economically ill-advised. Coming now, just as the Soviet Union has offered its most far-reaching concessions ever, at Reykjavik, it would constitute an especially gratuitous blow to the arms control process."

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cso: 5200/1099

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS DENIES CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN AFGHANISTAN

LD201501 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1339 GMT 20 Nov 86

[By TASS observer Vasiliy Kharkov]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Nov (TASS) — Slanderous fabrications that Soviet servicemen are using poisonous substances in Afghanistan have once again been put into circulation by Western propaganda. This time round the one spreading these already none too fresh lies is the English magazine "Jane's Defence Weekly". On Wednesday it asserted that, during recent battles against dushmen in the Pagman and Chesmibulbul areas, units are alleged to have shelled the localities with ammunition filled with asphyxiating gases.

In order to make its malicious fabrication appear at least marginally credible, the weekly cites some sort of "diplomatic sources". But this clumsy technique is not sufficient to mask the sordid objectives of the inventors and promoters of such forgeries.

The incessant anti-Soviet fabrications, similar to that published by "Jane's Defence Weekly", are some sort of smokescreen, designed for covering up the wide use of chemical weapons by the Afghan counterrevolution and its patrons in the nondeclared war against the DRA. Mines and grenades stuffed with toxic agents and other items of chemical ammunition are being delivered to the dushman gangs in ever-increasing quantities from the United States, the FRG, Britain, and other foreign states. Not only adult Afghans, but children too are affected by them.

At a press conference held in Kabul in the end of September, convincing new proof of the grave crimes which are perpetrated in Afghanistan by the Western special services, through the hands of mercenary killers from the dushman gangs, was given when these gangs were crushed in the provinces of Kabul, Lowgar, and Vardak. Not only were various types of chemical weapons of Western make seized, but also instructions for the dushmans explaining how to use those weapons in such a way that the blame for their use could be later placed on the Afghan Army and the Soviet military contingent.

No matter how many times you say a lie it does not make it any more credible. And the present forged document, fabricated by the British weekly, shall not help the liars. On the contrary, it only points to those who need the malicious slander of the Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan, and shows what they need it for.

/9604

CSO: 5200/1107

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

TASS ON UN VOTE--New York, November 10, TASS--TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshev reports: Today, by an overwhelming majority of votes, the first committee on the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution on a ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons. The draft resolution, sponsored by the delegations of socialist countries, points out the need to conclude as soon as possible a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The first committee called on all countries to refrain from producing new types of chemical weapons and from deploying them in the territories of other countries. The United States together with its closest NATO partners opposed the draft resolution. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1935 GMT 10 Nov 86 LD] /8918

TASS: SHEVARDNADZE ON CW BAN-Moscow, 10 Nov (TASS)—"The year 1987 may become a decisive one for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons," Eduard Schevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, stated at a press conference today in answer to a question asked by a TASS correspondent. "We can really expect to reach accord on this issue. But very much depends on what the U.S. stand will be." "As far as inspection at request is concerned, the Soviet Union is ready to adopt as the basis for that the proposal introduced by Britain at the Geneva conference." [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 10 Nov 86 LD] /9274

FOURTH ROUND OF USSR-U.S. TALKS--New York, 19 Nov (TASS)--The fourth round of Soviet-U.S. talks on all aspects of the problem of concluding an effective and monitorable international convention on the universal and total banning of chemical weapons was held in New York from 28 October to 18 November. The USSR delegation put forward new initiatives at the talks on guarantees of the nonproduction of chemical weapons in the commercial (civilian) industry, and on on-site inspection on request. The USSR delegation at the talks was headed by Ambassador V.L. Israelyan, Collegium member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. delegation by Ambassador D. Lowitz. [title as received] [Text] ["Soviet-U.S. Talks on Chemical Weapons Held"--TASS headline] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0321 GMT 19 Nov 86] /9604

CSO: 5200/1107

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S GRINEVSKIY DISCUSSES SOVIET TASKS IN CSCE

LD090158 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1705 GMT 8 Nov 86

[From the "International Diary" program; presented by Vladimir Pasko]

[Excerpt] The latest meeting of representatives of the member stated of the CSCE opened this week in the Austrian capital. Comrade Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet delegation at the Stockholm conference and roving ambassador, who is taking part in the meeting, discusses the tasks of Soviet diplomacy:

[Begin Crinevskiy recording] First of all I would like to emphasize that the European process had many facets, one of the most vivid of which is questions concerning the military-political situation: in other words, providing security on the continent of Europe. Of course, these questions constantly depend on what the situation is in Europe, what the situation is in the world. I think the European process has wide new prospects, and those prospects are raised by the situation that has developed in the world since the meeting in Reykjavik between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan. That meeting opened new political horizons, new possibilities for ensuring peace on earth and, particularly, in Europe. In view of the way these possibilities are refracted in European politics, new horizons are evidently opening for Stockholm and for Vienna. The question is whether the participants have sufficient desire, strength, will and imagination to embody these new realities opening up in politics—above all in military-political matters—in real agreements. We believe that these possibilities do exist.

In this connection, I would like to dwell on just two peculiarities of the European process that seem to have come vividly to the fore of late. Probably no one any longer doubts -- especially since the successful completion of the Stockholm conference--that the general European process is one of the best forms of cooperation between East and West. The prospect laid down in Stockholm should be continued, since to some extent the path is now clear, from Stockholm one to Stockholm two via Vienna. The name of the conference leaves no doubt: The Conference on Measures of Trust, Security and Disarmament in Europe. If we have fulfilled the first part, we still have the second part before us; and we therefore advocate, and will continue to advocate, the adoption in Vienna of a mandate for the next phase of the conference that will place at the center of attention at Stockholm two precisely the question of disarmament: the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. As far as we, the socialist countries, are concerned, our program is well known. It comprises the well known Budapest appeal in which our position is set out. [End recording]

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CSO; 5200/1092

TASS OUTLINES U.S. TESTS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LD011435 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 1 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow November 1 TASS -- The United States goes ahead with nuclear tests for the purpose of developing new types of weapons. This is why it is not interested in a moratorium on nuclear explosions.

This conclusion is corroborated in an article for the NOVISTI press agency by Major-General Ivan Anureyev, dr. of military science.

The tests of new types of nuclear weapons are conducted in such areas as the redistribution of energy or warheads according to (?effects); the use of new divisible elements in nuclear weapons; design modifications of munitions; the development of space-based nuclear weaponry. Under development, for example, are nuclear munitions in which more than 70 percent of energy is to be used to produce shock wave. Such munitions are intended for Pershing-2 missiles which are stationed in the FRG and trained on the USSR and other socialist countries.

New MIRVs, nuclear munitions and switchable TNT equivalent, nuclear weapons which penetrate deep into the ground, convertible weapons which can be used both as nuclear and conventional ones are being structurally modified.

Tests under the SDI programme for the purpose of achieving military superiority is yet another area. It includes the development of space strike weapons of space-to-space, space-to-air, and space-to-earth classes, in which both nukes and weapons based on new physical principles will be used.

Large-scale research is already under way in the United States into x-ray lasers which will require tremendous energy. An idea of developing a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser has arised. Several such tests have already been carried out at the Nevada test range. U.S. specialists believe that hundreds of nuclear explosions will be needed to test such a system.

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cso: 5200/1072

SOUTET GENERAL SAYS U.S. DOES NOT NEED NUCLEAR TESTS

AU081502 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 7 Oct 86 p 6

[Interview given by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov to NOVOSTI commentator Vasiliy Morozov: "The Soviet Moratorium--A Unique Action"--date and place not given; initial paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] The issue of the nuclear test ban currently tests the sincerity of the White House's approach to the reduction of nuclear weapons. The American administration's refusal to halt nuclear explosions compromises not only the U.S. policy in the sphere of arms control, but also NATO as a military pact declaring defense to be its objective. This was said by Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, who answered questions posed by MOVOSTI commentator Vasiliy Morozov.

[Morozov] Why does the U.S. Administration—ignoring the interests of the world public, including the interests of the American people—continue nuclear tests at the Nevada range regardless of the Soviet long-term moratorium?

[Chervov] By its stubborn refusal to halt nuclear explosions, the White House places itself, as well as the NATO military pact, in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the world public, since by now it is quite clear to everyone who actually is in favor of genuine steps toward limiting the feverish arms buildup, and who continues to escalate it. In private discussions held in Jurmala on 15-19 September 1986, also rank-and-file Americans were indignantly talking about the hypocrisy of the Washington administration on the issue of nuclear tests, and expressed support for the Soviet moratorium. They stressed that the Soviet moratorium was a unique action, dictated by new thinking, a new approach of the Soviet leadership to the resolution of the main tasks of the present—the halting of the feverish arms buildup and ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war.

A nuclear test ban is the most realistic [najrealnjse] way to bring an end to the feverish arms buildup. Without testing it is impossible to perfect or develop new types of nuclear weapons. If an agreement were to be reached between the USSR, the United States, and other nuclear powers on halting nuclear explosions, this would make it possible to get the entire process of nuclear disarmament out of the impasse. If the moratorium were to become bilateral, a Soviet-American moratorium, this would constitute a powerful impetus for arriving at an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear armament. The political aspect of the matter would also be very significant:

Halting tests would mean introducing in the Soviet-American relations elements of mutual trust, which they lack so much. To put it concisely, one would create a good foundation for a planned, joint work on reducing the level of nuclear confrontation.

[Morozov] What do you say about the American administration's "arguments" to substantiate its unwillingness to halt nuclear tests?

[Chervov] I can say only one thing: Even carefully devised "arguments" cannot cover up the stark nakedness of the U.S. standpoints on the issue of tests. The White House position cannot, in essence, be defended by anything or in any way but by an open U.S. admission that it wishes to continue its nuclear programs.

For a long time the U.S. Administration was hiding behind the issue of verification, which it invented itself: The Russians, allegedly would not assent to verification, and thus there was nothing to talk about. However, after the Soviet Union declared that the question of verification was no problem, that it agreed to any of its forms, also international, including on-site inspections, it emerged that the Washington ruling circles were simply scheming. Now they are forced to come out from their cover and show their true colors, that is, as was the case in the Hans Christian Andersen story—it has shown that "the emperor has nothing on."

Equally false showed themselves be the White House assertions that the design of the Soviet nuclear weapons is simpler and therefore there is no need to keep checking them, while the American ones are allegedly more complicated, and in order to ensure their reliability one has to keep on thesting them.
[as received]

Things are different in reality. Fissionable materials used in various types of wapons also age. Therefore there is no reason to test simple or complicated weapons more often. The reliability of nuclear weapons depends to a great extent on the condition of their automatics [automatika], that is, non-nuclear components and devices. And one does not need any explosions to test automatics. One can employ many other methods to do that (hydrodynamic tests, mathematical modelling, an objective analysis of the control data of telemetric measurements, and so forth).

The real situation in the issue of nuclear tests is as follows: the over-whelming majority of nuclear tests in the United States (17-18 explosions annually) is carried out within the framework of the Department of Energy, which develops new types of nuclear weapons. Regarding the ammunition, which is a part of armament, this is the responsibility of the Pentagon, which conducts 1-2 tests annually with the objective of checking the resistance of normal weapons systems and military equipment to the destructive factors of a nuclear explosion. At the same time, one also checks the reliability of ammunition. Well, when you consider that the United States has some 40 different types of nuclear weapons, not one of them can be checked by means of an explosion more often than once every 25-30 years. From this it follows that

for all practical purposes it is not essential to check the reliability of the existing American ammunition by means of explosions.

The United States has carried out more explosions than all nuclear powers put together. Compared with the Soviet Union, it has carried out approximately one—third more nuclear explosions. No matter what period we taken into consideration (15, 10 or 5 years), the superiority in the number of nuclear weapons tests is clearly on the side of the United States. It has carried out more nuclear explosions than the USSR, and that in all environments (in the atmosphere, underground, and underwater).

Therefore those who speak about some sort of lagging of the United States in nuclear tests, would like—in reality—to preserve for the United States the possibility of developing new types of nuclear weapons, and thus continuing the feverish arms buildup. The true reason for the unwillingness of the American Administration to renounce nuclear explosions is hidden in Washing—ton's effort to upset the balance of forces to its own advantage. It is to this end that the programs for the development of new types of weapons—the MX strategic weapons, the Trident—2, the Minuteman, as well as nuclear devices of various designations for offensive space devices in accordance with the "Star Wars" program—are oriented. There simply are no other reasons.

/9274 CSO: 5200/1101

TASS: PERLE 'CONSCIOUSLY OVERESTIMATED' USSR NUCLEAR TESTS

LD031137 Moscow TASS in English 1019 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] Washington November 3 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yuriy Shvets reports:

Some [word indistinct] administration officials of influence oppose the expediency of the United States imposing a moratorium on nuclear tests and to justify their obstructionist stance resort to the far-fetched pretexts that a test ban would not be verifiable, says an article published in the magazine "U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT."

One of these officials, the magazine writes, is Richard Perle, assistant defence secretary, who had recourse to direct misinformation of both the United States and world public on this issue.

For several years he consciously overestimated by 30 per cent the size of nuclear explosions conducted earlier by the Soviet Union and on this "ground" repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of "violating" the terms of the threshold test ban treaty, which limits test to 150 kilotons, which is known not to have been ratified by the United States.

"You would have to be crazy to conclude that the Soviets were cheating," a top-ranking Pentagon official told the magazine. Judging by everyting, Perle was this time short on justifications. He cannot be reached by journalists trying to compel him to comment on the statement made by his colleague, the magazine writes.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1072

MOSCOW: U.S. 'VIOLATION' OF MONITORING ACCORD ASSESSED

LD301430 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] The U.S. State Department has limited to 1 week the visit of the Soviet scientists who are due to come to the United States in order to determine the site for the installation of seismographic equipment to monitor [kontrol] nuclear tests. The American scientists who have been installing similar equipment in the USSR have described the State Department's decison as discriminatory. Here is a "Mayak" commentary: At the microphone is political observer Nikolay Shishlin.

On the whole, this is a rather amusing story. For many long years the United States has been speculating about the Soviet Union's approach to the question of monitoring [kontrol]. They have been claiming that the Soviet Union has far too morbid an attitude to this problem, and is evading monitoring [kontrol], preferring to talk just about practical steps connected with limiting the arms race.

But here we have the Soviet Union calling for each practical step toward limiting and curtailing the arms race being accompanied by proper and very strict an binding measures for monitoring [kontrol] the curtailment of the arms race. And it finds that the United States was indeed speculating when it spoke about its desire to establish strict monitoring [kontrol] over measurees to restrict and curtail the arms race.

This story about the siting of the American seismographs close to our nuclear testing ground at Semipalatinsk, and the United States' violation of the accord about the siting of coresponding apparatus close to the Nevada Desert where the American nuclear tests are being carried out, gives a clear indication of who favors monitoring [kontrol] and who is against it. But this is not the only issue. It is not just a matter of who is for monitoring [kontrol] and who is against it. This, in point of fact, shows who favors limiting and curtailing the arms race and who is against limiting the arms race. This shows who favors improving the international climate and who favors maintaining international tension and of raising the level of confrontation.

I believe, nevertheless, that such_self-exposure helps matters. The more so since now this very problem — the liquidation of the nuclear arms race — is not just a Soviet-American matter, it belongs to the whole world community. And that community believes that the Americans cannot keep giving their wretched "no" to every such proposal when the world community, and the Soviet Union, calls for a sharp turn for the better.

That is why it seems to me that this latest story connected with the violation of the agreement between the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences and the well-known Society for Environmental Protection in the United States serves, of course, as an additional argument both for the public and for political circles in the United States that American foreign policy is not only vulnerable to criticism, but that American foreign policy is in need of alternations, and radical ones at that.

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cso: 5200/1072

TASS SCORES U.S. NUCLEAR TEST BAN STANCE AT REYKJAVIK

LD301727 Moscow TASS in English 1643 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Iceland that the two countries immediately sit down to negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Showing flexibility and readiness to work out mutually acceptable decisions, the Soviet side announced its readiness to review at some point in those negotiations the question of "ceilings" on the yield of nuclear blasts, the question of the number of nuclear explosions a year and the fate of the treaties on the limitation of the yield of subterranean nuclear weapons tests and on nuclear tests for peaceful purposes, which had not been ratified through the fault of the United States. This approach of the Soviet Union made it possible to work out a full-scale treaty on the total and ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The sides were close to working out a mutually acceptable formula on that important issue in Reykjavik. The USSR announced, in particular, that it did not make the beginning of the talks on the total and ultimate prohibition of nuclear testing conditional on the U.S. joining the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union's clear and unambiguous proposals on nuclear and space weapons, put forward by the Soviet leader in Reykjavi, were appreciated by the world public as a realistic program of lessening the threat of nuclear war and achieving a breakthrough in international relations, a program which was making it possible to advance toward a nuclear-free world.

U.S. officials had to perform circus tricks in a bid to gloss over in the eyes of world public opinion the obstructionist stand of the U.S. Administration on the "Star Wars", which blocked large-scale agreements on disarmament, including a nuclear test ban accord. Meanwhile, Washington politicians no longer say that an end to nuclear testing is the ultimate goal of the Reagan administration. Conversely, they point out more and more often that nuclear testing is needed to modernize weapons of mass annihilation—that is, to continue the nuclear arms race in perpetuity.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, making public statements after the Soviet-American summit in Iceland, used several times a play of words to his liking, saying that the sides had reached accord in Reykjavik on the notes but not on the melody. There is every reason to believe that the "melody" Shultz is so fond of is the continued roar of nuclear explosions at the U.S. Nevada test site.

The Soviet nuclear test sites, meanwhile, have been silent for almost 16 months now. The USSR will honour its moratorium on all nuclear explosions till January 1, 1987.

One cannot agree more with Shultz's remark to the CBS T.V. company that, in the field of nuclear testing, "The melody they (the Soviet Union -- V.B.) want to play around that is different from the melody we want to play."

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CSO: 5200/1072

USSR SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

PRAVDA Supports Corridor

PM281554 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Second Edition p 5

[Vladimir Mikhaylov "Commentator's Column": "For Europe's Benefit"]

[Text] In Europe, in the homeland of the Helsinki charter for peoples and states to live together peacefully, the shoots of the new political thinking are multiplying and there is growing activity in favor of ridding the continent of weapons of mass destruction. A document "On the Principles of the Creation of a Nuclear-Free Corridor in Central Europe" has just been published in Bonn.

This important document was drawn up and adopted by major parties in two states with different systems and political orientations — the SED in the GDR and the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] in the FRG. This, too, is a sign of the times. An example of how to rise above differences and reach accords which improve the prospects of creating a stable situation in Europe what is the essence of the new peace—loving initiative? Along the borders separating the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, a corridor free from nuclear weapons is to be created, 150 km wide on each side — that is, with a total width of 300 km. It includes parts of the territory of the FRG, the GDR, and the CSSR. Later, the corridor is to be extended to the size of a nuclear—free zone.

The appeal from the initiating parties for talks to begin on creating first a corridor and then a zone is highly topical. The CPCZ's alignment with this initiative has already been announced in Czechoslovakia.

Things are more complex in the West. Here zealous attempts are being made to revise the American side's agreement in Reykjavik on individual propositions in the "package" of Soviet proposals and in general to break it up into sections and destroy the organic connection between the components. The accord on the entirely ridding Europe of medium-range nuclear weapons and on freezing shorter-range missiles and embarking on talks about their future is being subjected to fierce attacks.

FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, who is now in the United States, declared that "the mountain of nuclear weapons has helped to preserve peace" and that without it, "the threat of war will grow," since the Warsaw Pact countries supposedly have "clear superiority" in conventional arms. That is a false thesis. Just the other day the U.S. secretary of state showed that Western Europe has sufficient defense potential to get by without

nuclear weapons. If there are still any doubts, why have the FRG and NATO as a whole not yet responded to the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal for a radical reduction in conventional arms? Bonn now has a real chance to prove in practice the sincerity of its assurances that it is ready to do everything possible to ensure that war never starts on German soil.

As for the Soviet Union, the objectives of our continent's great movment for a nuclear-free Europe are our objectives, too. We have supported and continue to support the creation of zones free from weapons of mass destruction, whether in the north, the center, or the south. They could become the precursors of the complete liberation of the entire earth from such weapons.

Gerasimov Speaks on Corridor

LD281539 Moscow TASS in English 1506 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 28 TASS -- Speaking at a meeting for Soviet and foreign journalists here today, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, has touched upon the issue of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. On October 21, he recalled, the representatives of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (the FRG) and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (the GDR) came up with a proposal to form a nuclear-free corridor on each side of the line diving the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty states.

The Soviet Union's attitude to this issue, Gerasimov said, is determined by its consistent line for limiting and narrowing the sphere of military preparations, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction. The USSR stands for measures which promote the non-proliferation of neclear weapons, for zones free of these weapons and of other systems of mass annihilation.

At one time the Soviet Union has positively reacted to the initiative by the Palme Commission, of which the current proposal is the development. The Soviet side gave a principled and positive assessment of this proposal by the two parties during the visit to West Germany of the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This proposal, once implemented, would help, we believe, relax the tense situation of military confrontation and would be an important step towards strengthening peace and security on the European Continent, the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry said. In this connection the essential point of the initiative made by the two parties is that under its plan its presupposes forming a corridor as not an ultimate goal but as a part of a broader process in setting up a non-nuclear zone in central Europe, Gerasimov

UN Delegation on Corridor

LD040649 Moscow TASS in English 0632 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 4 TASS -- The Soviet delegation at the 41st U.N. General Assembly voiced its support for an important initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (GDR) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (FRG) which favoured a "nuclear-free corridor" in central Europe. Soviet representative V.L. Israelyan said at the First Committee of the General Assembly that the constructive content of this initiative convincingly corroborated a possibility for achieving concrete understandings on disarmament provided there was a new realistic approach to problems of ensuring security, irrespective of differences in political views.

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cso: 5200/1072

TASS: FRENCH SINK TRAWLER FOR ENTERING PROPOSED TEST SITE

LD101454 Moscow TASS in English 1232 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Text] Canberra November 10 TASS--TASS correspondent Aleksey Voronin reports: A French patrol boat sank the Southern Raider fishing trawler flying the Panamanian flag, since it entered an area where Paris intends to move its proving ground to test nuclear weapons. The trawler was sunken by gun and machine-gun fire on October 9 in the area of Saint Paul Island in the southern Indian Ocean. Such a statement was made by Australian John Chadderton, trawler master, in a telephone interview with the Sydney newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH.

In the captain's opinion, the French, after inflicting an irreparable damage on the Pacific atoll of Muroroa, are planning now to shift their nuclear tests to the island of Kerguelen 1,500 kilometres south of Saint Paul. DAILY TELEGRAPH writes today that reports are wide-spread in the French overseas department of Reunion with regard to secret plans of shifting tests to Kerguelen. This idea is not new. Back in 1984 these intentions were blurted out by Bernard Ledun, French consul in Melbourne, who later "explained" that that was his "personal opinion." Now the accident with the Southern Raider corroborates the existence of these plans.

"We are the second Rainbow Warrior," said J. Chadderton in his interview to DAILY TELEGRAPH, recalling the fate of the ship owned by the Greenpeace organization, which had planned to head a "peace expedition" against nuclear tests on the atoll of Muroroa. In 1985 the French intelligence service blasted the Rainbow Warrior in the harbour of the New Zealand city of Oakland.

The French are seeking to cover up the traces after the attack on the trawler, as it was the case with the Rainbow Warrior. At first Chadderton was proposed a big bribe to keep mum about the sinking and to confess that the Southern Raider had been illegally in the above area. When he refused "to confess" and continued insisting that the trawler had been engaged in legal fishing and oceanographic investigations, the entire crew was charged with drug trafficking and other crimes.

Rumours were circulated that the captain himself had given an order to sink the trawler to cover up evidence. At present the crew is forced to stay in Reunion.

DAILY TELEGRAPH points out that the Australian Government already expressed its dissatisfaction with Paris' intention to shift tests to Kerguelen. In case there is a radioactive discharge into the atmosphere during future tests, the lethal cloud can be swept in the direction of the fifth continent by winds prevailing in the area of Kerguelen.

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CSO: 5200/1072

MOSCOW: INFORMATION ON SEISMOLOGICAL VERIFICATION OF TESTING

Komsomol Paper Interview

PM241300 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 86 p 3

[S. Leskov report: "At the Epicenter of Silence"]

[Excerpts] Karkaralinsk, Bayanaul, Karasu -- A group of American seismologists and representatives of the Western news agencies visited the region of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range, where preparations are nearing completion for the second phase of the Soviet-American experiement in verifying that no nuclear tests are carried out. [passage omitted]

A unique scientific experiment is in progress, planned by the USSR Academy of Sciences and an influential nongovernmental organization which exists in the United States, funded by private subscriptions — the Natural Resources Defense Committee. We have already written about the first phase of the experiment, which began back in July.

And now the second phase is here. The most authoritative minds in seismology believe that it will make it possible to finally resolve the difficult task of recording nuclear explosions of even a minimal yield. In the first phase, equipment for recording surface vibrations was installed at three points around the testing range. But the equipment was on the surface — which means it is subject to the effect of wind, rain, and temperature fluctuations. In this important matter errors must be eliminated. It was decided to lower the instruments into 100-meter wells, where they will not be affected by the elements.

It did not prove easy to drill deep wells in the hard granite rock. All the same, the Soviet drilling workers succeeded.

Karkaralinsk, Bayanaul, and Karasu are the three points in Karaganda, Pavlodar, and Semipalatinsk Oblasts where the Soviet-American experiement is taking place. Our squadron of five much-used Antonovs flew around all three settlements: Is it all ready for the new, highly important second phase of the experiment? And the restless special correspondents of the American magazines U.S. NEWS WORLD REPORT and PEOPLE, West German and Japanese television, Czechoslovak radio, the news agencies of Italy, Hungary, and the GDR, the Japanese newspaper ASHAI, and other publications asked questions at every opportunity.

Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was the subject of the journalists' special attention. There was no end to the questions addressed to this leading specialist in the sphere of atomic physics:

[Question] What is the reason for the White House adminstration's refusal to issue entry visas to the Soviet seismologists who are planning to install similar equipment around the Nevada testing range?

[Velikhov] Our scientists are offered a choice between two options. Either to visit American university centers, or to participate directly in nuclear tests at the Nevada testing range. The former is irrelevant to the problem, and the latter must be regarded as a political provocation. Clearly Soviet scientists, who advocate a nuclear moratorium, cannot take part in carrying out explosions and thus sanction them. But the American side does not want to submit to verification.

[Question] Is the Soviet side planning to switch off the seismological equipment if an accord is not reached on this matter with the United States?

[Velikhov] We believe that the experiment serves the cause of peace. The agreement on cooperation has been concluded for a year, and we are not against extending it, regardless of the American Administration's actions.

[Question] Suppose an accord is reached on a bilateral moratorium. In this case, would it not be possible to carry out secret nuclear weapons tests?

[Velikhov] Skeptics and opponents of the moratorium express doubts, suggesting that by carrying out tests on the "tail" of earth tremors, which would be superimposed on the pictures of the explosion and camouflage it, or in an artificial cavity which extinguishes seismic waves, it would be possible to carry out deliberate deception. These doubts are based on the mistaken idea that the bowels of the earth are silent and tranquil, and only begin to shake at the moment of a test. The earth does not "slumber" for a moment, it displays stormy seismic activity, but every source of vibrations has its own specific features as to amplitude, frequency, and direction. An experienced seismologist and decipherer can identify and even localize the source of increased activity from the seismogram. Moreover, the preparations for nuclear tests require such a volume of work that it is simply impossible keep it secret.

[Question] Is a moratorium really necessary? Might it not be possible to create new types of nuclear weapons even without tests at the ranges?

[Velikhov] Realistically, I see no such possibility. That is why the U.S. President, gambling on the SDI program, which presupposes new types of weapons, cannot renounce nuclear tests. As M.S. Gorbachev said, the President is the prisoner of the military-industrial complex. The SDI program is advantageous to big business, and it is big business which largely determines U.S. government policy. Our age, when the nuclear threat hangs over all mankind, requires a new way of thinking, more mature than before. At the Reykjavik meeting M.S. Gorbachev proposed a realistic plan for the gradual reduction and complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war. This is a test of our maturity. The world is now at a crossroads, and I believe it will find a chance to survive. The Soviet-American experiment offers one such chance. Our work is urgent, it is necessary as quickly as possible to convince all those who doubt that foolproof verification that nuclear tests are not taking place is possible. [passage omitted]

TASS Correspondent Report

LD112341 Moscow TASS in English 2134 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 11 TASS -- By TASS Correspondent Anatoliy Lazarev

Despite obstacles put by the Reagan administration, the second stage of the Soviet-American project on studying the possibilities of verifying compliance with the terms of a potential agreement on banning nuclear tests has begun in the United States.

The first stage took place on Soviet territory within the framework of an arrangement between the Soviet academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defence Council.

A press conference, held in La Jolla, California, on Monday, was addressed by Dr. Thomas Cochran, chief geophysicist with the natural Resources Defence Council, who stressed the importance of the joint project.

Its aim, he said, was to demonstrate the real possibility of verifying the sides' compliance with a nuclear-test moratorium.

This should encourage the introduction of a worldwide ban on such tests to prevent the development of new types of nuclear weapons, he observed.

Cochran said that the council suggested that the Reagan administration take part in implementing the project. But Washington rejected the offer, stating that it opposed a moratorium on nuclear tests since they were necessary for ensuring the reliability of nuclear weapons and developing new weaponry systems.

THE NEW YORK TIMES observed in this connection that the Soviet Union had been observing a nuclear moratorium since August 1985.

Igor Nersesov, a Soviet seismologist working at the Institute of the Physics of the Earth under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, rejected the claims by some Washington figures that the principal aim of the joint project was of a propaganda character.

"What kind of propaganda is it," he asked, "if we all will live in a better an safer world without nuclear weapon tests?"

Observers pointed out that Soviet seismologists, although allowed to enter the U.S., did not enjoy the freedom of action that had been granted to their American counterparts in the USSR.

THE NEW YORK TIMES said that the group of Soviet scientists had planned to visit the potential sites for the installation of monitoring equipment in Nevada State but could not do that because of the requirements of the visa issued by the U.S. Administration.

As to the American scientists, the newspaper added, they had been in the area adjacent to the Soviet nuclear test site since July this year.

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cso: 5200/1072

PRAVDA INTERVIEWS NORWEGIAN PREMIER ON ARMS ISSUES

PM121537 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland by Own Correspondent M. Kostikov: "Security Is A Common Cause"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Oslo, Nov--M. Kostikov, PRAVDA own correspondent in the North European countries, asked Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party (social democrats), to answer a number of questions.

[Kostikov] Prime Minister, how do you assess the USSR's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which has been in force for more than a year now?

[Brundtland] The Norwegian Government regards the complete cessation of nuclear tests as an important arms control measure. That is why Norway participates actively in the international efforts in favor of ending nuclear tests both in the United Nations and at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

The Norwegian side has expressed its readiness to support measures capable of promoting the complete cessation of nuclear tests. In our view, such measures will be most effective if they are implemented in an accord among the interested sides.

[Kostikov] If the United States joined the Soviet moratorium, would it be possible to reliably monitor [kontrolirovat] its observance?

[Brundtland] Norway has considerable knowledge in monitoring [kontrol] the observance of a future agreement on ending nuclear tests. Recently, at the summer session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, we presented a new working document on seismic verification [proverka] of the observance of an agreement on ending nuclear tests. In this connection the Norwegian side noted with interest that at the Geneva Disarmament Conference the Soviet Union had recently advocated the development of a system for the exchange of information on wave configuration as part of a global seismic network. We believe it encouraging that U.S. and USSR experts will continue to exchange opinions on all questions connected with nuclear tests.

Recent scientific research in the sphere of seismic monitoring [kontrol] of the ending of nuclear tests, to which Norway itself made a concrete contribution and in which it has accumulated considerable expertise, has shown that the possibility of effective monitoring [kontrol] is now quite considerable. Most important now are the technical problems which need to be resolved—problems connected with recording low-yield explosions and underground explosions.

[Kostikov] Do you believe that the ending of nuclear tests could be a first step toward curbing the nuclear arms race?

[Brundtland] We believe that the ending of nuclear tests could be an important measure in the context of efforts to secure profound reductions in nuclear arsenals.

[Kostikov] How do you regard the U.S. statement that America needs the continuation of nuclear tests specifically for the practical implementation of its "star wars" plans?

[Brundtland] Norway has reportedly urged the prevention of an arms race in space. Above all it is our hope that the U.S.-USSR bilateral disarmament talks in Geneva will yield such a result. It is very important in this regard for both sides to show restrain.

[Kostikov] How do you view the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons?

[Brundtland] The U.S. and USSR statement that their long-term goal is the compelte elimination of nuclear weapons is very important. In particular, the accord between President R. Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Geneva summit last year to make it their aim to reduce strategic nuclear armaments by 50 percent is of great significance. The work of eliminating nuclear weapons is by nature a lengthy process. A number of important problems have still to be resolved. Thus we noted with disappointment that the Reykjavik meeting did not produce concrete results in the disarmament sphere. Nevertheless, so much was achieved in Iceland that there must be a good basis for further talks in Geneva.

Although the complete elimination of nuclear weapons may be a realistic possibility only in the long term, Norway believes that in the framework of the talks currently being held an accord on substantial reductions of both strategic armaments and medium-range missiles should be reached.

[Kostikov] How do you regard the proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe?

[Brundtland] The discussion of the problems of a nuclear-free zone in the north is also a part of the continuing efforts to reduce the nuclear arsenals in Europe. From the Norwegian side we have stressed that work in this sphere must be conducted as part of a broader European settlement within the framework of our NATO membership.

[Kostikov] What is your view on the need for a new approach to the resolution of international problems and for new political thinking, which presupposes the solution of these problems by means of cooperation and compromise, not by military confrontation?

[Brundtland] We share the view that problems in the world must be resolved by peaceful cooperation, not by military confrontation. In the nuclear age the security of all states is interdependent. In this connection I should like to stress the significance of the concept originally put forward by the Palme Commission: namely, common security.

In conclusion, I should like to say that for the present Norwegian Government, as for previous ones, the development of relations with our neighbor, the Soviet Union, is an important aim. The creation of mutual understanding, which is the precondition for stable relations between neighbors, requires the maintenance of broad and regular political dialogue. Incidentally, I am looking forward impatiently to my visit to Moscow this December in connection with the upcoming session of the UN Environment Committee.

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CSO: 5200/1093

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: BCP'S ZHIVKOV TO SYMPOSIUM ON EUROPEAN NFZS

LD271955 Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Text] Sofia October 27 TASS -- "The bold and constructive proposals put forward in Reykjavik by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, became the manifestation of a new political thinking corresponding to the realities of the present-day world."

"The USSR's stand will undoubtedly have an effect on the efforts of the governments and peoples of the world aimed at curbing the nuclear-missile arms race, at developing the process of disarmament, and at improving international relations," emphasizes a message of greetings sent by Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), president of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The message was read out by Dimitur Stanishev, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, at an international symposium which has opened here. The symposium's subject is "nuclear weapons-free zones in Europe."

"The address by the Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO countries on establishing in Europe zones free from nuclear weapons has met with broad support among European and world public."

"These ideas apply to northern Europe and the Balkans, to Central Europe and the Iberian Peninsula," the message says.

"The Soviet Union's readiness to guarantee the status of such zones has had a positive effect on the strengthening of this movement."

"Bulgaria is one of the most active initiators of making the Balkans a zone free from nuclear weapons."

"Availing myself of the opportunity, I want to state once again that Bulgaria is ready immediately to begin to discuss matters related to the realisation of this idea at any time, any place, and at all levels. Of course, we as realists take into account the fact that the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones has opponents."

"This requires still greater purposeful actions on the part of all public forces which, irrespective of their political and ideological affiliation, sincerely strive for stronger peace, security, and better mutual understanding among nations."

"One would like to believe that the Sofia symposium which is being held in the international year of peace will give a new impulse to the idea of establishing zones free from nuclear weapons."

The Bulgarian leader voiced confidence that the forces of reason would prevail over the forces of militarism.

"Security and peace will triumph on earth, our common home," Todor Zhivkov's message of greetings emphasized.

/8309 CSO: 5200/1072

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS COMMENTATOR ON 'SCIENTISTS FOR PEACE' SYMPOSIUM

LD101622 Moscow TASS in English 1540 GMT 10 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, November 10, TASS--By TASS commentator Vasiliy Kharkov

An international week-long campaign under the slogan "Scientists for Peace," which opened in Japan today, involves scientific workers from 24 countries who will take part in symposiums in 15 Japanese cities on practical measures to bridle the nuclear arms race.

It is the shared opinion of all these scientists that a complete end to nuclear testing should be among such measures.

They stress the need for a moratorium on nuclear explosions as a call of the times.

Silence has reigned supreme on the Soviet nuclear testing ranges for 15 months—the time the Soviet moratorium has been in effect.

It was declared on August 6, 1985, when the world observed the 40th anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima, the first victim of U.S. use of nuclear weapons, and evoked tremendous political response.

When the Soviet Union renewed its moratorium unilaterally for the 4th time, its significance and value were recognized worldwide.

Most members of the international community, including socialist countries, non-aligned nations and the "Delhi Six" group, supported the Soviet moratorium and urged Washington to follow suit.

Many speakers in a general debate at the current Vienna followup meeting of the states participating in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe also insisted on an end to nuclear blasts as a most important condition of stopping the nuclear arms race.

One of the Soviet proposals that made the integral package tabled at Reykjavik was that for starting full-scale talks on a total ban on nuclear testing.

Washington's SDI program, however, proved a barrier to delivering mankind from nuclear weapons. It became the main stumbling block on the way to a nuclear-free world.

It is to further this militarist program for developing more deadly kinds of weapons that Washington is pressing on with nuclear blasts.

But the Reykjavik meeting has shown that agreements towards nuclear disarmament are possible. This is why the campaign for and end to nuclear explosions and for a nuclear-free world has reached new frontiers which are characterized by vigorous actions by broadest public circles.

The current international week of action for peace in Japan is added evidence of this.

All people of good will see the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts as confirming the sincerity of the Soviet program for disarmament.

The USSR is fully resolved to do everything it can for a nuclear-free peace triumph all over this planet by century's end.

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CSO: 5200/1093

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS: U.S. N-TEST VERIFICATION—Washington November 3 TASS—The assertions of spokesmen of the Reagan administration to the effect that the U.S. cannot join the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests because it cannot be verified with the help of national technical facilities are obviously farfetched. This follows, specifically, from an article published by the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. According to the article, the U.S. has in Norway a system of observation over nuclear explosions which permits to register explosions of various capacity in the territory of the Soviet Union. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0755 GMT 3 Nov 86] /8309

TASS ON MURUROA TEST--Paris, November 13, TASS--On Thursday France conducted another underground nuclear explosion on Mururoa Atoll in the southern Pacific. According to a report by the FRANCE PRESSE NEWS AGENCY from Wellington today, the explosion with a yield of 20 kilotons, which was recorded by New Zealand seismologists, has become the 83d nuclear test conducted by France in the area since 1975. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0651 GMT 13 Nov 86 LD] /8918

cso: 5200/1093

TASS REPORTS SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FORUM ON SECURITY IN SWEDEN

LD132113 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] Stockholm November 13 TASS--Matters of creating a system of comprehensive security of states in the light of the conclusions of the Palme Commission's final report were on the agenda of the seminar that social democratic organization, the peace forum of the Swedish working class movement, held here today. The seminar was attended by prominent public figures and politicians of Sweden and a number of other countries, among them representatives of the USSR and the USA.

Addressing the seminar's opening, the head of the Swedish delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin noted the great role of the Late Olof Palme in averting the threat of nuclear catastrophe and in the struggle for peace.

Secretary of the Palme Commission Hans Dahlgren set out the main conclusions and proposals of the commission's final report. The commission holds that nuclear war cannot be won and that the security of one country must not be built at the expense of other states. The commission proposes the reduction of strategic offensive armaments and medium-range missiles in Europe, the conclusion of an international treaty on complete banning of nuclear testing, the creation of a zone free from nuclear battle field weapons in central Europe, observance of the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty.

The forum's president, Sweden's Foreign Minister Sten Anderson pointed out that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is utterly groundless and said it is necessary to create a comprehensive system of security of countries. The minister said that the United States "Strategic Defense Initiative" which blocks progress at Soviet-U.S. talks has been the obstacle to achieving agreements in the Icelandic capital. The minister said Sweden has always been very doubtful of the plans of creating an anti-missile space defense. The banking on this leads to the further arms race which, far from consolidating security, engenders uncertainty. The creation of such a system requires huge spending which could be channeled to other purposes.

Sten Andersson recalled that the leaders of the Delhi Six demanded the termination of the arms race on earth and its prevention in space, declared for the conclusion of an international treaty on complete ending of nuclear testing. A successful conclusion of the talks on a complete ban on chemical

weapons under way at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament could become an important step toward easing tension.

Emphasizing the importance of all aspects of the European process that was started in Helsinki, the minister highly assessed the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence— and Security—Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the Final Document adopted on its results. The Swedish Government holds that the mandate of the Stockholm Conference adopted at the Madrid meeting must be expanded to comprise matters of disarmament in the European continent.

The speech of deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency L. Hansen was discordant to other speeches. He tried to by-pass the problem of the elimination of strategic offensive arms in conditions of peace outer space, as is typical of the current leadership of the White House, has been glorifying the "Star Wars" program which, according to him, is aimed at "protecting democracy." In his speech the U.S. representative distorted the Soviet Union's stand at talks on problems of space and nuclear arms.

USSR Ambassador at Large Aleksey Obukhov said that the Soviet Union declares resolutely for concrete measures aimed at curbing the arms race and eliminating the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war. In this connection the USSR holds it is very important to rely on the positive things that have been achieved at the Reykjavik meeting and to carry the matters to a comprehensive solution of packages of questions of the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms till they are destroyed, elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, strengthening of the regime of the ABM treaty, banning nuclear weapon tests. These are precisely the aims of the proposals tabled by the Soviet side on November 7 of this year in Geneva on the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

Director of the Delhi Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis K. Subramaniam said that nuclear arms pose a huge threat also to developing countries and declared for strict observance of the threaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons which should be banned.

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ITALIAN CP DOCUMENT ON DISARMAMENT, DEFENSE, SECURITY

PM191312 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 16 Nov 86 p 10

[PCI Directorate document: "PCI Proposal for Security Policy in Italy and Europe"]

[Text] 1 — A country's security policy is its guarantee of free and independent development. It must now be conceived of and placed within the context of a balanced and controlled arms reduction process. Mankind's very survival is at stake, as it has been ever since the emergence of nuclear weapons and as vast nuclear arsenals have been amassed. The workers and socialist movement has always fought throughout its history for a world, a community of free peoples, without weapons and without wars. But we now find ourselves confronted with a vast arms race that has, after decades, reached the threshold of a qualitative technological and political leap forward beyond which any chance of control threatens to prove impossible. Introduced by both sides in the name of security, such developments have in fact made everyone less secure.

It has been stated most authoritatively that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." But it is necessary to proceed from this assertion to the real initiation of a disarmament process, since the major guarantee of security for all sides lies in such a process and in its balanced and controlled nature. The U.S.-USSR meeting in Reykjavik showed the specific possibility of far-reaching understandings on arms reduction, first and foremost in the nuclear field. At the same time it indicated the seriousness of the obstacle still to be overcome and the need for the broadest deployment of political, cultural, and ethical endeavors to surmount deep-seated rationales of conflict and mistrust and to establish new concepts in defense of the legitimate and inalienable requirements of security.

2 — An earnest debate on security matters has begun in the Western world and within NATO, both in Europe and in the United Nations. It is being conducted with a profound commitment by major political and ideological movements comprising the principal parties of the European Left, broad currents of secular and religion opinion, and wide-ranging pacifist movements in which we in Italy are extensively involved, observing their autonomy and pluralism. Aware of our responsibility, we intend this document to contribute ideas and proposals stemming from years of research and work.

- 3 It is our unshakable belief that the foundation of security for all countries lies first and foremost in the consolidation of peace, the weapons reduction to the lowest possible level, cooperation with other peoples, and the ability to tackle and resolve the structural problems of international relations in the modern world (the reduction of imbalances and cooperation between North and South, the development of the backward countries, and a new international economic order). We therefore consider the attainment of these objectives the basic aim of Italian foreign policy. It is with this attitude that we approach the specific major problems now facing the defense of a country such as ours. We are indeed convinced that a new and more balanced defense policy is an integral part of a policy of peace and gradual disarmament.
- 4 The development of nuclear weapons, which is increasingly accompanied by military doctrines envisaging their operational use, demands a radical change in the traditional criteria of security, hitherto based principally on the might of each side's armed forces. A new conception of security is indispensable. There are two particularly imperative principles:
- I The influence of political factors must become greater than that of purely military factors partly with a view to the quest for security.
- II There is now no possibility of unilateral security; the security of the world today can only be "shared, mutual, and interdependent, drawing together even sides that consider themselves antagonistic" (Berlinguer).
- 5 This implies certain specific conclusions:
- I The quest for military superiority by any side is unacceptable because it is illusory, damaging, and entails insecurity for all. What must be sought is a reasonable comprehensive balance of forces, which can be compatible even with imbalances in individual sectors.
- II The halt of the arms spiral and arms reduction are a fundamental and inalienable objective. Independent actions in this direction can be helpful to this end. But, consistently with the idea that real security cannot be achieved unilaterally, agreed

arms control remains the principal method. It must be given sharp priority in every country's foreign policy and must be regarded as an integral part of defense planning itself. In general terms accurate and convincing verification methods (including on site) are needed to facilitate effective and lasting arms control and reduction agreements. Such verifications, in line with the nature of the agreements, should be international in character, partly so as to increase confidence and cooperation between states in the military field too.

- 6— Historically post-war security in Europe has been organized through now consolidated blocs (alliances) except in the case of certain countries that have remained neutral. The negative effects of this option, which we have long opposed, are still apparent. The transcending of the division of Europe into opposing blocs has been, and remains, one of our fundamental objectives. We also know, however, that this can only be the result of a complex and far-reaching political process for which it is necessary to work patiently.
- 7 We have therefore been asserting for years that Italy's security policy is to be pursued within the NATO context. We have done so fully aware of the need strictly to observe the obligations entailed in membership of an alliance and resolutely determined to make a serious contribution to the discussion of the Atlantic alliance's unresolved problems of political approach and strategy. Observance of these commitments can in no way entail predetermined adherence to whatever political or strategic approaches may be dictated, perhaps temporarily, by the alliance's major power, the United States.
- 8 We regard NATO as a defensive and geographically confined alliance among equal and sovereign states. When we spoke out in favor of Italy's continued alliance membership, the alliance had summarized its approach in the 1967 Harmel Report simultaneous implementation of a policy of defense and a policy of detente. This approach must remain valid. Italy must fight within the NATO context too - together with the other European and American forces seeking the same ends --- for a policy of arms reduction, understandings, and broader international cooperation. It is also necessary to observe the following conditions which, though in response to the Atlantic alliance's founding principles, have too often been neglected by Italian governments: 1) The alliance's decisions must take account of the security interests of all member states; 2) no decision can be binding on any state without its explicit consent; 3) it is necessary to reject military theories, operational organizations, and weapons systems that could be regarded as threatening insofar as they could potentially be used for surprise attacks; and 4) there must be no direct or indirect extension of NATO's area of action. in violation of the principles and criteria enshrined in the alliance's own resolutions.
- 9 The most pressing problem is that of nuclear weapons. Our ultimate objective is their total elimination. We know that the attainment of this goal entails the thorough analysis and partial solution of manifold complex military and political issues. This process, which must be conducted with the necessary determination, can therefore only be gradual and must result in a multilat-

eral accord embodying a credible pledge by all the countries of the world, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons. The first problem is how to create the necessary conditions for this purpose, establishing the various short- and medium-term objectives. Within this framework it will be necessary first and foremost to agree on the basic stages in substantial nuclear arms reduction by both major powers.

- 10 Creating the conditions for gradual nuclear disarmament also entails a profound reappraisal of military strategies. Strategic rivalry has been partly nurtured by doctrines envisaging an increasingly extensive role for nuclear weapons. In this connection it must be stressed that it is necessary to reject, on account of their dangerous nature, every conception that regards nuclear weapons as actually usable in wartime or as tools of political intimidation. Their role must be confined to the exclusive task of deterring a nuclear attack by another side. Consequently the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals which are utterly excessive in this regard must and can be simultaneously and drastically reduced in accordance with criteria of absolute necessity for the purposes of this role as an ultimate deterrent.
- 11 A number of other considerations apply to Europe. Any hypothesis of a limited nuclear conflict is not only aberrant for us Europeans, because our territory would be destroyed, but senseless, because the chances of containing and controlling a nuclear war are virtually nonexistent. The strategies for the use and massive deployment in Europe of nuclear weapons - especially the fixed weapons (mines) or very short-range ("battlefield") weapons that would be used in the very first stages of a future war - point toward such hypotheses and exacerbate the vulnerability and insecurity of our continent's nations. A strengthening of European security requires first and foremost a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons (the raising of the "nuclear threshold" in the event of a conflict). This can be achieved quickly by various kinds of measures listed below (point 13). Thus the preconditions will be established for attaining the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons deployed by both the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe — a goal that can be achieved much sooner than total nuclear disarmament.
- 12 The main path to be pursued to reduce tensions between the blocs and the dangers connected with nuclear weapons is that of negotiations among all the sides involved. The most important negotiations at present are those between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. As far as their offensive strategic weapons are concerned, we hope for the conclusion of increasingly effective accords envisaging major quantitative reductions (first by 50 percent and subsequently even more) and clear-cut qualitative limitations. The medium-range nuclear missiles (SS-20's, Pershing-2's, and cruise missiles) deployed in Europe must be entirely eliminated (the "zero option"), thus resolving the problem of the withdrawal of cruise missiles from Comiso. Similarly it will be necessary to discuss (in Geneva or in another negotiation forum) problems relating to the gradual balanced reduction (through their elimination) of all the shortrange nuclear missiles (with a range of 200-1,000 km) deployed by the United States and Soviet Union in Central Europe. Europe has a vital interest in a positive outcome to these negotiations which, as far as medium-range missiles are concerned, could be concluded sooner than and independently of the solution of the

other topics being negotiated in Geneva. The European countried must be able to assert their own legitimate security interests in these negotiations. It is also up to them to put forth proposals and adopt modes of conduct that will make the attainment of such objectives possible.

- 13 To achieve conditions of more stable security we believe it is desirable and possible to adopt in the relatively near future a number of measures related to nuclear weapons that will bring a lull in the arms race and become part of a broad and gradual disarmament process. Some of these measures concern the two major powers first and foremost. Others, however, directly concern Europe: They therefore require a special commitment from Europe. We propose as follows:
- The controlled freezing of the testing and deployment, and subsequently production, of U.S. and USSR nuclear weapons systems. It would be desirable for the other states equipped with nuclear weapons (Britain, France, and China) to suspend their own plans for stepping up their nuclear arsenals.
- The conclusion, within the context of the Geneva disarmament conference, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests, including those underground. An immediate moratorium on testing is extremely important, partly with a view to facilitating this accord.
- The observance and strengthening of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in view of the great danger entailed in the spread of such weapons.
- Negotiations for the creation of a 300 km wide nuclear weapons-free zone (150 km on each side) in central Europe, to which Italy can add part of its territory in the Northeast in exchange for offsets by the Warsaw Pact, and backing for other plans for nuclear weapons-free zones (among which those in the Balkans and Northern Europe may be considered first, since they can be achieved more quickly).
- The reduction and then complete elimination from Europe of tactical nuclear weapons and first and foremost of very short-range "battlefield" weapons, partly by means of independent moves by both alliances.
- The quest for strategic, organizational, and negotiating conditions for attaining a bilateral renunciation agreed by both sides of the first use of nuclear weapons.
- 14 The Geneva negotiations also embrace space weapons and strategic defense systems. An accord on these issues too is crucial. In any case the development, production, and deployment by both sides of new strategic defense systems based both in space and on earth would have very negative effects on the structure of the nuclear balance and on threats as perceived by both sides, would stimulate the strengthening of offensive weapons, would violate the ABM Treaty, and would more generally make all arms control processes more difficult. It must also be remembered that a global strategic defense is in fact entirely illusory, in the opinion of the vast majority of scientists. These considerations also suggest that the arguments and objectives put forth in support of the SDI ("Star Wars") program sponsored by the Reagan admin-

istration lack credibility and are unacceptable: We therefore sharply oppose the project. Consequently, while taking account of the impossibility of verifiably halting basic research conducted in the United States and the Soviet Union, we believe it is absolutely essential to have an accord on the relinquishment of the development of all possible new strategic defense systems (whether or not they are based in space).

To this end both the letter and the spirit of the ABM Treaty must be strictly observed; and it must also be strengthened and brought into line with the latest technological developments.

- 15 From the European viewpoint too any antimissile defense projects on either side must be rejected. In the event of our continent's being excluded from such defense systems, the major powers' quest, albeit illusory, for invulnerability would tend to create feelings of greater insecurity and dependence in Europe and could nurture rash theories of limited warfare. But even if West European territory were to be covered by the American antimissile defense network or if similar endeavors were to be developed independently by European NATO membercountries, all the negative assessments already expressed in connection with strategic defense would still apply. In particular Europe would risk becoming the theater for a new and bitter rivalry between defensive and offensive systems. As far as European scientific and technological research is concerned, a stimulus is not to be sought in military programs of this kind. The French-sponsored "Eureka" project could perform a useful alternative role, as long as it becomes properly comprehensive, acquires a real European dimension, serves peaceful ends, and is not covered by specific systems of secrecy.
- 16 Apart from any new strategic defense systems based in space, other military activities in space could have serious destabilizing effects. We have in mind antisatellite weapons in particular. Military artificial satellites perform various kinds of roles, including the very useful ones of mutual control and verification of arms accords. Therefore, they must be not only maintained but also protected and strengthened. In this connection it would be possible to add a system of European satellites that would extend and internationalize the forms of control and verification. In any case it is essential that a treaty be concluded as soon as possible to ban all antisatellite activities and weapons (ASAT). More generally there must be a ban on all equipment with destructive military capabilities that can be used in and from space.
- 17 Chemical weapons constitute another important aspect. The Geneva Convention banning their use currently applies. Partly in the light of the latest worrying developments (the Reagan administration's decision to produce binary chemical weapons), it is essential that a multilateral treaty banning even the development, production, and possession of any kind of chemical weapon be concluded at last within the framework of the Geneva disarmament conference. Pending such a treaty it would be helpful for a broad zone free of such weapons to be established in Europe.
- 18 The gradual reduction of the role of nuclear weapons increases the importance of the role of conventional weapons. It is therefore necessary to guarantee the balance of the two alliances' conventional forces in Europe. This balance must be

viewed comprehensively on the basis of reasonable considerations taking account both of strictly military factors, in which not only quantitative but also qualitative factors are important, and of political, economic, geographical, and other factors significantly influencing both sides' offensive and defensive capability. This means that the objective must not be an obsessive quest for perfect numerical parity between the two alliances in every kind of weapon but measures able to guarantee situations structurally balanced from the military viewpoint, that is, which will in no way facilitate aggressive pressures.

19 — There must be a resolute determination to ensure defense against any kind of attack. But there must be an equally resolute determination to avoid actions, arrangements, strategies, and alignments that could appear threatening to the other side. Within this context priority must be given to the restructuring - not the expansion - of NATO's conventional forces, so as to reduce the threats and, as far as possible, the burden of spending. The restructuring, which should be directed toward a "nonthreatening defense," must be carried out simultaneously with effective measures to gradually reduce the nuclear component, such as those listed above. It is necessary to reject any tendency to pursue not understandings with the Warsaw Pact for balances as the lowest possible level but plans to strengthen NATO's conventional capability that would ultimately produce another stage in the race for sophisticated offensive weapons and, at worst, could even supplement the deployment of new chemical and nuclear weapons.

20 — With regard to conventional weapons too, the principle that must apply is that it must be sought through opportune accords at the lowest possible level. We believe that this is consistent with the objective of best protecting our continent from conventional conflicts too, which would themselves be very destructive and which, under present conditions, could in any case degenerate into nuclear conflicts.

21 — The two permanent negotiations on security in Europe can be used to the utmost and can perform an essential role to this end. The negotiations being conducted within the context of the CSCE conference produced a very significant result with the recent Stockholm accord signed by 35 countries, reaffirming nonuse of force and extending the existing confidence-building measures through the obligatory notification of military activities and the opportunity for on site verification. It is an accord that we have always advocated and we believe that in the future it will be necessary to proceed further in the direction of military confidence-building measures based on the utmost mutual information. The other negotiation forum is Vienna, where the topic being broached is the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe. A new boost must be imparted to these negotiations and the objective pursued must be a reduction not only of troops but also of individual weapons and weapons systems, especially those considered offensive. Accords on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons could also be discussed within the context of the Vienna negotiations.

22 — West European security is organized within the Atlantic alliance. For a number of historical reasons the United States has had a predominant role within this alliance. This situation must be changed, partly because Western Europe's security interests do not automatically coincide with those of our American ally,

just as their policies with respect to other parts of the world may differ. It is necessary to ensure that in the future Western Europe participates in the alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic under conditions of absolute parity. It is therefore necessary to reappraise — partly for the sake of the alliance's efficient functioning — the present configuration of its structures and relations between its member countries, in the light of all the problems that have recently emerged.

23 — Western Europe must therefore seek, and equip itself to exert, a much greater influence in defining the orientations and strategies of the Atlantic alliance and in the current debate on such points within the alliance, especially in view of the doctrines and options represented by the Reagan administration. In this new context it is also desirable that Western Europe shoulder greater responsibilities for its own defense in the conventional field. Western Europe must also perform a greater role in all arms control negotiations that concern it and participate actively in the implementation of any future accords. In these contexts it is necessary to work within the alliance for a qualitative leap forward in European cooperation, and it is possible to talk in terms of a European "pivot" or "pole." Even in the future it is necessary to prevent the creation of a military "third bloc" especially one equipped with independent nuclear weapons, since not only would it be politically inconsistent with the aim of eliminating the blocs but it would also considerably alter the various perceptions of security and further stimulate processes of general rearmament. It must be stressed that all these prospects of change in relations among the allies depend considerably on greater Western European political unity, as envisaged by the draft treaty approved by the European Parliament.

24 — In all the available forums (the WEU, the Eurogroup, the European Independent Planning Group, the EEC institutions, and the Atlantic assembly) it is necessary to pursue, now and in the future, greater cooperation among the West European states embracing not only political options designed to avert a war and repercussions in Europe of conflicts in other parts of the world but also the defense sector, especially with regard to weapons standardization, industrial and scientific cooperation, the adoption of common rules and controls on weapons sales to third countries, and the examination of possible forms of industrial conversion in line with agreed arms reductions.

25 — Italy is a European and Mediterranean country. Its security must therefore be guaranteed in both these sectors. Any threat to our territory and its integrity, from whatever source, must be resolutely opposed and repelled. The Mediterranean is a vital communication route for us, as it is for all the countries of the area and for world traffic as a whole. In the Mediterranean too the best guarantees of security depend on its transformation into an area of peace and cooperation, free of nuclear weapons and with as few conventional weapons as possible. We are convinced, however, that this objective too can only be the result of a wide-ranging political process for which it is necessary to work steadfastly and gradually.

26 — One characteristic of the security issue in the Mediterranean area is that is is only slightly connected with the East-West dispute and much more so with relations with and among the nonaligned countries. Here, more than elsewhere, political factors, the peoples' economic interdependence and selfdetermination, observance of their sovereignty, and aid for their development have already had to some extent — and above all can and must have — a predominant influence compared to military factors. A serious threat to our security will persist until the Middle East conflict has been resolved — nor is such a solution conceivable without the precise recognition of the Palestinian people's rights to self-determination, a homeland, and a state and of Israel's right to its existence and security. For the very sake of its own security, Italy is therefore obliged to actively promote a just settlement of the Middle East problems and to seek a similar endeavor on the part of the entire EC.

- Recent events have shown that serious threats to our nation can originate precisely within the Mediterranean area, as a result of initiatives beyond our control that can even be taken unbeknownst to us by an allied country such as the United States. Such threats demand a particularly committed response from us. In this region the principle of not extending NATO's geographical area, either directly or indirectly, must apply in the strictest manner to prevent our country from becoming automatically involved in conflicts alien to its own interests. It is also necessary to prevent military actions directly or indirectly involving our territory from being undertaken by our allies without the Italian Government's approval. There must be precise and publicly verifiable guarantees against the use of military bases and units (including the American 6th Fleet) hosted on our territory for purposes alien to the specific defensive aims of NATO and for actions in areas beyond NATO's geographical confines.

28 — All the accords signed by the Italian Government on the status of allied military bases in Italy must be immediately communicated to Parliament, which must be exhaustively briefed and put in a position to judge whether or not they need to be revised to fully assert the rights of supervision and guarantees of national sovereignty which, even within the context of integration within the alliance, constitute a foundation of relations within the alliance. More generally we believe that international politicomilitary treaties, even if only executive in nature, must be submitted to a parliamentary vote and that the possibility of a consultative referendum must be envisaged. This is the substance of the proposed revision of Article 80 of the constitution submitted by Communist parliamentarians.

29 — We consider it necessary and possible right now to adopt a number of measures, albeit incomplete, to promote detente in the Mediterranean and strengthen security in the area. It is necessary, first and foremost, to prevent any expansion of the two alliance's nuclear forces; furthermore, any spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, especially in the Middle East, must be energetically opposed because it would be extremely dangerous. Support must be given to the plan for a nuclear weaponsfree area in the Balkans: This could initiate a process leading to a general gradual nuclear arms reduction in the Mediterranean. Last, it is necessary to plan and implement - especially in the air and naval field — mutual confidence-building measures for this sea and its surrounding area similar to those envisaged for Europe as a whole: These measures could be drawn up within the context of the CSCE conference, preferably by a working group created for this specific purpose.

30 — Security in the Mediterranean is a prime necessity for the whole of Europe. The European NATO countries must therefore perform a decisive role in defining the alliance's defense guidelines in this area. We also propose the examination and implementation of specific forms of consultation and cooperation between the countries directly adjoining the Mediterranean, from which Europe as a whole is entitled to expect a particular contribution in the form of proposals and suggestions.

31 — The fight against terrorism is an integral part of the conception of interstate security. However, it cannot be waged successfully unless work is done to eliminate the fundamental political causes behind the phenomenon. We unconditionally condemn, irrespective of the reasons cited, the use of terrorist methods claiming innocent victims attacked indiscriminately or on account of their membership of ethnic or religious communities. Such acts are intolerable on the basis of ethical and political principles and damaging to the very causes that they are supposed to serve. We consider any state support for groups using such methods incompatible with the fundamental rules of international coexistence and as such to be combated in the appropriate forums. For the sake of the same principles we reject all forms of indiscriminate blackmail, whether exercised by governments or by individual organizations, which merely nurture an uncontrollable spiral of violence and crime. Defense against terrorism is a right for every people and adequate means are needed for this purpose. This defense will be all the more effective the closer the international cooperation that can be achieved within the most varied contexts - between European states, between countries of East and West, within the United Nations, and in general between all governments that intend to work together to defeat such phenomena.

32 — According to the principles of peace and of the Constitution, the Italian Armed Forces must have a structure suited to their strictly defensive tasks in protecting the country's integrity and independence and within the Atlantic alliance context. Military spending must be strictly adjusted to such tasks. To guarantee the Italian Armed Forces the necessary degree of efficiency it is now necessary to promote not their expansion or transformation - contrary to constitutional intentions - into a career army, but a restructuring based on inter-service coordination and planning. This entails the necessary adjustment of the territorial balance of the national defense system; an improved balance among the land, sea, and air forces; and closer links between logistical structures, territorial units, and combat units. For the sake of greater efficiency it is also necessary to pursue European cooperation in weapons production and acquisition, the elimination of wastage and unproductive spending, the reduction of administrative machinery and organization in favor of operational and logistical structures, the updating of training resources, the modernization of barracks, and the strengthening of civil defense.

33 — The constitutional principle that requires the Armed Forces to conform to the democratic spirit of the Republic must be fully implemented. To this end it is necessary to update, under effective parliamentary supervision, the decisionmaking processes affecting the Armed Forces' internal disposition, organization, use and personnel recruitment. Career soldiers and draftees must be protected against any kind of political discrimination. It is necessary fully to implement the new disciplinary regulations, according to which military personnel's constitutional rights must be guaranteed, discipline must be not authoritarian but

enlightened, and rank must be reflected in different tasks without infringing the principle of equal status of members of the Armed Forces. The professional standards of members of the Armed Forces must be held in due regard. The constitutional principle whereby all citizens share the duty to guarantee the country's defense must be safeguarded, to which end the necessary integration between the Armed Forces and civilian community must be ensured. Therefore the reform of the draft, with particular reference to soldiers' training, the protection of their security, their reintegration into working life, and their pay, must be carried out in conjunction with the prompt introduction of voluntary civilian service for men and women. Within the context of this service - rendered more efficient for tasks of civil protection and international cooperation — it is necessary to provide for improved disciplinary measures for conscientious objectors and to respond positively to the demand for a better civilian employment of objectors.

34 — Our defense industry should be in strict proportion to Italy's needs, while leaving scope within the European context for broader forms of cooperation, integration, and division of labor, facilitating the conversion of superfluous sectors to civilian purposes. Emphasis is placed on the need for strict rules governing weapons exports and banning them in certain well defined cases (countries at war, countries subject to UN embargoes, and so forth). In general the reissue of export licenses should be subject to political criteria takling account primarily of the problems of security in the areas to which the weapons would be sent. To this end it is necessary fully to assert Parliament's guiding and supervisory role.

/9274 CSO: 5200/2453

UN COMMITTEE ADOPTS PRC DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION

OW121204 Beijing XINHUA in English 1154 GMT 12 Nov 86

[Text] United Nations, November 11 (XINHUA) -- The First Committee of the General Assembly adopted unanimously this afternoon a draft resolution submitted by China, calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to take the lead in nuclear disarmament.

The draft, first ever by the Chinese delegation on disarmament issues, urges the two superpowers, which posses the most important nuclear arsenals, "to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreements on the drastic reduction of their nuclear weapons."

The draft, which became a formal resolution of the committee after the adoption, reiterates that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.

Before the committee took the decision at the afternoon session, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Fang Gouxiang stated that China, in submitting the draft resolution, is solely aimed at facilitating the negotiations between the two major nuclear powers for an early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

He said that when the two superpowers have drastically reduced their nuclear weapons, other nuclear-weapon states should participate in the process, thus creating conditions for the eventual complete elimination of all nuclear weapons on earth.

He reiterated that China, as a nuclear power, will not shirk its responsibilities in this regard, and that it will, as it has always stated, make its own contributions in opposing the nuclear arms race and for the final complete destruction of all nuclear armaments.

The resolution, along with other disarmament-related resolutions adopted by the committee, will be submitted to the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly for approval as a document of the assembly.

CSO: 5200/4018

UN BODY ADOPTS PRC CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESOLUTION

OW141222 Beijing XINHUA in English 1049 GMT 14 Nov 86

[Text] United Nations, November 13 (XINHUA)—A draft resolution on conventional disarmament, the first ever submitted by China on conventional weapons cuts, was adopted this afternoon by the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Without mentioning names, the draft called on the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact to reach an early agreement on conventional disarmament.

The General Assembly, it said, "urges the countries with the largest military arsenals, ... (and) the two major military alliances, to continue negotiations on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control..."

The draft respected the needs of national security in encouraging all states to take appropriate steps, either alone or with neighbours, to promote conventional disarmament.

A total of 125 countries including the United States and the Soviet Union voted for the draft while India and Iraq abstained.

Prior to the vote, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Fang Gouxiang said while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, China felt conventional arms reduction should also be part of a move to complete disarmament.

Two days ago, China's first draft resolution on nuclear disarmament was unanimously adopted by the same committee, which deals with political and security affairs.

The two draft resolutions sponsored by China will be submitted to the Plenary Session of the U.N. General Assembly for approval as documents of the assembly, which is almost invariably the case.

/8309

cso: 5200/4020

BRIEFS

U.S. OPPOSES UN DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS -- New York, 11 Nov--On the socialist countries' initiative, the UN General Assembly First Committee has voted by an overwhelming majority to adopt a draft resolution on the banning of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It points to the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on banning the development, production, and stockpiling of all kinds of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The First Committee urged all states to refrain from producing new types of chemical weapons and from deploying them on other countries' territory. Twelve NATO countries, headed by the United States, voted against this draft. At the proposal of a large group of socialist and nonaligned states, a draft resolution was adopted on banning the development and production of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of those weapons. It stresses the importance of preventing the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to mankind's interests. Only the United States voted against this document. The U.S. delegation was also in complete isolation in voting against the draft aimed at limiting naval arms and at disarmament in this sphere. Only Israel and France joined the United States in saying "no" to the document adopted on banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons. [TASS report: "On the Fraternal States' Initiative"] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 86 First Edition p 1 PM] /8918

CSO: 5200/1091